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Abstract 
The United States Army activated the Aeronautical Division, United States Signal Corps, 
on August 1, 1907.  The men of the Aeronautical Division faced hardships and challenges from 
the very beginning as they tried to build the nation’s first air force prior to World War I.  The 
U.S. Army, the War Department, Congress, and even the American people, really did not know 
what aircraft could do beyond simple flight.  American airmen tried to demonstrate what air 
power was capable of, but the response to their achievements never met their expectations.  
Using an abundance of primary and secondary sources on American air power, this 
dissertation demonstrates that airmen’s struggle for a separate service was not something that 
developed slowly over the course of decades.  Instead, this dissertation shows that airmen wanted 
independence from the U.S. Army from the start.  From their point of view, the U.S. Army, the 
War Department, and Congress never really appreciated or understood air power. As a result, 
airmen became more and more alienated with each passing year until they achieve want they 
wanted—independence. 
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Dedication 
To all those brave enough to challenge the status quo 
1 
 
Preface 
Many historians have attempted to explain why it took over forty years for the United 
States military to establish the United States Air Force on September 18, 1947.  Some postulate 
that American airpower was simply too weak to develop into a separate service prior to the end 
of World War II.  Others argue that airmen were too focused on arguments over the internal 
structure of their service to devote their energies toward gaining independence.  However, the 
truth of the matter is that airmen wanted to gain centralized control over airpower from nearly 
the beginning.   
On August 1, 1907, the United States Army activated the Aeronautical Division, United 
States Signal Corps.1  The men of Aeronautical Division quickly discovered that their colleagues 
in the U.S. Army, as well as their superiors in both the Army and the War Department, did not 
quite know what to make of aviation.2   Worse still the U.S. Army didn’t have enough money to 
buy an aircraft for the men in the Aeronautical Division to fly until Theodore Roosevelt, the 
President of the United States, interceded on their behalf in 1908.  One year later, on August 2, 
1909, the Wright brothers delivered the Aeronautical Division’s first aircraft, named Signal 
Corps No. 1.3 
The fact that it took two years for the Army to procure an aircraft for the Aeronautical 
Division was important because it made airmen feel as though their superiors did not care.  In the 
                                                 
1 On that date, there were three men assigned to the Aeronautical Division: Captain Charles deforest Chandler, 
Corporal Edward War, and Private First Class Joseph E. Barrett. Juliette Hennessy, The United States Army Air 
Arm, April 1861 to April 1917 (USAF Historical Study No. 98, 1958), pp. 26-27. 
 
2 Brothers Orville and Wilbur Wright made their first successful powered flight on December 17, 1903.  Orville flew 
a total of 120 feet became coming to a stop. Fred C. Kelly, ed. Miracle at Kitty Hawk, The Letters of Wilbur & 
Orville Wright (New York: Da Capo Press, 2002), pp. 112-113. 
 
3 Meghan Cunningham, ed. The Logbook of Signal Corps No. 1: The U.S. Army’s First Airplane (Washington, D.C.: 
Air Force History and Museums Program, 2004), pp. 3-7. 
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Army’s defense, the service did not drag its feet when it came to purchasing the aircraft.  The 
delay was the result of the convoluted contracting process.  However, the airmen did not see 
things that way.  They were frustrated that they could fly.  They were angered that the Army did 
not seem to be as enthusiastic as they were about aviation.  Thus, they developed an adversarial 
attitude that shaped future interactions between airmen and their non-flying superiors in the U.S. 
Army.  
The difficulties that aviators faced continued as they tried to build the U.S.’s first air 
force.  In addition to their superiors in the U.S Army, the airmen had to contend with members of 
the U.S. Congress who did not understand aviation in the least.  Reflecting on the early days of 
the Aeronautical Division, Major General Benjamin Foulois recalled that the chasm between 
airmen and their superiors in Congress was huge. Foulois recalled that Joseph “Uncle Joe” 
Cannon, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, was highly skeptical of aviation.  While 
attending a demonstration at Fort Myer, Virginia, Cannon stated: “You can’t convince me that 
that thing will fly.”  After the pilots took off, Cannon stated: “Well, it’s flying, but you can’t 
make me believe it will stay up!”4 
United States Army leaders and members of Congress were not the only ones skeptical 
that aviation would ever amount to anything.  Foulois, who joined the U.S. Signal Corps shortly 
after being promoted to first lieutenant in May 1907, explained that many of his classmates at the 
Signal Corps School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, did not have much appreciation for aviation.  
He stated that his classmates and his instructor thought that he was “some kind of a nut” because 
he argued that “if it [the airplane] continues to progress toward perfection as rapidly in the next 
                                                 
4 Benjamin D. Foulois and C.V. Glines, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1968), p. 1. 
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year or two as it has in the past two years, we will see aerial navigation reduced to a very simple 
problem, and tacticians will have to revise their books on tactics.”5 
Skepticism like that exhibited by Cannon and Foulois’ fellow students was common and 
it helped shape the culture that American airmen had begun to develop.  Hardened by the harsh 
reality that their military and civilian superiors often viewed aviation as a novelty with limited 
military potential, airmen began to trust only those who had done what they had done—take the 
controls of a machine made of wire, wood, and canvas in their hands and pilot it into the air.  
Most importantly, they came to believe that they needed to gain centralized control over their 
own service because only they could properly employ airpower. 
American airmen’s push to gain control over airpower gained greater momentum after 
they read sports coming from Europe that discussed the progress of aviation in France, Great 
Britain, and Germany.  According to many of those reports, European nations had surpassed the 
U.S. in aviation.6  American airmen believed it was caused by a lack of concern among their 
leaders in the U.S. military and the U.S. Congress.  Their feeling of alienation was fueled by the 
fact that the War Department provided the Aeronautical Division with minimal manpower and 
small, sometimes nonexistent, budgets.7  To compensate for the lack of support that they 
perceived, the men of the Aeronautical Division focused on improving their flying skills and 
showing non-flyers what aircraft could do.   
                                                 
5 Foulois and Glines, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts, p. 43. 
6 Buckley, John. Air Power in the Age of Total War (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), 
pp. 30-34. 
 
7 Foulois and Glines, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts, p. 78. 
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The most important impact of the lack of understanding and support from non-aviators in 
the U.S. military and Congress was evident in the mindset that developed among American 
airmen.  Long before outspoken airpower advocate William “Billy” Mitchell entered the scene, 
American airmen came to see their struggle as an “us versus them” battle between themselves 
and the non-flying officials who just didn’t “get it.” That mindset, fostered in frustration and 
disappointment, took root quickly and deeply.  In fact, it became so ingrained in the psyche of 
American airmen that it shaped all interactions between airmen and their superiors.   
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The Historiography of Early American Air Power 
Historians who have written about the beginnings and early development of United States 
military aviation have focused on many aspects of the men, machines, and events that shaped 
American air power.  Some have focused on the daring pilots who broke new ground with each 
flight.  Others have focused on the growth of the Aeronautical Division, United States Signal 
Corps, and its evolution over the decades that followed.  Still others have detailed airmen’s view 
on their service and its relationship with the rest of the U.S. military, especially the United States 
Army.  All their works are important contributions to the history of American military air power. 
However, few historians have addressed the fact that American airmen’s effort to separate from 
the U.S. Army began shortly after the U.S. Army activated the Aeronautical Division on August 
1, 1907. 
Following World War I, the relatively young U.S. Air Service faced a number of 
challenges.  First and foremost, the Air Service sought to educate future airmen, non-flying 
officers, the U.S. government, and the American public about airpower and its role in future 
conflicts.  The most significant proponents of airpower in the interwar period were William 
“Billy” Mitchell and the men who studied and taught at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS).  
Mitchell, a single individual, established himself as the most vocal and, therefore, most 
recognized proponent of airpower during the 1920s.   Conversely, the ACTS was a group of 
individuals, each with different ideas and concepts regarding airpower that had an equally 
significant impact of U.S. airpower.  
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William “Billy” Mitchell 
 William “Billy” Mitchell is perhaps the most well-known and most controversial 
American airpower theorist.  As a result, a great many works have been written that focus on 
various aspects of Mitchell’s military career.  While Mitchell’s exploits in France during World 
War I and the early 1920s have received more than passing attention in a number of works, the 
bulk of scholarship concerning Mitchell focuses on his well-publicized 1925 court-martial.  
 Given the level of his celebrity, significant works on Mitchell began to appear 
shortly after his death in 1936.  These early works paint the portrait of a man far ahead of his 
time and misunderstood by those unable to grasp the level of Mitchell’s foresight.  Some of the 
earliest works that include this interpretation of Mitchell’s importance to American airpower are 
Emile Gauvreau and Lester Cohen’s Billy Mitchell: Founder of Our Air Force and Prophet 
without Honor (1942), Ruth Mitchell’s My Brother Bill: The Life of General “Billy” Mitchell 
(1953), Roger Burlingame’s General Billy Mitchell: Champion of Air Defense (1952), and Isaac 
Don Levine’s Mitchell, Pioneer of Air Power (1958).  Overall, these works offer very little 
analysis of Mitchell’s theories and his contributions to American airpower doctrine.  However, 
the works do provide insight into Mitchell’s pre-World War I career, especially his time in the 
U.S. Army Signal Corps from the Spanish-American War until the end of his assignment with 
the Army General Staff in 1916.  Ruth Mitchell’s My Brother Bill is particularly helpful as she 
included her brother’s previously unpublished writings that covered the early years of his career 
in the Philippines, Cuba, and Alaska.   
More recent works that further the theme of Mitchell’s prescience are H. Paul Jeffers’s I 
Told You So: Right and Wrong Predictions in American History and the People Who Made Them 
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(2006) and Douglas Waller’s A Question of Loyalty: Gen. Billy Mitchell and the Court-Martial 
that Gripped the Nation (2004).  Relying heavily on the transcripts from Mitchell’s court-martial 
and the Army’s Inspector General (IG) files on Mitchell, Waller argues that things were going in 
Mitchell’s favor until he took the stand and alienated many in the courtroom with a performance 
that demonstrated that he lacked a great deal of knowledge concerning naval aviation.  Overall, 
however, Waller contends that Mitchell was correct in his assessments of the potential of 
airpower. 
The initial lack of scholarly analysis of Mitchell’s theories and contributions to doctrine 
did not last long.  Beginning in the late 1960s, several scholars began to focus on Mitchell’s 
significance as an airpower thinker and move beyond simple biographies of his life.  These 
works agree that Mitchell was ahead of his time, but they tend to disagree as to the extent to 
which Mitchell’s ideas where adopted.  Works that include this interpretation are Burke Davis’s 
The Billy Mitchell Affair (1967), Alfred F. Hurley’s Billy Mitchell: Crusader for Air Power 
(1975), and James J. Cooke’s Billy Mitchell (2002).  In The Billy Mitchell Affair, Burke Davis 
argues that Mitchell’s Army and Navy contemporaries were too conservative and thus, were not 
willing to accept many of his groundbreaking ideas and concepts.  Similarly, Alfred F. Hurley’s 
Billy Mitchell: Crusader for Air Power (1975) covers many of the same themes, including the 
conservatism of military officers in the interwar period.  Hurley’s work remains the most-
thorough and all-encompassing account yet written of Mitchell’s life.  Hurley’s primary focus is 
on Mitchell’s role as a U.S. Air Service leader and as a shaper of airpower doctrine in the 
interwar years.  Overall, Hurley agrees with earlier assessments of Mitchell that contend that 
Mitchell was ahead of his time with regard to his theories on how warfare would be conducted in 
the future.  While he does agree with Davis that Mitchell faced a conservative officer corps, 
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Hurley argues that Mitchell’s often-strident personality and the aggressive style of his official 
presentations often led potential supporters to be much more cautious in supporting Mitchell’s 
airpower concepts than they otherwise might have been.  
Other scholars argue that Mitchell’s ideas concerning the use of airpower had a 
tremendous impact on other airpower advocates in the U.S.  Works that contain this 
interpretation include Mark A. Clodfelter’s “Molding Airpower Convictions: Development and 
Legacy of William Mitchell’s Strategic Thought” (1997), Robert F. Futrell’s Ideas, Conepts, 
Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force (1989), and Barry D. Watts’s The 
Foundations of US Air Doctrine: The Problem of Friction in War (1984).   Both Clodfelter and 
Futrell maintain that Mitchell’s writings and speeches influenced nearly every important 
airpower thinker and advocate prior to World War II.  Furthermore, these authors maintain that 
the U.S. Air Service’s first school, the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS), based it core 
curriculum on the ideas and concepts discussed in Mitchell’s Winged Defense (1925). 
Other works of importance concerning Mitchell are William B. Mitchell’s Memoirs of 
World War I: From Start to Finish of our Greatest War (1960) and Winged Defense (1925). 
Mitchell’s work is essentially a compilation of his diary entries that appeared in Liberty 
magazine throughout 1928.  Although limited in scope, Mitchell’s autobiography offers 
important insight into his personality.  However, caution must be taken when reading Mitchell’s 
work because he initially published his diary entries nearly a decade after the end of World War 
I.  Consequently, Mitchell often mixes his post-war arguments regarding the supremacy of 
airpower with his earlier the views that he held during the war.  
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The Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) 
One interpretation maintains that the ACTS served as a focal point around which the 
airpower minds of the interwar years centered their activity.  More importantly, this view 
contends that the ACTS created, refined, and championed airpower doctrine prior to World War 
II thus establishing the doctrine the U.S. Army Air Force used throughout most of the conflict.  
Works that include this interpretation are Robert T. Finney’s History of the Air Corps Tactical 
School, 1920-1940 (1955), Peter R. Faber’s “Interwar US Army Aviation and the Air Corps 
Tactical School: Incubators of American Airpower” (1997), John F. Shiner’s Foulois and the 
U.S. Army Air Corps, 1931-1935 (1984), and Benjamin Foulois and C.V. Cline’s From the 
Wright Brothers to the Astronauts: The Memoirs of Benjamin D. Foulois (1968).  In History of 
the Air Corps Tactical School, Finney argues that the ACTS provided the structure the U.S. Air 
Service needed to properly educate air officers on both the lessons of World War I and the rapid 
advancements in airpower technology that occurred throughout the interwar period.  In addition, 
Finney contends that the ACTS also helped equip U.S. air officers with the knowledge of a wide 
variety of skills related to airpower including: “command and staff function, intelligence, 
logistics, the tactics and techniques of the various classes of aviation, theories of the employment 
of the air force, and the tactics, techniques and doctrines of the other services.”   Similarly, in 
“Interwar US Army Aviation and the Air Corps Tactical School,” Peter R. Faber contends that 
the work done at the ACTS during the two decades before World War II culminated in the 
creation of the Air War Plans Division staffed by former ACTS students and instructors 
including future U.S.A.A.F. generals Haywood Hansell and Laurence Kuter among others.  
Furthermore, Faber maintains that AWPD-1, which was the “blueprint for strategic air warfare in 
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Europe,” was the culmination of the ACTS’s work during the interwar period and laid the 
foundation for the creation of an independent U.S. Air Force following World War II.  
Another interpretation argues that Billy Mitchell’s writings and experiments with 
airpower in the early 1920s provided the superstructure upon which the ACTS was built.  This 
view is found in Mark A. Clodfelter’s “Molding Airpower Convictions: Development and 
Legacy of William Mitchell’s Strategic Thought” (1997), Robert F. Futrell’s Ideas, Conepts, 
Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force (1989), and Barry D. Watts’s The 
Foundations of US Air Doctrine: The Problem of Friction in War (1984).   Clodfelter contends 
that Mitchell’s ardent support of airpower alienated many officers in the Army and Navy.  
However, Clodfelter argues that Mitchell’s “notions” were accepted by most Air Service officers 
who subsequently pushed Mitchell’s ideas and concepts regarding airpower doctrine following 
his resignation.  Therefore, Clodfelter maintains that Mitchell was essential to the creation of the 
ACTS which turned his ideas and concepts into doctrine prior to World War II.  In Ideas, 
Concepts, Doctrine, Futrell argues that the “Mitchell era” established the doctrine that the ACTS 
further developed and refined beginning in the mid-1920s.  Furthermore, Futrell contends that 
Mitchell’s Winged Defense “publicized the ideas which would be continued, expanded, and 
refined to become the doctrine of the Air Force.”  
A third interpretation argues the ACTS was essential not only to the development of 
airpower doctrine, but to the development of the U.S. Air Service’s system of Professional 
Military Education (PME).  Works that contain this interpretation are Jerome A. Ennels and 
Wesley P. Newton’s The Wisdom of Eagles: A History of Maxwell Air Force Base (1997) and 
Jeffrey C. Benton’s They Served Here: Thirty-Three Maxwell Men (1999).  In The Wisdom of 
Eagles, Ennels and Newton argue that the ACTS was the foundation for officer education in the 
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United States’ evolving air arm.   Similarly, Benton contends that the establishment of the ACTS 
provided the U.S. Air Corps with a much-needed place in which to train airmen on airpower 
doctrine and officership, thus providing the basis for the eventual creation of Air University in 
the early 1940s. 
A final interpretation is found in Scott D. West’s Warden and the Air Corps Tactical 
School: Déjà vu? (1999) and Howard D. Belote’s “Warden and the Air Corps Tactical School: 
What Goes Around Comes Around” (1999).  In his work, West argues that the ACTS has had a 
profound impact on airpower theorists which has remained undiminished despite the passage of 
time and the evolution of technology.  West argues that the basic theories presented by John 
Warden are essentially those first discussed by the ACTS in the interwar years.  West’s argument 
is echoed by Belote, who contends that the ACTS’s “industrial web” theory provided the basis 
for Warden’s later “five ring” model which also focused on reducing an adversary’s ability to 
fight by destroying their military and economic capabilities. 
Airpower Doctrine 
The best works that address the span of development of airpower doctrine are Robert 
Frank Futrell’s Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force (1989) 
and The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory (1997).  These works typify the 
interpretation which argues that the interwar years were vital to the creation and propagation of 
airpower theory and doctrine.  The Paths of Heaven, completed by the Air Force’s School of 
Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS) located at Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Alabama, 
argues that the 1920s and 1930s provided the U.S. Air Service with the time it needed to develop 
the doctrine that the U.S. would use in World War II.  In Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, Futrell 
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contends that the development of tactics and doctrine in the U.S. Air Service was a slow process 
due to the U.S. Army’s natural reluctance to pour resources into a branch that many initially 
regarded with skepticism.  However, Futrell contends that the perseverance of Mitchell, and 
others at the ACTS, facilitated the creation of the Air Service’s first concrete doctrine.  
According to Futrell, the doctrine developed during the interwar period laid the foundation for 
the U.S. Army Air Force’s work in World War II.   
A second group of scholars contend that airpower doctrine has been flawed from the start 
due to various factors.  This interpretation is found in works such as Barry D. Watts’s The 
Foundations of US Air Doctrine: The Problem of Friction in War (1984), John R. Carter’s 
Airpower and the Cult of the Offensive (1998), and I.B. Holley, Jr.’s Ideas and Weapons (1953).  
In The Foundations of US Air Doctrine, Watts argues that airpower doctrine has been flawed 
from early on, beginning with the ACTS.  Watts contends that airpower advocates have been far 
too reliant on technology, and, therefore, their way of developing airpower doctrine has been 
based on a far-too-scientific approach to warfare, which he labels “mechanistic.”  For example, 
Watts maintains that precision bombing became the mantra of nearly every airpower advocate 
during the interwar years.  However, Watts concludes that precision bombing was nothing more 
than a tool airpower advocates used in an attempt to prove that their service was unique from the 
Army with its own technical requirements.  In Airpower and the Cult of the Offensive, John 
Carter argues that reliance on offensive doctrine was a result of American airpower proponents’ 
and officers’ initial reliance on both the lessons learned during World War I and the British 
Royal Air Force (RAF) doctrine during the interwar years.   
An opposing interpretation is found in Stephen L. McFarland’s America’s Pursuit of 
Precision Bombing, 1910-1945 (1995), Peter R. Faber’s “Interwar US Army Aviation and the 
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Air Corps Tactical School: Incubators of American Airpower” (1997), and Allan Millett’s 
“Patterns of Military Innovation in the Interwar Period” (1996).  These authors argue that U.S. 
airpower doctrine was sound, with precision bombing serving as its guiding principle.  In 
America’s Pursuit of Precision Bombing, McFarland argues that precision bombing was the 
driving force behind airpower doctrine during the interwar years.  Furthermore, McFarland 
contends that airpower advocates, especially the men at the ACTS, tirelessly worked to prove 
that precision bombing was not only possible, but highly effective, thereby increasingly U.S. 
government and military support for airpower.  Similarly, in “Patterns of Military Innovation,” 
Allan Millett argues that precision bombing doctrine, and the strategic bombing doctrine that 
developed as a result, gained widespread acceptance during the interwar period due to the efforts 
of the men at the ACTS.   
Another interpretation argues that the airpower doctrine created during the interwar 
period was essential to the American war effort in World War II, but that it failed to adequately 
address cooperation between air and surface forces.  In particular, these scholars argue that the 
doctrine of Close Air Support (CAS) and aerial interdiction suffered due to airpower advocates’ 
and air officers’ focus on strategic bombing and air superiority.  This view is found in Thomas 
H. Greer’s The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941 (1955), David N. 
Spires’s Air Power for Patton’s Army: The XIX Tactical Air Command in the Second World War 
(2002), Martha Byrd’s Chennault: Giving Wings to the Tiger (1987), Ronald Spector’s “The 
Military Effectiveness of the US Armed Forces, 1919-1939” (1988), Richard R. Muller’s “Close 
Air Support: The German, British, and American experiences, 1918-1941” (1996), Jonathan M. 
House’s Towards Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th Century Tactics, Doctrine, and 
Organization (2002), Thomas Alexander Hughes’s Overlord: General Pete Quesada and the 
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Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II (1995), and Williamson Murray’s “Strategic 
Bombing: The British, American, and German experiences” (1996).  In The Development of Air 
Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, Greer contends that doctrinal development went through three 
separate and distinct stages during the interwar years: 1919-1926, 1926-1935, and 1935-1939.  
Greer argues that each phase of development built upon the one before it as a result of ongoing 
discussions and debates during the years prior to World War II that became increasingly complex 
and representative of the realities of aerial combat.  Yet, Greer maintains that the airpower 
doctrine created in the interwar period failed to adequately address the “precise relationships and 
practical arrangements between ground and air commanders, or the detailed composition and 
employment of support units.”   Overall, however, Greer concludes that airpower doctrine prior 
to World War II did prepare the U.S.A.A.F. for many of the missions it conducted, just not all of 
them.  In Air Power for Patton’s Army, Spires argues that airpower proponents place close air 
support (CAS) low on the priority list due to the increased risk of operating at extremely low 
altitudes that exposed them to increased fire from enemy troops and anti-aircraft artillery.  
Furthermore, Spires contends that the U.S.A.A.F’s increasing support of strategic bombing only 
increased the reluctance of air officers to develop doctrine that stressed the support of friendly 
ground forces.  Muller, in Close Air Support, echoes Spires, arguing that an emphasis on long-
range bombers and the doctrine of air superiority left the Army’s air arm unprepared for many of 
the missions it was faced with during World War II.  
Conversely, in Beyond the Battle Line: US Air Attack Theory and Doctrine, 1919-1941 
(1996), Gary C. Cox argues that ACTS focus on strategic bombing before World War II did not 
hinder the development of airpower doctrine that stressed cooperation with Army ground forces.  
While Cox does agree that airpower doctrine regarding close air support and the direct support of 
15 
 
friendly troops needed a great deal of improvement, he contends that the “indirect approach” of 
aerial interdiction advocated sporadically by the ACTS during the interwar years did work quite 
well in World War II. 
A final interpretation contends that U.S. military technological development was limited 
by manufacturing and commercial considerations.  In addition, this interpretation argues that the 
aforementioned issues had a tremendous impact on airpower doctrine.  The best example of this 
interpretation is Philip Meilinger’s Air War: Theory and Practice (2003).  In Air War, Philip 
Meilinger argues that the various incarnations of the U.S. Army’s air arm were able to move 
forward during the interwar years by focusing on the production of airframes that they argued 
could serve both military and commercial purposes.  Consequently, Meilinger argues that 
American airpower doctrine was largely shaped by the types of airplanes most likely to receive 
support from the commercial airline industry.  Furthermore, Meilinger maintains that high-
performance aircraft were not potentially dual-use and, thus, received a low-priority prior to the 
outbreak of World War II.  He concludes that such considerations further supported the airpower 
doctrine being developed in the interwar period that increasingly focused on strategic 
bombardment aircraft without the support of high-performance escort fighters. 
The Role of Airpower: The U.S. Military and Defense Policy Prior to World War II 
One interpretation argues the interwar period was a difficult time for the American 
military, yet one that fostered the development of the U.S. Army Air Corps.  Scholars that 
support this interpretation contend the political climate of the 1920s and 1930s created an 
environment that made it difficult for the U.S. armed services to achieve the maximum level of 
readiness with regard to their wartime mission.  However, these authors also maintain that the 
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U.S. military, particularly the U.S. Air Corps, used new weapons and technology to perform their 
traditional missions despite the many obstacles they faced.  Furthermore, these scholars contend 
that the Air Corps was able to gain increased independence during the period largely due to 
public support and congressional lobbying.  Examples of this viewpoint include Ronald 
Spector’s “The Military Effectiveness of the US Armed Forces, 1919-1939” (1988) and Philip 
Meilinger’s Air War: Theory and Practice (2003).  In “The Military Effectiveness of the US 
Armed Forces, 1919-1939,” Spector argues that a prevailing mood of isolationism kept military 
expenditures to a minimum during the interwar years.  Yet, Spector contends that the Air Corps 
managed to gain increased importance during the period as evidenced by the fact that “no less 
than fifteen different government boards and committees were established to wrestle with the 
question of the proper role and organization of aviation in the nation’s defense establishment” 
between 1919 and 1935.    
Another interpretation argues that internal problems sapped the U.S. Army’s 
preparedness during the interwar period.  In particular, these authors contend that competition 
between the U.S. Army and its aviation branch for resources and importance prior to World War 
II inhibited the preparedness of both groups.  Examples of this interpretation are David E. 
Johnson’s “From Frontier Constabulary to Modern Army: The U.S. Army between the World 
Wars” (2000) and Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945 
(1998).  In “From Frontier Constabulary to Modern Army,” Johnson argues that the U.S. Army 
experienced “severe resource constraints” during the 1920s and 1930s.  However, Johnson 
contends that “intellectual and institutional defects” were the most significant challenges the U.S. 
Army faced during the period.  Johnson maintains that the debate surrounding military aviation, 
which was one of the most contentious issues of the interwar years, is indicative of the U.S. 
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Army’s internal deficiencies during the period.  According to Johnson, aviation divided the U.S. 
Army “between those who saw technology as a way to revolutionize warfare and those who 
clung to the past and saw machines merely as a means to improve existing concepts.”   Johnson 
concludes that greater resources wouldn’t have resolved the internal problems the U.S. Army 
struggled with prior to World War II.  Instead, Johnson maintains that more resources would 
only have resulted in increased competition between the U.S. Army and the U.S.A.A.C.  
A third interpretation contends that Army policy became more accepting of airpower as 
World War II neared, with the air arm gaining increased autonomy which each passing year.  
However, these works also argue that airpower did not truly have widespread support until the 
end of World War II.  Examples of this interpretation are Chase C. Mooney’s Organization of 
the Army Air Arm, 1935-1945 (1956), Monro MacCloskey’s The United States Air Force (1967), 
James P. Tate’s The Army and Its Air Corps: Army Policy toward Aviation, 1919-1941 (1998), 
and Williamson Murray’s “Strategic Bombing: The British, American, and German experiences” 
(1996).  In Organization of the Army Air Arm, Mooney contends that the 1935-1945 period was 
vital to establishing the long-held goal of airpower proponents who hoped to gain a degree of 
autonomy within the U.S. War Department.  However, Mooney argues that an independent “air 
arm” was simply seen as unfeasible by the majority of American civilian and military leaders 
prior to the end of World War II.  According to Mooney, most opponents of a separate air force 
argued that airpower should be used as an auxiliary rather than a service on equal footing with 
the Army and Navy.  Yet, Mooney concludes that it took the immense challenges of World War 
II and the corresponding expansion of U.S.A.A.F. bureaucracy to secure an independent air 
force. Similarly, in The Army and its Air Corps, Tate argues that proponents of airpower had 
little influence “among ranking military men” and government officials during the interwar years 
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as a result of the relatively low-level of priority placed on aviation until the outbreak of World 
War II in Europe.  Consequently, Tate contends that airpower advocates turned to Congressional 
hearings and public demonstrations of aircraft in an attempt to gain increased influence with 
regard to defense spending.  Tate maintains that despite their best efforts, airpower proponents 
were unable to gain the level of support they sought prior to World War II.  According to Tate, 
the circumstances airpower supporters found themselves in created a “persecution complex” 
among many in the Army’s aviation branch who argued that the Army bureaucracy was “hostile” 
with regard to airpower.  However, Tate contends that Army officials were simply more cautious 
in their approach than airpower advocates who often argued their case to the point of 
insubordination.   
Another interpretation contends that the Army and Navy clashed frequently during the 
interwar period as a result of tensions created by how best to utilize American aviation assets.  
Examples of this interpretation are Vincent Davis’s The Admirals Lobby (1967), Ronald 
Spector’s “The Military Effectiveness of the US Armed Force, 1919-1939” (1988), and William 
F. Trimble’s Admiral William A. Moffett, Architect of Naval Aviation (1994).  In The Admirals 
Lobby, Davis argues that the airplane created a number of problems for the Navy, especially after 
Billy Mitchell’s successful bombing experiments and the publication of his seminal work, 
Winged Defense.  Davis contends that one of the most pressing problems was the fact that the 
airplane “created a need for new professional specialists in the making of national security 
policy: scientists, engineers, researchers—in brief, the technicians.”   However, Davis maintains 
that the Navy was both at odds with Mitchell, who wanted all American aviation assets placed in 
one service, and Navy aviators who wanted increased autonomy within their particular branch of 
the military.  Davis argues that Navy leadership eventually sided with the naval aviators because 
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they hoped to “thwart” Mitchell’s efforts.  Furthermore, Davis contends that the establishment of 
the Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics headed by Rear Admiral William A. Moffett was not 
indicative of an upsurge of aviation enthusiasm.  In fact, Davis maintains that most naval officers 
failed to appreciate the “military significance of the airplane” during the interwar period. 
What Is Left? 
 Although the history of early American military air power has been covered extensively, 
there remains much to be done with regard to explaining the motivations of the airmen who 
fought to achieve independence from the U.S. Army.  Many historians have tried to explain why 
airmen sought to separate from the U.S. Army, but few have tried to uncover the origins of that 
desire.  This dissertation will describe when and how the idea of a separate air arm originated.  It 
will help students of history, particularly air power history, understand that airmen’s push for 
independence was present at the genesis American military air power. It will then trace the 
development of that effort throughout the decades that followed.  Most importantly, it will show 
that, despite the efforts of the U.S. Army, the War Department, and the U.S. Congress, to 
increase the size of the air arm, airmen were not satisfied until they had achieved independence. 
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Chapter 1 - A Struggle for Survival: American Airmen Began their Fight for 
Independence 
 Airmen’s desire for control over their own service began from nearly the start.  Faced 
with military and civilian leaders who did not understand aviation, which was still in its infancy 
at the time, American military airmen believed that that had to gain control over their own 
destiny to the greatest extent that they could.  This chapter tracks the development of that desire 
between 1907 and the United States’ entry into World War I in April of 1917. 
Prior to the outbreak of the World War I, most military and civilian leaders in the United 
States viewed aviation as nothing more than an auxiliary force that, only under the best of 
circumstances, could provide anything of value to military forces.8  The primary reason for this 
was that military and civilian leaders in the U.S. simply did not have much knowledge of 
aviation.  Fewer still had any interest in a fledgling technology that had not been proven in 
combat.   
The lack of knowledge and interest on the part of senior military leaders and members of 
the U.S. Congress caused the Aeronautical Division of the U.S. Signal Corps, which the U.S. 
Army established in 1907, to develop slowly in the years prior to World War I.  The men of the 
Aeronautical Division tried desperately to change the situation by testifying before Congress, 
demonstrating their skills during public demonstrations and military exercises, and working to 
improve the capabilities of both themselves and their aircraft.   
                                                 
8 The United States Army treated military aviation as something of a sideshow from its inception during the 
American Civil War.  During that divisive and bloody conflict, the Union Army Balloon Corps and the Confederate 
Balloon Corps endeavored to provide their respective commanders with another viewpoint of the battlefield below 
them.  However, too few commanders fully took advantage of the new technology.  As a result, the use of balloons 
to aid U.S. military operations quickly fell by the wayside. Rebecca Robbins Raines, Getting the Message Through: 
A Branch History of the U.S. Army Signal Corps, p. 165. 
21 
 
In spite of their efforts, the men of the Aeronautical Division all too often failed to 
generate the enthusiasm and interest they desired.  As a result of the constant struggle they faced, 
the energetic aviators in the Aeronautical Division became increasingly agitated with their 
superiors in the U.S. Army and their civilian representatives in Congress.  That frustration led 
many of the aviators to develop an aggressive, almost insubordinate, attitude towards their 
leaders who they believed did not appreciate air power.   
The belief that they were being neglected continued to grow year after year as the men in 
the Aeronautical Division watched as the War Department provided their service with negligible 
manpower and insufficient budgets in the years before World War I.   In spite of such treatment, 
these airmen continued to push for a strong air force.  They did not let others lack of foresight or 
imagination deter them from their goal.  Confident that they could develop air power into a 
powerful military weapon, these adventurous airmen pushed harder when others may have quit.  
They were determined to succeed because they believed in the potential of air power.   
The Dawn of United States Air Power 
United States military aviation at the beginning of the twentieth century consisted entirely 
of the few balloons in service with the United States Army Signal Corps.  Although United 
States Army soldiers and their Confederate counterparts had used balloons for observation and 
reconnaissance during the American Civil War, very few advancements in aviation occurred 
between the end of the war in 1865 and the start of the twentieth century.  A number of factors, 
including low defense budgets, led the U.S. military to shelve further advancements in aviation.    
As a result, the U.S. military had almost no aviation assets upon which to build and few officers 
or men schooled in the principles or practices of lighter-than-air flight.  And, more importantly, 
the U.S. military had little interest in aviation throughout the period in question. 
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For the most part, the U.S. military’s lack of interest in aviation did not hamper U.S. 
military actions during the latter half of the nineteenth century.  However, this indifference 
proved to be a significant problem in the decade prior to World War I as the leaders U.S. military 
quickly found their service’s aviation capabilities far behind those of both friendly and 
belligerent European nations.  While somewhat understandable given the limited capabilities of 
the aircraft then in use, the lack of vision among U.S. military leaders hampered the development 
of U.S. military aviation at a critical moment in world history.  Worse still, many U.S. military 
leaders not only lacked interest in aviation; they couldn’t conceive of how balloons or aircraft 
would benefit their respective services.   Their lack of imagination portended the difficult 
struggle that American airmen faced in the decades that followed.  
The Wright Brothers 
Experiments with lighter-than-air flight had a long history but heavier-than-air flight only 
began to gain momentum by the beginning of the twentieth century.  All that changed when, on 
December 17, 1903, Orville and Wilbur Wright achieved controlled flight in their Wright Flyer I 
aircraft.  While low-powered and difficult to control, the Wright’s aircraft sparked the 
imagination of forward-thinking men and women around the world.  Some of those individuals 
served in the United States military.  In the years that followed the Wrights flight, many of those 
young airmen devoted their military careers and, sometimes, their lives, to create the United 
States military’s first air force.9 
Although the Wright brothers’ flight proved that heavier-than-air flight was possible, it 
did not alter the fact that such flight was extremely difficult to achieve and to maintain.  In fact, 
                                                 
9 Bernard C. Nalty, editor, Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the USAF. (Washington, D.C.: Air Force 
History and Museum Programs, 1997), p. 7. 
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on the first flight, Orville piloted the Wright Flyer at 6.8 miles per hour (MPH) over a distance of 
approximately 120 feet.  Subsequent flights extended the distance of the first but remained 
limited in duration.  The Wrights slowly and steadily improved upon their aircraft’s performance 
over the next two years.  However, they soon decided that such tests had to stop so that they 
could concentrate on obtaining the financial support they desperately needed in order to build 
more aircraft.10   
To further increase the chances of long-term success for their efforts, the Wrights 
composed letters to William H. Taft, U.S. Secretary of War, and Brigadier General Adolphus W. 
Greely, the Chief Signal Officer of the U.S. Army, hoping to secure orders for Wright Flyers.  
Both Taft and Greely initially showed little interest in the Wrights’ aircraft, which many 
regarded as little more than a novelty with limited military potential.   Most people in the 
government and in the military argued that the Wrights’ aircraft could not fly very far, was 
relatively fragile, and did not have any weapons.  Undaunted, the Wrights lobbied the 
governments of France, Germany, and Great Britain in the hope that the Europeans would be 
willing to take a chance on their new invention.11   
The Wrights received numerous enthusiastic letters from various groups in Europe that 
were interested in aviation, which led them to make their first trip outside the U.S. in 1907.  To 
stoke interest in aviation abroad, the Wrights disassembled, crated, and shipped a recently 
constructed Wright Model A Flyer to France.  The Wrights’ trip to Europe quickly proved to be a 
                                                 
10 Nalty, Winged Sword, Winged Shield, pp. 7-10. 
 
11 Fred Howard, Wilbur And Orville: A Biography of the Wright Brothers (Mineola: Dover Publications, Inc., 1998), 
pp. 258-260. 
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boon for the two ambitious brothers because it exposed them to a military man who helped them 
attain their goal.   
While in France, a fortuitous meeting occurred between Wilbur and Lieutenant Frank P. 
Lahm of the U.S. Army’s Aeronautical Division, then part of the Office of the Chief Signal 
Officer (OCSO).12  Lahm, who was in France observing recent French aviation developments, 
was extremely impressed by Wilbur.  Still recovering from typhoid, Lahm wrote to his superior 
Brigadier General James Allen, the U.S. Army’s Chief Signal Officer (CSO).  Lahm pleaded 
with Allen, who sat on the U.S. Army’s Board of Ordnance and Fortification in Washington 
D.C., to allow the Wrights to address the board following their return to the U.S.13  
Allen, who had created the Aeronautical Division on August 1, 1907 as a result of 
“interest expressed by President Roosevelt,” was hesitant to grant Lahm’s request.  On October 
10, 1907, Allen addressed the potential for military aircraft in a letter to the Board of Ordnance 
and Fortification.  Allen, who favored dirigibles over airplanes, stated: “The military uses of a 
flying machine of any type will be only for purposes of observation and reconnaissance, or, as an 
offensive weapon, to drop explosives on the enemy.”  But Allen then contradicted himself, 
saying that, “For the purpose of dropping explosives on an enemy, a high speed airplane is 
hardly suitable….”14 
                                                 
12 On August 1, 1907, Brigadier General James Allen, the Chief Signal Officer, issued “Office Memorandum No. 
6.”  Allen stated: “An Aeronautical Division of this office is hereby established, to take effect this date.  This 
division will have charge of all matters pertaining to military ballooning, air machines, and all kindred subjects. All 
data on hand will be carefully classified and plans perfected for future tests and experiments.” Captain Charles 
DeForest Chandler served as the first head (Office in Charge) of the Aeronautical Division.  Other personnel 
included Corporal Edward Ward and First-class Private Joseph E. Barrett.  Juliette Hennessy, The United States 
Army Air Arm, April 1861 to April 1917 (Washington, D.C.: USAF Historical Study No. 98., 1958), p. 217. 
 
13 Fred Howard, Wilbur and Orville: A Biography of the Wright Brothers (Dover, 1988), p. 230. 
 
14 Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-
1965 (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 1974), p. 8. 
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On December 5, 1907, the members of the Board of Ordnance and Fortification directed 
Allen to acquire an airplane for the Aeronautical Division.  Within days, the Signal Corps issued 
Specification Number 486 which solicited bids for the construction of an airplane under military 
contract.15   The Wrights wasted little time, submitting their bid for the U.S. Army contract in 
January 1908.  The Signal Corps accepted three bids, including the Wrights’ bid, which required 
them to build one aircraft within 200 days for no more than $25,000.16   
Despite the positive step that the bids represented, the Signal Corps faced a significant 
problem because the U.S. Army lacked enough money from regular budget appropriations to 
fund the three bids the Signal Corps had accepted.  To ensure that the Signal Corps would 
receive the aircraft under contract, Lahm, Captain Charles D. Chandler, and General Allen 
explained their predicament to U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt.  Roosevelt, who had all but 
ordered Allen to establish an Aeronautical Division within the Signal Corps, personally helped to 
procure the funds that General Allen needed to fulfill the three contracts.17 
Soon after securing the contract with the U.S. Army, Wilbur Wright traveled to France to 
further expand the market for their airplanes.  The flying skills of French aviators had progressed 
since Wright’s visit the year before.  However, Wilbur’s command of the Wright Flyer proved 
that America continued to have the best pilots and the best airplanes in the world.  On August 14, 
1908, Wilbur flew at Le Mans, France.  Ferdinand Léon Delagrange, one of the top French 
aviators at the time, was so impressed by Wright’s piloting that he reportedly exclaimed: “Nous 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
15 Hennessy, The United States Army Air Arm, p. 27. 
 
16 The sum of $25,000 in 1908 equated to approximately $625,000 in 2013.   
 
17 Hennessy, The United States Army Air Arm, p. 27. 
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sommes battus” [“We are beaten”].18   Similarly, a member of the Aero Club de France argued 
that “par rapport aux Wrights nous sommes comme des enfants” [“compared with the Wrights 
we are as children.”].19   
Wilbur Wright’s visit to France was primarily intended to secure orders for Wright 
aircraft.  Yet, it did more than that, it dramatically altered the course of French aviation. 
Completing more than 100 flights while in France in during his 1908 trip, Wilbur demonstrated 
again and again that his piloting abilities far surpassed those of his French contemporaries.  To 
their credit, many French aviators soon redoubled their efforts in order to prove that Frenchmen 
could compete with their American colleagues.  On 30 October 1908, just shortly after Wilbur 
returned to the U.S., Henri Farman completed a non-stop 27 kilometer flight from Châlons, 
France, to Reims, France.20 
Wilbur’s actions in France also sparked the interest of businessman, government 
officials, and military personnel from France, Great Britain, Italy, Germany, and Spain who had 
witnessed one or more of his flights.   One of the most positive accounts of Wilbur’s impact on 
European aviation came from Major B.F.S. Baden-Powell, the president of the Aeronautical 
Society of Great Britain.  After witnessing one of Wilbur’s flights, Major Baden-Powell stated: 
If only some of our people in England could see or imagine what Mr. Wright is now 
doing I am certain it would give them a terrible shock.  A conquest of the air by any nation 
means more than the average man is willing to admit or even think about.  Wilbur Wright is in 
possession of a power which controls the fate of nations is beyond dispute.21 
                                                 
18 Staff, “French impressed by Wright brothers' flying machine,” The Guardian, August 14, 1908; On January 7 
1909, Delagrange received one of the first eight aviator certificates awarded by the Aero Club de France. Aero Club 
de France, Flight, February 4, 1911. 
 
19 Basil Collier, A History of Air Power, (MacMillan Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 35-36. 
 
20 John Buckley, Air Power in the Age of Total War, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
1999), p. 30. 
 
21 Staff, New York Herald (Paris Edition), October 6, 1908. 
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Ultimately, Wilbur’s visit to France was important because it increased many Europeans’ 
enthusiasm for aviation at a critical time.  His visit gained the attention of many European 
political and military leaders who had witnessed his flights.  Those individuals, who included 
Leon Bollee, Henri Farman, Charles Rolls, Princess Margherita of Savoy, and King Edward VII 
of Great Britain, spread interest in aviation throughout their respective nations.22   
As the Europeans worked to build their own aviation industries, the Wright brothers 
began the first flight trials for the U.S. military.  On September 9, 1908, the Wilbur and Orville 
brought the 1908 Wright Flyer to Fort Myer, Virginia, for long-anticipated flight trials.  Frank 
Lahm, who had a great deal of familiarity with aviation, became the first U.S. military member 
to fly in a powered airplane when he accompanied Orville on the second trial flight of the day.  
Although the flight only lasted six minutes and 24 seconds, it demonstrated to those present that 
more tests were worth undertaking.23   
The trials at Fort Myer continued for several days without much incident until September 
17, 1908.  Early that morning, Lieutenant Thomas E. Selfridge accompanied Orville on a test 
flight.24  Shortly into the flight, the Wright Flyer’s propeller splintered, causing the then 
unpowered aircraft to plummet to the ground.25  The crash caused grievous injuries to both 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
22 Fred C. Kelley, The Wright Brothers, (Courier Corporation, 2012), pp. 233-253. 
 
23 Foulois and Shiner, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts, p. 56-58. 
 
24 Lieutenant Selfridge was an experienced pilot at the time of the Fort Myers tests.  He had joined the Signal Corps 
on August 3, 1907, and earned his FAI airship license in August 1908.  He had designed aircraft built by Dr. 
Alexander Graham Bell’s Aerial Experiment Association.  Selfridge also piloted Thomas Baldwin’s “White Wing” 
aircraft.  Rebecca Hancock Cameron, Training to Fly: Military Flight Testing, 1907-1945, (Washington, D.C.: Air 
Force History and Museums Program, 1999), p. 17. 
 
25 John F. Shiner, Foulois and the U.S. Army Air Corps, 1931-1935 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 
1983), p. 2. 
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Orville and Selfridge, neither of whom had safety equipment of any kind.  After falling from an 
altitude of approximately 75 feet, both Orville and Selfridge found themselves pinned in the 
shattered wood, canvas, and wire wreckage of the Wright Flyer.  Orville retained consciousness 
but was covered in blood and was in severe pain.  Selfridge, on the other hand, was unconscious 
with a large head wound clearly visible to those who rushed to his aid.  Several men who 
witnessed the crash worked feverishly to free both men before subsequently rushing them to the 
nearest hospital.  Doctors tried to save Selfridge but the head trauma, which included a badly 
fractured skull, was too great for them to prevail.   Orville had a broken left leg, broken ribs, cuts 
on his head, and minor cuts and bruises over most of his body.  The injuries forced the usually 
energetic Orville to take a brief break from flying.26 
Selfridge’s death at Fort Myer deeply saddened everyone involved but it did not derail 
the U.S. military’s preliminary interest in aviation despite the fact that Selfridge was the first 
U.S. military aviator to die from injuries caused by an airplane accident.27  Nor were the Wrights 
dissuaded by the deadly accident, which was also the first accident involving one of them that 
resulted in a fatality.  In fact, the event persuaded Orville, who took months to recover from the 
injuries he sustained in the crash, to push the Wright Flyer even harder in order to show the 
Army that it was safe, reliable, and capable.28  However, both Orville and Wilbur were careful 
not to take any unnecessary risks that might jeopardize themselves, their passengers, or their 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
26 Foulois and Shiner, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts, p. 56-58. 
 
27 Historian Rebecca Cameron argues that Selfridge’s death “landed a particular blow to the new enterprise. The 
Army had no other officer with Selfridge’s experience in heavier-than-air flight.”  Rebecca Cameron, Training to 
Fly, p. 19. 
 
28 Selfridge intended to join Foulois during U.S. Army maneuvers near St. Joseph, Missouri.  Orville sustained 
serious injuries in the crash, which caused him to be trapped under the splintered pieces of the airplane.  Staff, “Fatal 
Fall of Wright Airship,” The New York Times, September 18, 1908. 
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aircraft, because they feared that another incident might convince U.S. Army leaders that 
aviation was far too dangerous to explore further.29 
The second round of U.S. Army trials began on June 28, 1909.  Several of the politicians, 
who included U.S. President William Howard Taft, and many of the Army officers in attendance 
did not fully understand or appreciate the Wrights’ methodical and cautious approach to flight 
throughout the trials.  Only willing to fly under the best weather conditions, the Wrights were not 
afraid to cancel a scheduled flight if either the aircraft or the weather were not exactly to their 
liking.  Frank Lahm, one of the participants in the trials, stated: “Flights were made only in light 
winds, and while large crowds and high officials were often disappointed, the Wrights were 
adamant in their decision not to fly unless conditions were just right.”30  In fact, the Wrights 
waited on perfect conditions for nearly one full month.   
Such caution helped ensure the safety of both the aircraft and the pilots.  However, as 
Lahm mentioned above, some of the officials attending the trials were rather annoyed when the 
Wrights cancelled a scheduled flight.  Having taken time out of their schedules to witness the 
trials, the officials did not appreciate having to leave without seeing the Wrights fly their 
airplane.  The commander of Fort Myer was equally annoyed with the Wrights because their 
airplane generated a lot of noise, which scared the horses stationed at the post.31   
                                                 
29 The Wright brothers initially wanted to conduct the trials without any passengers, but U.S. Army officials insisted 
that Lieutenant Selfridge participate in the flight.  Thus, his death was especially troublesome for the Wrights.  They 
knew that another accident might jeopardize their effort to sell aircraft to the U.S. Army. Paul W. Clark and 
Laurence A. Lyons, George Owen Squier: U.S. Army Major General, Inventor, Aviation Pioneer, and Founder of 
Muzak (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland and Company, Inc., Publishers, 2014), p. 89. 
 
30 Frank, Lahm, “The Wrights as I Knew Them,” Air Force, March 15, 1939, p. 3. 
 
31 Benjamin Shaw, “The Wright Brothers Prove Their Worth in Arlington and College Park,” weta.org, August 26, 
2015. 
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After a series of delays, Orville completed the first flights of the new trials on July 27, 
1909, with Lahm serving as the passenger throughout the flight.  The two men remained aloft for 
nearly one hour and thirteen minutes, thereby surpassing the endurance benchmark that the U.S. 
Army had set in the requirements for the new airplane.  Several days later, on July 30, 1909, 
Orville completed a speed test with Lieutenant Benjamin Foulois along for the flight.   On that 
flight the two men maintained an average speed of 42 miles per hour, which surpassed the 
Army’s speed requirement by two miles per hour.32   
The successful trials appeased those who had waited to see the Wrights fly.  More 
importantly, the trials demonstrated that the Wrights’ aircraft could meet the U.S. Army’s 
requirements, which included flying at 40 miles per hours, carrying a total passenger weight of 
350 pounds, maneuvering in any direction while airborne, landing without damage, and 
remaining airborne for at least one hour without stopping.33   
In spite of the positive outcome of the trials, the Signal Corps faced a serious problem 
that could not be resolved quickly.  Specifically, although the men of the Signal Corps now had 
their first aircraft, they had few officers trained to fly and no school in place to train new 
aviators.  Frustrated by the situation, General Allen asserted: “One thing that has kept back both 
dirigible balloons and aeroplanes is the fact that there has been no market for them and also that 
there has been no place where aviators could practice their art.”34 
The situation was somewhat different in France where interest in and enthusiasm for 
aviation had exploded following Wilbur’s visit in 1908.  One prominent example of the 
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difference between what was happening in the U.S. and what occurred in France came on July 
25, 1909.  Early that morning, Louis Blériot sat behind the controls of his Blériot XI monoplane 
and took off toward the coast of England.  Roughly 36 minutes later, the brave French aviator 
landed at the coastal town of Dover.  The flight, which made news around the world, catapulted 
Blériot into instant fame.35  More importantly, his flight proved that the English Channel was no 
longer the buffer zone that it had once been.  After hearing of the accomplishment, the influential 
Alfred Charles William Harmsworth (1st Viscount Northcliffe), the owner of both the Daily 
Mirror and Daily Mail, remarked that “England is no longer an island.”36 
Another important event that spurred European aviation forward occurred one month 
later.  From August 22, 1909 to August 29, 1909, many of the best aviators in the world attended 
the Le Grande Semaine D'Aviation de la Champagne (The Champagne Region's Great Aviation 
Week), on the Bétheny plains near Reims, France.  A total of 23 aviators, including Glenn 
Curtiss, Henri Farman, and Louis Blériot, flew during the event which was attended by an 
estimated 500,000 visitors from around the globe.37  The success of the event caught the 
attention of many of the politicians and military leaders who witnessed the event.  One of them, 
Englishman David Lloyd George, maintained that the meet had proven to him that "flying 
machines are no longer toys and dreams…they are an established fact." 38   
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As the Le Grand Semaine d’Aviation de la Champagne helped generate enthusiasm for 
aviation throughout Europe, General Allen ordered his men to look for a place to build the U.S. 
Army’s first aviation school.  Allen, who believed that the Aeronautical Division could not 
expand without a dedicated school, tasked Lahm to find land suitable for flying training.  Lahm 
hoped to use the parade ground on Fort Myer, but the installation’s commandant would not allow 
it on the grounds that it would interfere with the training of U.S. Army ground units.39   The 
Wright brothers also rejected Fort Myer, arguing that the parade ground was too small to use in 
properly teaching new aviators.40   
Since Fort Myer proved to be an untenable option, Lieutenant Lahm began searching for 
another location near Washington, D.C.  After a brief series of searches using a hot air balloon, 
Lahm recommended that the Signal Corps lease a large amount of land—approximately 160 
acres—near College Park, Maryland.  Lahm argued that College Park was an excellent option 
because it had land that could easily be used for flying operations.  Furthermore, College Park 
was close enough to Washington, D.C. to allow for quick visits from military and government 
officials.  General Allen agreed to lease the land in September 1909.  Within days, engineers had 
constructed a single hangar and the monorail track required to launch the skid-equipped Wright 
Flyer.41   
General Allen then chose Lieutenant Foulois and Lieutenant Lahm as the first two 
officers to train at the new aviation school at College Park.  Both men had a great deal of 
enthusiasm for aviation.  In addition, both men had demonstrated their bravery and aptitude for 
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flight training by accompanying the Wright brothers on several flights.  However, shortly before 
the Wrights arrived at College Park, General Allen ordered Foulois to attend the International 
Congress of Aeronautics at Nancy, France as the Signal Corps’ representative.  With Foulois on 
his way to France, Allen picked Lieutenant Frederic Humphreys to train with Lahm and the 
Wright brothers.42 
The school at College Park proved to be important because it was the U.S. Army’s first 
step toward aviation training.  More importantly, it demonstrated that the Aeronautical Division 
was intent on expanding beyond a single aircraft and a handful of men.  However, the cold fall 
and winter weather in Maryland made flying at College Park rather uncomfortable in the latter 
part of 1909.  As a result, Lieutenant Foulois, who had returned to the U.S. in early November 
1909, and several enlisted men from the Aeronautical Division relocated to Fort Sam Houston in 
San Antonio, Texas.   
The move to Texas was both a blessing and a curse for the men of the Aeronautical 
Division.  The warm and dry weather in Texas allowed for year-round flying, which was what 
the airmen desired.  However, its distance from Washington, D.C. meant that first-hand 
demonstrations for distinguished civilian and military visitors was less likely to take place.  
Although many of the aviators saw that as a positive, they were out of sight, which meant that 
they were also out of mind.   
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In spite of the potential problems associated with being so far from Washington, D.C., 
Foulois and his men made great strides.  Three months after they arrived in Texas, in February 
1910, they constructed a hangar to house Signal Corps Airplane Number 1, the Aeronautical 
Division’s sole airplane.43  Less than one month after arriving, Foulois completed his first solo 
flight in an airplane.  Over the next seven months, Foulois spent a total of nine hours in the air 
over the course of 61 solo flights.  Throughout that period, Foulois and the Wright brothers 
exchanged letters regarding Foulois’s flights.  Foulois would write a detailed explanation of each 
flight that included the duration of the flight, the highest altitude he reached, and any problems 
that he faced during the flight.  The Wright brothers responded with tips for Foulois to follow on 
subsequent flights.44  
During those seven months of flying training, one of the biggest issues that Foulois and 
his men needed to solve concerned the airplane’s ability to land and take off.  The Wright Model 
A required the use of a catapult to launch the airplane from a single rail secured to the ground.  
The system worked well, but the airplane could not take off without using the system.  To 
remedy the problem, Lieutenant Foulois, Corporal Glen Madole, and civilian mechanic Oliver 
Simmons worked together to design a tricycle landing gear.  The crude apparatus worked but 
they quickly replaced it with a more substantial system that the Wrights had designed.45 
In late September 1910, Foulois briefly halted his training so that he could participate in 
the International Aviation Meet held at Belmont Park on Long Island, New York, the following 
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month.  In November 1910, Foulois attended another aviation meet held in Baltimore, Maryland.  
Foulois asserted that attending such events was critical because it allowed him to meet other 
aviators and witness aviation innovations firsthand.  He also argued that participating in the 
events was important because they increased the visibility of U.S. Army aviation among those in 
attendance, as well as those who read newspaper coverage of the events.46 
The efforts that Foulois and his men put forth to increase interest in aviation did little to 
sway a largely uninterested U.S. Congress.  Few Congressmen had much interest in providing 
more funds or other resources to further military aviation.  For the most part, they had little 
exposure to aviation.  In addition, the airplanes in use at the time had limited capabilities.  As a 
result, Congressmen simply did not view the airplane as a military weapon of much potential.  
Foulois, exasperated by the lack of interest among America’s elected representatives, stated that 
one confused Congressman had responded to General Allen’s request for more airplanes by 
saying: “Why all this fuss about airplanes for the Army?  I thought we already had one!”47   
The lack of support and understanding in Congress ultimately kept the Aeronautical 
Division from expanding.   Largely unaware of the flying advances that Foulois and his men 
were making in Texas, Congress failed to provide the Aeronautical Division with a budget of any 
significance.   In both fiscal years 1908 and 1909, Congress had not appropriated any money at 
all for the Aeronautical Division.  General Allen tried to intercede on the Aeronautical Division’s 
behalf by requesting approximately $200,000 for fiscal year 1910 but Congress did not provide 
any appropriation yet again.  Foulois later maintained that civilian and military leaders in the 
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War Department simply “ignored” General Allen’s annual report and his request for more 
money.48   
 The Aeronautical Division’s budget woes blocked the service’s ability to expand.  Yet, 
in Great Britain, powerful men with influence helped British military aviation expand rapidly. 
Lord Northcliffe, who witnessed the flying at Reims firsthand, championed the merits of aviation 
via his newspapers the Daily Mail and the Daily Mirror.  His efforts, as well as those of others, 
resulted in the Aerial League of the British Empire.  Established in 1909, the Aerial League 
worked to advance aviation in both British civil and military sectors.  Their efforts paid great 
dividends in relatively short order.  For example, in 1909 the British spent approximately £9,000 
on aviation.  By 1911, British aviation expenditures had climbed to £131,000.49 
Unlike their British counterparts, the men of the Aeronautical Division had to do 
whatever they could to survive since Congress and the War Department would not provide them 
with funding.  The Aeronautical Division’s lack of funds all but forced Foulois to use his 
personnel funds to purchase the equipment and supplies that they needed to maintain the U.S. 
Army’s lone aircraft.  General Allen gave the Aeronautical Division $150 from the Signal Corps’ 
budget to help fuel and maintain that airplane but that amount could not do much to satisfy the 
need for more aircraft.50  As a result, private investors, including Robert F. Collier, owner of 
Collier’s magazine, aided the Aeronautical Division’s efforts.  In early 1911, Collier purchased a 
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1910 Wright Type B that he rented to the Aeronautical Division for the small sum of one dollar 
per month.  Foulois took delivery of the airplane on February 21, 1911.51 
There is no clear evidence to indicate that the delivery of Collier’s airplane had any effect 
on the members of Congress.  However, what is certain is that Congress voted to provide the 
Aeronautical Division with an appropriation of $125,000 for fiscal year 1912 on March 3, 1911.  
Although the amount was $75,000 less than General Allen had asked for each fiscal year from 
1908 through 1911, the appropriation was significant.  Foulois, in particular, was pleased that 
Congress finally seemed to understand that aviation was worth some investment.52   
The Aeronautical Division quickly bought three Wright Model B airplanes and two 
Curtiss airplanes at approximately $5,000 each.53  The first two of the new aircraft, Signal Corps 
Airplane Number 2 (S.C. No. 2) and Signal Corps Airplane Number 3 (S.C. No. 3), arrived at 
Fort Sam Houston in April 1911.  The arrival of the new airplanes was particularly important 
because it allowed the Aeronautical Division to fly more sorties than ever before, which meant 
that the service could also train more pilots.  In addition, both the Wright brothers and Curtiss 
sent instructor pilots to help Foulois and the student pilots better understand and deal with the 
unique characteristics of each airplane.54 
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The flying training at Fort Sam Houston ended when a serious accident occurred on May 
10, 1911.  On that day, Lieutenant G.E.M. Kelly crashed S.C. No. 2 when attempting to land at 
the end of his primary pilot qualification flight.  Witnesses stated that Kelly came in far too fast 
for the landing and failed to get the airplane level to the ground in time to land properly.  
Consequently, one of the front wheels of S.C. No. 2 hit the ground, causing the airplane to twist 
violently to one side.  The impact of the crash threw Kelly from the airplane, badly fracturing his 
skull.  He died several hours later at the hospital on Fort Sam Houston.55 
Kelly’s crash had repercussions for the Aeronautical Division, especially the men 
stationed at Fort Sam Houston.  To begin with, General William H. Carter, commander of the 
Maneuver Division, ordered a halt to all flying at the post.56  The order led the Aeronautical 
Division to move its operations back to College Park, Maryland.  At roughly the same time, 
Simmons decided to take a job with Robert Collier, which left the Aeronautical Division without 
an experienced mechanic.57  Ultimately, Kelly’s accident and death had taken a toll on the 
Aeronautical Division; but it did not deal a fatal blow to the fledgling organization.  Much like 
what had happened at the time of Selfridge’s death, the men of the Aeronautical Division viewed 
Kelly’s demise as unfortunate but still as an occasionally likely part of their highly dangerous 
profession. 
Despite the abruptness of their departure from Fort Sam Houston, the Aeronautical 
Division’s return to College Park proved to be a positive event that helped the service grow.  
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However, many of the men were concerned that the U.S. Army might retard the growth of the 
Aeronautical Division following Kelly’s death.  Years after the accident, Foulois recalled: “As I 
packed my bags for the trip to Washington, I wondered if I could take being chained to a desk, 
especially when it seemed to be a punishment.”58   
Fortunately for Foulois, his fear that he and the rest of the Aeronautical Division were 
being punished turned out to be unwarranted.  The move to College Park proved to be beneficial 
for the Aeronautical Division because it coincided with the arrival of new personnel who would 
have a long-term impact on the development of U.S. air power.  The new personnel included 
Second Lieutenant Henry H. “Hap” Arnold and Second Lieutenant Thomas DeWitt Milling.  
Both men arrived at College Park on June 15, 1911 with the goal of becoming pilots.59   
The return to College Park also happened shortly before the General Allen decided to 
require all pilots to pass Fédération Aéronautique Internationale (FAI) tests.  Previously, the 
Signal Corps and the Aeronautical Division did not have any real requirements for pilots other 
than that they were daring enough to attempt to fly an airplane.  The Aero Club of America, the 
only FIA-sanctioned group in the U.S., facilitated the process ordered by General Allen by 
ensuring that the Aeronautical Division pilots complied with the FAI’s requirements.   The FAI 
tests brought a level of legitimacy to the Aeronautical Division that had been missing because its 
pilots could now boast that they too had passed the same rigorous test their as counterparts in 
Europe.60   
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Finally, the move from Fort Sam Houston occurred at the same time that the Aeronautical 
Division established the Signal Corps Aviation School at College Park.  The school was larger 
and more sophisticated than what had existed in Texas.  At Fort Sam Houston, the aviators had 
had only one hanger and two aircraft, the College Park school four airplanes, four hangers, and 
more personnel.61  The school’s additional capabilities allowed the Aeronautical Division to train 
more aviators, helping offset what had been one of the service’s greatest handicaps throughout 
its brief existence.   
Although the Signal Corps Aviation School at College Park proved highly valuable to the 
Aeronautical Division because of its proximity to Washington, D.C., particularly the halls of 
Congress, the cold winter weather in the region continued to be a concern.  Therefore, in 
November 1911, the War Department directed the Aeronautics Division to relocate the Signal 
Corps Aviation School from College Park, Maryland, to Augusta, Georgia, so that flying could 
continue during the winter months.  On November 28, 1911, five officers and 20 enlisted men 
loaded four aircraft (one Burgess-Wright, two Curtiss, and one Wright), horses, wagons, trucks, 
and mules aboard a train before leaving for Georgia.62  Upon arrival, the officers secured lodging 
in a local hotel, while the enlisted men rented rooms on a farm that the U.S. Army Quartermaster 
Department leased for the site of the Signal Corps Aviation School.63 
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Ironically, rare snowfall in January and February, followed by rain and flooding in 
March, interfered with flying training and instruction in Georgia.  At one point, the Savannah 
River covered most of the field used for takeoff and landing.  Yet, the officers and men at the 
Signal Corps Aviation School managed to fly on 58 of the 124 days they were in Augusta in 
spite of the fact that the normally mild Georgia winter had proven to be colder and wetter than 
usual.64   
The flying at Augusta continued until March 28, 1912.  A few days later, on April 1, 
1912, the officers and men of the Signal Corps Aviation School departed Augusta and returned 
to College Park to continue flying operations.65  The move to Augusta had not been without 
problems, but it was important because it allowed the aviators to continue flying during the 
winter months.  It allowed them to continue learning about the capabilities of both themselves 
and their aircraft which was important because they knew that they had to prove themselves to 
their military and civilian superiors who did not fully appreciate the progress they had made. 
While the men of the Aeronautical Division trained in Augusta, Signal Corps officials 
had taken the important step of codifying the requirements for U.S. Army aviators.  The Signal 
Corps publicized the new Military Aviator rating in War Department Bulletin No.2 on February 
23, 1912.  Two months later, on April 20, 1912, the requirements for the new rating appeared for 
the first time in Secretary of War Stimson’s report to the U.S. House of Representatives.  
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According to Secretary Stimson’s report, anyone desiring a Military Aviator rating had to be a 
commissioned officer or the U.S. Army (Regular Army) or an “Organized Militia.”  In addition, 
they had to have passed the Military Aviator test, which required them to climb to at least 2,500 
feet, carry one passenger to an altitude of approximately 500 feet, fly in a 15 mile-per-hour wing, 
execute a “dead-stick” landing within 150 feet of a pre-designated point, and complete a cross-
country flight that covered a distance of at least 20 miles while maintaining an altitude of 1,500 
feet.  If they had the necessary qualifications, the officers would have to submit proof of their 
qualifications to the Adjutant General.  They would then be listed as Military Aviators on their 
official U.S. Army records.66 
The Military Aviator rating, like the FAI test, helped increase the legitimacy of the 
Aeronautical Division. The men of Aeronautical Division had lobbied for the Military Aviator 
rating because they believed that it demonstrated both their competence and uniqueness to others 
in the U.S. Army.  Captain Chandler, Lieutenant Arnold, and Lieutenant Milling, three of the 
first Aeronautical Division aviators to earn their FAI-approved pilot licenses, also received the 
first three Military Aviator certificates awarded.  They had completed all of the qualifications for 
the rating on July 5, 1912.  For their effort, they received credit on their official record.67   
General Allen argued that a simple statement in someone’s official record did not 
adequately address the importance of such an achievement.  Allen believed that Military 
Aviators needed a badge that showed their achievement to all who saw them in uniform.  As a 
result, he created a drawing of the proposed badge and pressured the War Department to award it 
                                                 
66 War Department Bulletin, No. 2, February 23, 1912; Chief Signal Officer’s Annual Report, 1912. 
 
67 Hennessy, The United States Army Air Arm, p. 59. 
 
43 
 
to all qualified Military Aviators.68  It took until May 27, 1913, for the War Department to issue 
General Order No. 39, which officially authorized the certificate and badge for Military 
Aviators.69    
The effort led by General Allen represented an important step forward for the men of the 
Aeronautical Division because it demonstrated to everyone that military aviators were officially 
recognized as performing a unique mission within the U.S. Army.  For the aviators, the badge 
provided the acknowledgement that they had sought since the U.S. Army activated the 
Aeronautical Division in 1907.  The badge was also a mark of distinction that separated airmen 
from the enlisted men and officers in the other branches of the U.S. Army.  The badge made 
them unique.70 
The successful effort to institute the Military Aviator badge was not the only significant 
achievement for the Aeronautical Division in the spring of 1912.  On March 26, 1912, the U.S. 
House of Representatives formally asked Secretary of War Stimson to provide Congress with a 
report on aviation in foreign countries, as well as a plan to increase the size of the Aeronautical 
Division. The request from the House Committee on Military Affairs came in response to 
repeated assertions in American newspapers and in Congress that U.S. aviation had fallen behind 
compared with aviation in several foreign countries, most notably Great Britain, France, and 
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Germany.71  The transcript of the hearings included an excerpt from Brigadier General James 
Allen’s annual report.  Allen, the U.S. Army’s Chief Signal Officer, stated: 
The progress and development by this auxiliary to the military establishment during this 
period is believed to be without precedent.  Although the United States was the first nation to 
recognize the aeroplane for military purposes and carried out the first official Government tests 
of an aeroplane in 1908 and 1909 at Fort Myer, Va., yet such has been the phenomenal progress 
in the science and art that this country had been left far behind in securing practical equipment 
and organization for the use of this recognized indispensable adjunct to war….72 
 
On April 20, 1912, Secretary Stimson issued the report that Congress had requested.  He 
explained that the Signal Corps had ten officers assigned to aviation duty at that time.  He also 
reminded Congress that the number of aviators could not be increased without their 
authorization.  Therefore, he urged Congress to quickly remedy the situation by passing a bill 
that the War Department had submitted as a draft to the House Military Affairs Committee just 
over a month before on March 14, 1912.73    
Stimson’s report indicated that he was sympathetic to the Aeronautical Division’s plight.  
Further evidence of his support came on April 25, 1912, when he agreed to let the United States 
Aeronautical Reserve build a small station at College Park.  He also allowed the Aeronautical 
Reserve’s pilots to fly from the field at College Park as long as they adhered to all rules and 
regulations set by General Allen.  The following month, Stimson gave the Christmas Airplane 
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Company permission to use the facilities at College Park.74  His decision to allow both the 
Aeronautical Reserve and the Christmas Airplane Company to use the same facilities at College 
Park ultimately benefitted the Aeronautical Division because it helped increase the number of 
trained American aviators just a few short years from the start of World War I.   
As Stimson and the Signal Corps leaders worked to improve the Aeronautical Division’s 
capabilities, the officers and men of the service continued to break new ground.  On May 6, 
1912, a group of pilots assigned to the Signal Corps Aviation School flew from College Park to 
Chevy Chase, Maryland, where they landed on the Chevy Chase Club’s golf course.  Led by 
Captain Charles Chandler, the flight was the first cross-country flight by a group of U.S. Army 
aircraft.75  Less than one month later, on June 1, 1912, Lieutenant Arnold broke the existing 
altitude record when he reached 6,450 feet.  That same evening, Captain Chandler completed the 
U.S. Army’s first night landing after engine troubled delayed his return to College Park after a 
flyover at the annual Army-Navy college baseball game, held that year in Annapolis, 
Maryland.76  The efforts of Arnold, Chandler, and their fellow pilots were important to the 
overall growth and development of American aviation because they demonstrated that the men 
of the Aeronautical Division were capable and motivated in spite of the significant obstacles they 
faced. 
The men of the Aeronautical Division continued to experiment in order find new ways to 
prove that aviation had tremendous value for the nation.  Their drive for innovations resulted in 
an important test that they believed would demonstrate the airplane’s potential as a weapon of 
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war.  On June 7, 1912, nearly one week after Arnold’s and Chandler’s separate feats, Colonel 
Isaac Lewis brought to College Park a new machine gun that he had invented to see if it could be 
fired from an aircraft.  Colonel Lewis originally designed his machine gun to be used by both 
infantry and cavalry.  As a result, Lewis had made the weapon as light as he could.  Weighing in 
at 25 pounds, 6 ounces, the air-cooled and gas-operated “Lewis Gun” utilized a 50-round drum 
magazine that fired the .30-06 Springfield cartridge.   Captain Chandler volunteered to be the 
first aviator to fire the Lewis Gun from an airplane.  Just before the flight, Lewis set the rate of 
fire for the Lewis Gun at 500 rounds per minute.77  Chandler loaded the weapon aboard a Wright 
B Flyer piloted by Lieutenant Milling before climbing aboard.  Once airborne, Milling piloted 
the aircraft over a cheesecloth target that was roughly 6-feet wide and 7-feet long.  As Milling 
kept the aircraft at the low altitude of 250 feet, Chandler fired the Lewis Gun at the relatively 
small target.  Even though it was the first time he had fired such a weapon, which he set on the 
aircraft’s front crossbar, Chandler managed to hit the target five times.78   
The following day, June 8 1912, Chandler and Milling conducted flight tests using the 
Lewis Gun and a larger cloth target 6 feet wide and 64 feet long.  Flying at an altitude of 550 
feet, Chandler fired 44 bullets and hit the target 14 times.  Chandler, Milling, and others at the 
Signal Corps Aviation School were impressed by the Lewis Gun.  More importantly, they 
believed that arming aircraft with such weapons would allow the Aeronautical Division to 
contribute more to the U.S. Army than just reconnaissance and observation.  As a result, they 
asked the U.S. Army to purchase ten Lewis Guns so that they could conduct further tests.  The 
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U.S. Army Ordnance Department disapproved the request because it had not officially accepted 
the weapon which was still undergoing field tests.79   
The fact that the U.S. Army denied the Aeronautical Division’s request for ten Lewis 
Guns did not surprise anyone in the Signal Corps.  The U.S. Army, including the Ordnance 
Department, moved at a slow pace when it came to accepting or implementing changes.  The 
Lewis Gun, a new and seemingly complicated weapon, had performed well during field tests.  
Yet, the Ordnance Department rejected the weapon following extensive field testing in the 
summer of 1912.  Members of the Ordnance Department argued that the Lewis Gun had several 
faults that concerned them enough for them to reject the weapon.  Lewis, who stated that he had 
been “slapped by rejections from ignorant hacks” on more than one occasion, retired from the 
U.S. Army and moved to Belgium where he established the Armes Automatique Lewis.80 
In August 1912, approximately two months after the experiments with the Lewis Gun, 
men from the Aeronautical Division participated in U.S. Army maneuvers near Bridgeport, 
Connecticut.  The Aeronautical Division flew at the request of the War Department, which, after 
reading reports of the progress of British, French, and German air forces, wanted to see whether 
U.S. airplanes and American ground troops could work together effectively.  The Aeronautical 
Division sent Captain Frederick Hennessey, Lieutenant Arnold, Lieutenant Foulois, Lieutenant 
Harold Geiger, Lieutenant Harry Graham, Lieutenant Roy Kirtland, and Lieutenant Milling to 
participate.81    
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During the maneuvers, the aviators completed a number of reconnaissance flights that 
helped track the position of ground forces which had been designated as the “blue” and “red” 
forces.  Although inclement weather interfered at several times throughout the maneuvers, the 
event demonstrated the value of cooperation between aircraft and ground forces.  For example, 
alternating between assisting the “blue” force and the “red” force, the aviators successfully 
spotted weaknesses in the opposing force that were all but impossible to see from the ground.  As 
a result, the officers leading the maneuvers determined that the ground force assisted by aircraft 
had an edge over the force that did not have aviation support.82  The aviators’ success during the 
U.S. Army maneuvers generated a great deal of pride throughout the Aeronautical Division.  It 
also led the U.S. Army to include aircraft in future ground exercises so that the partnership 
between air and ground forces could be explored further.  
Two months after maneuvers in Connecticut, in October 1912, the Aeronautical Division 
had a total of nine aircraft in service.83  The Signal Corps had purchased eleven airplanes 
between 1909 and 1912.  Of those, one aircraft, a Wright Model B, was destroyed in a crash 
while another aircraft, a Wright Model A, was on static display in the Smithsonian Institution.  In 
addition to the nine serviceable aircraft at the Signal Corps Aviation School, the school had 39 
enlisted men, fourteen officers, and one civilian assigned.84 
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While still small compared to the number of aircraft that the U.S. fielded in World War I, 
the fact that the Aeronautical Division had nine aircraft and 54 men by the end of 1912 indicated 
that at least a few individuals in the U.S. military and in Congress had begun to see the value of 
airplanes.  However, as discussed above, a great deal of that support only came after Congress 
had received numerous reports which indicated that the Aeronautical Division lagged behind its 
European counterparts.  As a result, many airmen remained convinced that few in the U.S 
military and Congress supported them.85 
Around the same time, Congress held hearings on the War Department appropriation for 
fiscal year 1914 (FY14), which covered the period from 1 July 1913 through 30 June 1914.  
During the hearings, Brigadier General George Scriven, General Allen’s replacement as Chief 
Signal Officer, testified that the Aeronautical Division desperately needed more men in order to 
expand.  Scriven explained that the Aeronautical Division would have 22 aircraft in service at the 
end of FY14 if all went as planned.  Although that number was a significant increase over the 
nine aircraft in service at that time, it did not solve the service’s largest problem—a lack of 
trained aviators.  Scriven argued that, unless Congress took immediate action, the U.S. Army 
would only have fourteen trained aviators as of the end of FY14.  Because each aircraft was 
intended to carry two men, the Aeronautical Division would need to train 30 more aviators in 
order to have enough personnel to crew all 22 aircraft.86 
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General Scriven’s plea for more aviators came as several air forces in Europe began to 
increase in size.  In early 1912, Prince Heinrich of Prussia led a National Aviation Fund drive in 
Germany that collected 7.2 million marks.  With that money, Germany purchased 62 aircraft and 
trained 162 pilots.  Austro-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia also increased the 
size of their budding air forces between 1911 and 1912.  Historian Walter Boyne argues that the 
growth of aviation in each of those countries was driven by their desire to have a robust civilian 
aircraft industry.  As Boyne demonstrates, the military forces in each of those nations worked to 
ensure that the civilian industry would ultimately be utilized to support military requirements.87 
General Scriven understood that the growth of the various European air forces was not 
something that the U.S. should ignore.  Thus, as Congress deliberated the War Department 
appropriation, which they passed on March 2, 1913, Scriven tasked all U.S. Army aviators in the 
Washington area to work together to develop legislation that he hoped would help the 
Aeronautical Division expand.  The group that responded to Scriven’s request consisted of Major 
Edgar Russel, Captain Hennessy, Lieutenant Graham, Lieutenant Arnold, Lieutenant Milling, 
and Lieutenant Sherman.  The men met several times in February 1913 before crafting a bill that 
requested more flying personnel, the creation of a board of officers who would oversee the 
promotion of aviators, a pay increase for all men on flying status, and death benefits for aviators 
killed in the line of duty.  The men hoped that the bill would entice more men to join the 
Aeronautical Division by correcting what the problems that they believed had kept some men 
away.88 
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Two months later, on May 16, 1913, Representative James Hay of Virginia introduced 
House Resolution 5304 at the urging of Captain Paul Beck.  Largely written by Beck, H.R. 5304 
called for the creation of a separate U.S. Army corps that would focus solely on aviation.  The 
hearings on H.R. 5304 were historic because, for the first time in U.S. history, Congress 
addressed whether the Aeronautical Division should remain part of the Signal Corps or become a 
separate branch of the U.S. Army.  Beck argued in favor of removing the Aeronautical Division 
from the Signal Corps.  He maintained that the Signal Corps would never allow the Aeronautical 
Division to fully develop.89   
Hay’s bill indicated that airmen’s long-simmering dissatisfaction with the way they had 
been treated by the U.S. military and Congress was beginning to reach a critical mass.  However, 
not all airmen were ready to demand a separate service.  Scriven, Assistant Secretary of War 
John Breckinridge, and the majority of the officers in the Aeronautical Division wanted U.S. 
Army aviation to remain in the Signal Corps for the near future.90  Those officers included 
Lieutenant Arnold, Captain William “Billy” Mitchell, and Captain Foulois.  All three men 
testified that separating the Aeronautical Division from the Signal Corps would damage both 
entities because the young service was simply too new to function successfully on its own.  
Mitchell, who would later become the most outspoken proponent of a separate air force, 
maintained that the progress of U.S. Army aviation would be unnecessarily slowed by such a 
move.91   
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Despite Beck’s well-reasoned argument, the House Military Affairs Committee chose to 
shelve the bill and pursue another course of action.  While disappointed with the outcome, 
Foulois argued that the hearings had been useful because they allowed the Aeronautical Division 
to “present a compilation of aeronautical progress being made by all the major world nations.”  
Foulois believed that the members of the committee did not fully understand the issues that the 
Aeronautical Division faced.  Therefore, he hoped that hearings would help the committee 
members appreciate the fact that the Aeronautical Division was underfunded and understaffed 
compared to the air forces of the major European powers.  Foulois explained that the hearings 
included a comparison of the annual aviation expenditures of 26 governments over a period of 
five years.  Germany led the pack with a total expenditure of $28 million, while the U.S. came in 
fourteenth with a total expenditure of approximately $435,000.92   
In addition to educating the House Military Affairs Committee on European aviation, 
Foulois asserted that the hearing forced “Senior Signal Corps officers” to take a close look at the 
Aeronautical Division and begin to “realize the potential of military aviation.”93  Although both 
General Allen and Scriven did a lot to help the Aeronautical Division grow, Foulois is correct 
that the hearings did force General Scriven to reassess the Aeronautical Division’s importance 
within the Signal Corps and the U.S. Army.  For perhaps the first time, Scriven understood how 
the Aeronautical Division compared to its counterparts in Europe.94   
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As Scriven worked to find a way to expand the Aeronautical Division, he and his men 
had to deal with a long-pressing issue that had grown into a serious problem.  Accidents had 
occurred throughout the Aeronautical Division’s brief existence.  In fact, such events were 
viewed by many aviators as an unpleasant reality of flying airplanes.  However, a series of 
deadly crashes between 1912 and 1913 forced the U.S. Army to launch an investigation into 
aircraft construction standards.  By late 1913, a total of eleven Army aviators had died in 
airplane crashes while on duty.  Six of the crashes involved Wright Model C airplanes.  Pilots in 
the Aeronautical Division said that the Model C was nose-heavy, which led to frequent nose 
dives.95  Orville Wright, one of the Model C’s designers, argued that the nose dives were a result 
of pilot error, not an inherent flaw in the design of the airplane.  However, Orville agreed to 
install a flight indicator to help pilots avoid placing the aircraft in a dangerously steep attitude.96  
Unconvinced that Orville’s remedy would prevent further accidents government investigators 
concluded that the Model C was “dynamically unsuited for flying.”   
In response to the uproar over the accidents, the General Scriven issued an order on 
February 16, 1914 that directed the Aeronautical Division to stop flying the Wright B and Wright 
C aircraft immediately.  Scriven did so because he was concerned that the accidents might lead 
the U.S. Army, the War Department, or Congress to halt all Aeronautical Division flying.  To 
help solve the problem, Scriven appointed a board of officers to determine whether those two 
types of aircraft were safe to fly.  The board included Lieutenant Joseph Carberry, Lieutenant 
Walter Taliaferro, Captain Carleton Chapman, Captain Townsend Dodd, and Captain Benjamin 
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Foulois.  The board concluded that the Model B and Model C were inherently dangerous because 
they were equipped with engines located directly behind the pilot, which had a frequently caused 
severe injury or death in a crash.  The board asserted that the Aeronautical Division should buy 
aircraft with the engine located in front of the pilot.  Known as “tractor” aircraft because the 
engines “pulled” the aircraft forward, they tended to be much less harmful to the pilot during a 
crash because the engine absorbed a great deal of the impact in a crash.97   
The board’s findings led General Scriven to prohibit the use of all rear-engine “pusher” 
aircraft.  His decision meant that the Aeronautical Division, which had always suffered from a 
lack of resources, only had five operational aircraft: one Curtiss aircraft (Number 1) and four 
Burgess aircraft (Number 9, Number 24, Number 25, and Number 26).98  Scriven’s order 
effectively ended the U.S. Army’s use of “pusher” aircraft.  Although ultimately wise given the 
problematic record of pusher aircraft during World War I, the move to flying only tractor aircraft 
slowed training because it limited the number of airplanes available.99 
The accidents not only changed the type of aircraft used by the Aeronautical Divsion; 
they also altered aviation instruction and training.  In February 1914, the U.S. Army’s Inspector 
General Department sent Colonel J.L. Chamberlain to inspect the 1st Aero Squadron and the 
Signal Corps Aviation School.  In his report, Chamberlain found numerous deficiencies present 
in both units.  He was especially critical of the 1st Aero Squadron which, he argued, lacked 
enough officers and men to function as an effective unit.  Chamberlain, who had no aviation 
experience, also found fault with the aircraft manufacturers.  General Scriven did not agree with 
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Chamberlain’s report.  He believed that Chamberlain’s report failed to account for the dangers 
associated with flying.  Scriven argued that “in spite of short-comings and accidents the results 
obtained are believed to be fully commensurate with the means provided for the establishment of 
this new art in the Army.”100 
As the Aeronautical Division worked through its difficulties with airplanes, Congress 
provided some much needed positive news.  The revised H.R. 5304 proved to be much more 
acceptable to both the War Department and Congress than the original bill had been.  Although it 
authorized the creation of an Aviation Section which would be larger than the existing 
Aeronautical Division, it was kept in the Signal Corps which pleased most members of Congress 
and the bulk of the officers in the Signal Corps.  Both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate passed H.R. 5304.  On July 18, 1914, the bill became law, officially establishing the 
Aviation Section, U.S. Signal Corps.101  The new law stated that “there is hereby created, an 
aviation section, which shall be a part of the Signal Corps of the Army, and which shall be, and 
is hereby, charged with the duty of operating or supervising the operation of all military aircraft 
[within the U.S. Army], including balloons and aeroplanes.”  The law also charged the Aviation 
Section “with the duty of training officers and enlisted men in matters pertaining to military 
aviation.”102   
The Aviation Section  
Created less than two weeks before the start of World War I, which began on 28 July 
1914, the Aviation Section contained just nineteen officers, 101 enlisted men, and seven aircraft.  
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Yet, activation of the Aviation Section proved to be a pivotal moment for U.S. military aviation.  
To begin with, the Aviation Section had a $250,000 budget that was approximately twice as 
large as any previous appropriation that the Aeronautical Division had received.  In addition, the 
new law authorized the Aviation Section to add an additional 320 men, which included 260 
enlisted men of all ranks (private through sergeant first class).  Those men joined the existing 
complement of nineteen officers and 101 enlisted men who had been part of the Aeronautical 
Division.  As a result, the Aviation Section had a total of 421 personnel assigned.103   
The rapid growth that followed the Aviation Section’s creation required the service to 
buy new aircraft and to establish new training schools in order to train the incoming men.  To aid 
that effort, the Aviation Section purchased 11 aircraft, which brought the total number of aircraft 
in service at the end of 1914 to 20.104   
The task of purchasing those aircraft and setting up the training schools occupied a great 
deal of the Aviation Section’s resources throughout 1914.  Scriven, acutely aware that the 
Aviation Section needed to prove that it was up to the task, ordered the 1st Aero Squadron’s 1st 
Company to report to San Diego, California.  On July 17, 1914, the 1st Company arrived in San 
Diego where they joined the Signal Corps Aviation School at North Island off the coast of San 
Diego.105   
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The Signal Corps Aviation School at North Island had taken shape in November 1912 
when the U.S. Army’s first school detachment arrived.  By June 1913, the school officially 
began operating.  The location proved to be well-suited for flying.  Lieutenant Colonel Arthur 
Cowan, commandant of the Signal Corps Aviation School, stated: “As far as being a suitable 
place for flying, it would be hard to imagine a better place.  There is all the room that could be 
desired for a training station, with plenty of landing ground and nothing whatever to interfere 
with us.”106   
The growth of the Aviation Section and the addition of the new school at San Diego 
proved to be more important than anyone could have anticipated, especially once the developing 
tensions in Europe reached the breaking point in July 1914.  United States Army leaders, having 
long treated aviation as an auxiliary, finally had a reason to pay more attention.  With 
approximately 20 aircraft, the Aviation Section continued to trail far behind its European 
competitors.  Great Britain’s Royal Flying Corps fielded 48 aircraft, while France had 136 
aircraft in service.  Germany, the rival of those two nations, possessed 180 aircraft.107   
As the conflict in Europe worsened, the men of the Aviation Section prepared for the 
possibility that the U.S. might become involved in World War I.  On August 17, 1914, aviators at 
the North Island school began a series of bombing tests that lasted until August 24, 1914.  Led by 
Captain Goodier, the aviators dropped “dummy” bombs, explosive bombs, grenades, and an 
artillery shell on a bulls-eye target roughly 100 feet in diameter.  Captain Muller served as the 
official observer for the Aviation Section while Colonel J.W. Jones watched the tests for the War 
Department.  Muller believed that the tests proved that the Aviation Section needed to provide 
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bombing instruction to all new aviators.  He also argued that the Aviation Section needed to 
select several officers who would work on becoming experts in aerial bombing.108 
General Scriven, who was well aware that his superiors in the U.S. Army and the War 
Department would not fund such experiments, did not share Captain Muller’s enthusiasm.  He 
maintained that it was not likely that the Aviation Section would undertake anything other than 
reconnaissance for some time.  As a result, none of Muller’s recommendations took hold.  
However, Scriven was not entirely unwilling to explore new technologies and roles for the 
Aviation Section.  In September 1914, Scriven and Lieutenant Colonel J.E. Hoffer, an officer 
from the U.S. Army’s Ordnance Department, examined a recoilless gun invented in 1910 by 
Commander Cleland Davis, U.S. Navy.  The weight of the gun, precisely 155.35 pounds, proved 
to be too heavy for the aircraft then in use.109  Two months later, in November 1914, Scriven 
agreed to conduct more tests after Brigadier General William Crozier explained that the U.S. 
Army had two machine guns which might work well in airplanes due to their light weight.  
Crozier, a member of the Ordnance Department, recommended that the Aviation Section test the 
1909 machine-rifle and the Vickers machine gun.  After receiving Scriven’s approval, the 
Ordnance Department sent one of each gun to San Diego for field testing.110   
In December 1914, General Scriven testified before the House Committee on Military 
Affairs.  Scriven, acutely aware of developments in Europe, told the committee that the U.S. 
trailed dangerously far behind in aviation expenditures.  Scriven pointed out that the $250,000 
that the Aviation Section received in 1914 did little to help the service compete with the $45 
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million that the German Air Service had at its disposal.111   Yet, the disparity between United 
States’ and Germany’s aviation expenditures did not seem to worry the members of the House 
Committee on Military Affairs.  After General finished detailing the amount of money that the 
European powers had spent on their air forces, Senator Kenneth D. McKellar stated: “Well, they 
have proved worthless to a very large extent.”  McKellar than argued: “And if that is true, we are 
the gainers by not having spent so much.”112  Scriven argued that airplanes had proven their 
utility again and again, but the committee members were not convinced.  On March 4, 1915, the 
House Military Affairs Committee provided just $300,000 for the Aviation Section.113   
The Impact of the Great War 
In early 1915, the air forces of France, Great Britain, and Germany continued to grow in 
size and sophistication at a rapid pace to keep up with the demands of war.  In the U.S., the 
Aviation Section continued to develop too but the pace was much slower.  In part, Americans 
may have thought they could afford to move more slowly because the threat of American 
involvement in the war seemed distant.   The $300,000 that Congress gave the Aviation Section 
clearly demonstrated that too few American leaders at the time feared becoming entangled in the 
“European War.”  Many men in the Aviation Section were not happy with the amount of the 
appropriation.  Foulois argued: “It was nothing more than War Department tradition and 
congressional shortsightedness which was hampering the progress of military aviation.”  He 
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added that “we were grateful that our Signal Corps superiors saw the future as we did and that 
General Scriven had the courage to buck the War Department General Staff on Capitol Hill. But 
his courage didn’t help, and we staggered along as best we could....”114 
Many officers in the Aviation Section had paid close attention to the advances in aviation 
happening in Europe.  By reading newspapers, official reports, and letters from Americans 
serving with the French and the British they learned that the French, British, Germans, and other 
warring air forces had moved beyond using airplanes solely for reconnaissance purposes.  In fact, 
the air forces of those three nations, as well as others involved in the conflict, had begun to use 
aircraft to attack other aircraft, to protect reconnaissance aircraft, and to direct artillery fire.  The 
Aviation Section, on the other hand, had only just begun to attempt anything other than aerial 
reconnaissance.  However, with the help of proponents of aviation in the U.S. Navy, the Aviation 
Section began to push hard to expand their capabilities.115 
The members of Congress helped matters some when they passed the Naval 
Appropriation Act on March 3, 1915.  The act authorized the creation of the National Advisory 
Committee on Aeronautics (NACA).  Composed of twelve members appointed by the President, 
NACA had five primary tasks.  The first was to provide information on all matters related to 
aeronautics.  The second was to institute research into problems related to aeronautics.  The third 
was to keep apprised of aeronautical advances made throughout the world.  The fourth was to 
disseminate information that committee members had gathered regarding aeronautics.  Finally, 
the committee’s fifth task was to “be at all times at the service of the President, Congress, and 
the executive departments of the government for consideration of any problems regarding 
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international air navigation regulation and development of civil aerial transport as well as 
technical development policies of the military, naval, and postal air services.”116 
Scriven, spurred by what he believed was increased support for the Aviation Section, 
acted quickly.  On April 9, 1915, General Scriven ordered the formation of an aero company at 
San Antonio, Texas.  On the same day, Scriven informed the men of the Aviation Section that 
three additional aero companies would soon deploy to Corregidor in the Philippine Department, 
Fort Kamehameha in the Hawaiian Department, and the Panama Canal Zone in the Panama 
Department.  Scriven explained that all three units would fly seaplanes while operating from 
their overseas bases which were all located in nations near larges bodies of water.  Scriven 
argued that the units were absolutely necessary because they would provide much needed 
protection for U.S. territories.117 
The Aviation Section gained a boost in July 1915 when several men in New York 
established a “Business Men’s Camp” at Plattsburgh, New York.   Members of the camp 
included Captain Raynal Bolling of the New York National Guard, Richard Fearing, and James 
Miller.  In September 1915, Bolling and Miller began the task of establishing an aero company in 
the New York National Guard.  Two months after that, the New York National Guard officially 
activated the 1st Aero Company of the New York National Guard.  Briefly called the Aviation 
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Detachment, First Battalion, S.C., National Guard, New York, the unit included four officers and 
40 enlisted personnel.118   
The creation of NACA, Scriven’s decision to expand the scope of the Aviation Section’s 
operations, and the activation of the 1st Aero Company of the New York National Guard did not 
immediately alter the Aviation Section’s fortunes.  However, those three events indicated that 
there was a growing concern among some Americans that quick action was needed if the U.S. 
was going to be able to compete with the world’s major aviation powers.  
Just as things began to look more positive for the Aviation Section, several accidents 
occurred that once again highlighted the service’s longstanding problem with airplanes.  On 
September 5, 1915, Lieutenant Joseph Morrow and his passenger, Private Adam Khuen-Kryk, 
took off from Brownsville, Texas.  While in a left turn, Morrow’s Curtiss JN2 went into a nose 
dive.  Morrow managed to gain positive control of the aircraft but not soon enough to prevent a 
crash.  Both men survived but the accident convinced many that the JN2 was not a safe airplane.  
In fact, B.Q. Jones, the officer in charge of the detachment at Brownsville, argued that the JN2 
was not suitable for military flying at all.119   
Foulois soon formed the same opinion of the JN2 that Jones had.  While at Fort Sill, 
Oklahoma, the 1st Aero Squadron attempted to undertake several reconnaissance missions with 
artillery troops as passengers.   Foulois explained that the squadron’s members had a difficult 
time performing their duties because “constant engine and air-frame troubles prevented us from 
being very useful.”  The engines proved to be the most problematic with seven of the twelve 
                                                 
118 Garry Clifford, The Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburg Training Camp Movement, 1913-1920 (University of 
Kentucky Press, 1972), p. 68. 
 
119 Foulois and Glines, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts, p. 120. 
 
63 
 
engines that the 1st Aero Squadron had taken with them being all but scrapped.120  Foulois tried 
to rectify the situation by contacting the Curtiss company but no one responded to his requests 
for more engines and parts.  As a result, the 1st Aero Squadron had to ground all of the airplanes 
within two weeks.121   
The death of Captain G.H. Knox further compounded the 1st Aero Squadron’s problems.  
Captain Knox had been a passenger is a JN2 flown by Lieutenant R.B. Sutton.  Foulois met with 
his pilots after the crash to discuss a way ahead.  Out of the twelve pilots in attendance, ten 
argued that the JN2 was not safe, especially when carrying a passenger, because the airplane 
simply didn’t have enough power to carry two men.  The aviators also complained that the JN2 
was poorly built, unstable, and difficult to maneuver when using the airplane’s rudders.  Foulois 
and Milling did not think that the JN2s were as bad as the other pilots believed them to be.  Yet, 
Foulois suspended all JN2 flights for six weeks so that mechanics could check and repair the 
airplanes.  Glenn Curtiss sent new engines, wings, stabilizing fins, and rudders to replace the 
defective parts on the 1st Aero Squadron’s JN2s.122 
Problems Mount 
The men of the Aviation Section found their service under close scrutiny due to the 1st 
Aero Squadron’s difficulties in Mexico and the morale problems discovered during the court 
martial of Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Goodier, Sr.123  Things came to a head on January 5, 1916, 
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when Senator Joseph Robinson of Arkansas called for an investigation of the Aviation Section 
after he had received several reports from disgruntled young aviators.  Robinson then introduced 
Senate Joint Resolution 65 to gain support for the investigation.  Robinson argued that some 
within the Aviation Section had concealed problems within their service from both the War 
Department and Congress.124  Robinson publicly stated that the Aviation Section had only 24 
qualified pilots as opposed to the 46 they officially claimed.125  He also maintained that the 
Aviation Section was underequipped and its men undertrained.    
As Robinson’s resolution moved through Congress, the Signal Corps began its own 
investigation into the matter.  On February 2, 1916, the Signal Corps opened an internal 
investigation into the matter led by Colonel David Shanks, the Signal Corps’ Inspector General 
(IG).   Approximately one year earlier, in January 1915, Shanks had noted that the Aviation 
Section’s school in San Diego had done virtually nothing to correct the deficiencies that the 
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Inspector General had discovered there in early 1914.  Most notably, Shanks asserted that Reber 
had largely suppressed the Inspector General’s report.126   
Shanks’ highly-critical report drew a response from numerous individuals.  On February 
9, 1916, General Scriven responded to Colonel Shanks’ report, rebutting the allegations against 
him and arguing that Senator Robinson was wrong on all counts.  However, Scriven candidly 
admitted that the tense situation with the Aviation Section was the direct result of having officers 
who were “young in years and in service, and deficient in discipline and the proper knowledge of 
the customs of the service and the duties of an officer.”  Scriven then argued that the War 
Department could help ease the situation by removing the restrictions on age and marital status 
for aviation officers in order to “do away with many of the difficulties that have beset the 
progress of aviation in the Army.”  Essentially, Scriven argued that age restriction, which 
required new aviators to be unmarried lieutenants under the age of 30, had led to the Aviation 
Section’s discipline issues.127 
The problems within the Aviation Section became even more critical in the spring of 
1916 when the men of the Aviation Section found themselves involved in armed conflict south 
of the U.S. border.  On March 9, 1916, in the wake of Pancho Villa's raid on Columbus, New 
Mexico, the War Department attached the 1st Aero Squadron to Major General John J. “Black 
Jack” Pershing's “Punitive Expedition.”  The 1st Aero Squadron sent a total of eleven pilots, 84 
enlisted men, a civilian mechanic, one engineer officer, and eight  aircraft.  The men of the 1st 
Aero Squadron disassembled their JN3 aircraft for transport from Fort Sam Houston in San 
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Antonio, Texas, to Columbus, New Mexico.  In addition to the aircraft, the squadron included 
twelve trucks, one automobile, and six motorcycles.  The enlisted men reassembled the aircraft 
after they arrived in Columbus on March 15, 1916.  The next day, the pilots of the 1st Aero 
Squadron flew the first observation mission flown during the Punitive Expedition.  The 
following day, March 17, 1916, Lieutenant Dodd (pilot) and Captain Foulois (observer) 
completed the first U.S. military reconnaissance flight over a foreign nation when they flew over 
a small section of Mexico.128 
On March 29, 1916, as the men of the 1st Aero Squadron supported the Punitive 
Expedition, Representative Charles Lieb of Indiana introduced a bill to establish a Department of 
Aviation, led by a Secretary of Aviation who would oversee all military aviation in the U.S.  The 
Committee on Military Affairs virtually ignored Lieb’s bill.129  However, the difficulties that the 
men of the 1st Aero faced in Mexico in the weeks that followed demonstrated to the American 
press that the Aviation Section desperately needed more funding to effectively accomplish its 
assigned missions. 
The effort in Mexico quickly demonstrated that the Aviation Section’s aircraft were 
woefully underpowered and difficult to handle under all but the best flying conditions.  For 
example, the aircraft’s laminated wood propellers had to be removed after each flight due to the 
extremely dry conditions in the area of operations.  Worse yet, the relatively fragile aircraft were 
simply falling apart from regular use.  In fact, the general wear and tear from regular use during 
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the early part of the Punitive Expedition led Foulois to condemn all eight aircraft by April 22, 
1916.130   
Secretary Baker, who received regular reports on the Punitive Expedition, interceded 
with Congress on behalf of the Aviation Section.  Baker stressed the need for an emergency 
appropriation, exclaiming: “We now have actual field operations going on.”  Baker argued that 
the Aviation Section needed to buy airplanes immediately so that they could take “advantage of 
the experience that manufacturers in this country have had from the European experience, and 
send them down there and get the value of testing them under actual field conditions.”131  
General Pershing, who saw the problems that Foulois and his men faced, joined Baker’s call for 
action.  Referring to the 1st Aero Squadron, Pershing stated: “They have already too often risked 
their lives in old and often useless machines which they have patched up and worked over in an 
effort to do their share of the duty this expedition has been called on to perform.”132  Convinced 
by both Baker’s argument and Pershing’s plea, Congress passed an emergency appropriation of 
$500,000 to fund the purchase of new aircraft, parts, and other related equipment.133  
In addition to the deficiencies in equipment that it exposed, the Punitive Expedition 
generated a great deal of additional controversy for the Aviation Section.  During the campaign, 
members of the 1st Aero openly expressed their frustrations with the aircraft they were flying.  
According to Foulois,a reporter working for the El Paso Herald learned about the 1st Aero 
Squadron’s aircraft problem.   Two widely-read newspapers, the New York Times and the New 
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York Herald Tribune, published accounts of the pilots’ complaints.  The accusations were not 
harmful enough on their own to initiate investigation.  However, when combined with previous 
complaints regarding the Aviation Section’s readiness and capabilities, the criticism of aircraft 
performance during the campaign against Villa caused Congress to take notice. 
As the 1st Aero Squadron’s problems in Mexico continued, Major General Hugh L. Scott, 
U.S. Army Chief of Staff, appointed Brigadier General Ernest A. Garlington, the Army Inspector 
General, to chair a board to investigate the Aviation Section.134  The Garlington Board, as it 
became known, investigated several things, including Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Goodier’s claim 
that Captain Arthur Cowan and his staff at the San Diego school had accepted flight pay despite 
not being qualified pilots.   Another aviator, Lieutenant Herbert Dargue, the officer in charge of 
training at the San Diego school, stated that the Aviation Section did not have a combat-ready 
unit because of poor leadership at top of the Signal Corps.  Dargue asserted that Signal Corps 
leadership simply did not understand aviation and never would.   
Garlington and the rest of the men on the board spent a month looking into the allegations 
brought forth by Goodier, Dargue, and others.  After reviewing all the available evidence, they 
determined that Cowan and others had received unwarranted flight pay.135  Yet, the issue with 
flight pay was not the only problem that the Garlington Board uncovered.  Their inspection 
revealed that the Army officers assigned to monitor the government’s contracts with aircraft 
manufacturing companies had accepted poorly built aircraft.  Specifically, the board argued that 
the Aviation Section had received poor quality aircraft prior to the Punitive Expedition because 
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Scriven and Reber had failed to supervise their men properly during the aircraft acquisition 
process.  The board argued that, because Scriven and Reber were in command, they were 
ultimately responsible for the breakdown in discipline that had caused the problem.  Most 
importantly of all for the Aviation Section, the members of the Garlington Board asserted, the 
U.S. Army should remove the Aviation Section from the Signal Corps.136 
Secretary Baker directly addressed the multitude of problems facing the Aviation Section 
on May 4, 1916.  During a hearing before the Committee on Military Affairs, Baker argued that 
the problems within the Aviation Section were largely the result of the clash between the 
energetic and enthusiastic young aviation officers and their superiors who, he argued, did not 
truly understand the unique requirements of aviation.  However, Baker made it clear that the 
young officers in question had not been insubordinate.  Baker then explained that he had ordered 
the Army General Staff to conduct a study of the Aviation Section which would be used as the 
basis for a reorganization to be overseen by George O. Squier.137 
The House of Representatives also discussed the Aviation Section on May 4, 1916.  
Representative Charles Caldwell of New York argued that a Congressional investigation was 
necessary in order to ensure that the U.S. would become the world’s leader in aviation.138  
Caldwell asserted that the Aviation Section simply did not then have the men or equipment 
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necessary to compete against their European counterparts.  Caldwell’s plea for increased funding 
for the Aviation Section failed.139 
The findings of the Garlington Board’s findings had a lasting impact on the Aviation 
Section.  On May 5, 1916, Secretary Baker removed Reber as the Chief of the Aviation Section.  
Baker selected Captain Billy Mitchell to serve as the new Chief of the Aviation Section until a 
replacement could be found.  Angered by their actions and their sometimes poor leadership, 
Baker issued letters of reprimand to Scriven, Reber, and Cowan.140  Reber quickly left the 
Aviation Section and the Signal Corps, remaining in the U.S. Army throughout World War I.  
Cowan was removed from command of the San Diego school.  Scriven, who retained his 
position as the Chief Signal Officer, remained on duty until his retirement in February 1917.141 
Baker’s reprimand of Scriven, Reber, and Cowan, underscored the problems that had 
plagued the Aviation Section since 1907.  Many in the U.S. Army, the War Department, and 
Congress, continued to believe that aviation was not worthy of significant investment.  As a 
result, they did not appropriate much money to support the Aviation Section.  The airmen, 
feeling slighted at nearly every turn, developed an attitude towards their military and civilian 
leaders that sometimes bordered on insubordination.  Baker understood that, but believed that the 
reprimand of Scriven, Reber, and Cowan, was “an essential part of the plan for clearing up the 
whole aviation question and making a fresh, and I trust better, start.”142 
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To achieve the fresh start that he wanted, Baker chose Colonel George Squier to serve as 
the new Chief of the Aviation Section.  Baker selected Squier for several key reasons.  First, 
Squier had been involved with aviation since 1907 when he served as the executive to General 
Allen, the Chief Signal Officer.  In addition, Squier, who had graduated from the U.S. Military 
Academy at West Point in 1887 and had earned a Ph.D. from John Hopkins University in 1893, 
and he had a number of friends in the American industrial and scientific communities who could 
help move the Aviation Section forward.  Finally, Squier had witnessed the British, French, and 
German air forces in action over the Western Front first-hand.   
Squier officially assumed command of the Aviation Section on May 20, 1916.  Upon 
Squier’s arrival, Captain Mitchell became his deputy.  Within weeks, Congress voted to increase 
the size and strength of the U.S. military in response to the growing possibility that the U.S. 
would enter World War I.  On June 3, 1916, Congress passed the National Defense Act (NDA) 
of 1916, which greatly increased the size and budget of the entire U.S. military, including the 
Aviation Section.  Specifically, the NDA increased the size of the Aviation Section to 148 
officers, allowed the President to establish the overall size of the enlisted force, and created the 
Signal Officers Reserve Corps (297 officers) and the Signal Enlisted Reserve Corps (2,000 men).  
Almost three full months later, on August 29, 1916, Congress appropriated the immense sum of 
$13,000,000 to fund the expansion of U.S. military aviation.143 
General Squier quickly took advantage of the Aviation Section’s new financial windfall 
by establishing the Field Officers Course for Aviation at North Island.  Squier patterned the new 
course after the U.S. Army’s staff schools at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  The course served as 
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the basis for the many U.S. military aviation courses and schools that followed, including the Air 
Corps Tactical School. 
In November 1916, Secretary Baker issued his annual report.  In the report, Baker 
addressed the state of the Aviation Section.  Baker explained that the Aviation Section, which 
had 60 officers and 260 enlisted men assigned in June 1916, would grow to 77 officers and 1,800 
in 1917.  More importantly, Baker stated: 
The men of the Aviation Corps have been almost exclusively comparatively young men, very young men, 
indeed, and they have been engaged in an art desperate, daredevil, hazardous indeed, so that they have an attitude 
toward life and toward themselves that men have who are engaged in an especially hazardous service.  Being fliers, 
they have had rather a disposition to chafe at the restraint and discipline which was made for more normal kinds of 
service, feeling that they were not adapted to the regulations and restrictions of men who were not engaged in so 
unusual an occupation.  In other words, they had an impatience at being controlled by men who did not themselves 
know the business in which they were engaged.  I do not want to be understood to criticize these young men.  They 
are pioneering for the army and United States and their exploits are superb.  The net result of it all is that I am going 
to reorganize the entire Aviation Section.144 
 
The reorganization of the Aviation Section happened at a critical point in the service’s 
existence.  Beset by problems with both personnel and equipment, the Aviation Section was on 
the verge of internal collapse when Congress finally decided to fund aviation at an 
unprecedented level.  Baker, who was well aware of the difficulties the airmen had dealt with, 
hoped that the reorganization would resolve many of those challenges.  However, Baker did not 
direct any significant changes to the existing structure of the Aviation Section at that time.  
Instead, he hoped that General Squier’s leadership would be enough to appease airmen until they 
were ready to handle their own service.145 
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The Aviation Section started 1917 with a renewed focus after weathering numerous 
challenges the previous year.  In early January, the 1st Aero Squadron left Mexico after a long 
and difficult deployment that severely tested the Aviation Section’s capabilities.  Looking back 
on the Punitive Expedition, Foulois maintained that it had benefitted the Aviation Section and 
had ended the violence along the border between Mexico and the U.S.   Foulois said that he 
considered the “experience of our eight-plane air force to have been a vital milestone in the 
development of military aviation in this country” because it showed that the Aviation Section 
could be a vital asset for the U.S. Army.146   He also asserted that the scouting and air mail 
flights that the 1st Aero Squadron completed during the Punitive Expedition “proved beyond 
dispute to the most hardened former soldier congressman that aviation was no longer 
experimental or freakish.”147 
The U.S. Army promoted Squier to the rank of brigadier general on February 14, 1917.  
Squier replaced Brigadier General Scriven as the Chief Signal Office.  Scriven chose to retire 
from the Army in the wake of the problems uncovered within the Aviation Section in 1916.  
Upon assuming command, Squier selected Lieutenant Colonel John B. Bennet as the head of the 
Aviation Section.  Bennet immediately worked on increasing the number of personnel in the 
Aviation Section.148 
Bennet’s efforts were important but ultimately did not significantly increase the size of 
the Aviation Section.  As a result, when the U.S. declared war on Germany on April 6, 1917, the 
Aviation Section remained a relatively small and hollow force.  The Aviation Section had 
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ordered 366 airplanes in 1916 but had received only 83 by the end of the year.  More 
importantly, the aircraft in use in the Aviation Section were not combat-capable aircraft.  As the 
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence Historical Division stated in his report on the Aviation 
Section: “No airplane in America up to 1917 had ever mounted a machine gun, and aviation 
personnel had practically no knowledge of radiotelegraphy and telephony, photography, 
bombing equipment, lights for night flying, aviators clothing, compasses used in flying, or other 
aviation instruments well known to Aviators of Germany, England, and France.”149 
Conclusion 
As demonstrated throughout this chapter, the decades prior to the U.S.’s entry into World 
War I proved to be very tumultuous for American military aviators.  Throughout much of that 
time, U.S. Army leaders, as well as many of the members in the U.S. Congress, simply did not 
believe that aviation would ever contribute much to the U.S. military.  Consequently, neither the 
U.S. Army nor Congress provided much funding for the nation’s fledgling air force.   
In spite of that reality, airmen continued to push forward in order to gain centralized 
control over air power.  They faced a determined opposition that did not have faith in air power 
or airmen’s ability to properly employ such a force.  Yet, they did not relent because they 
believed that the airplane would be developed into a weapon of war that would change warfare 
forever.  Although airmen had very little evidence to base their theories on, they were convinced 
that air power possessed tremendous potential.  They were prepared to demonstrate what air 
power could do—all they needed was a conflict to take part in. 
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Chapter 2 – The Rise of the True Believer: Billy Mitchell in World War I 
The mindset that American airmen formed between 1907 and 1917 continued to guide 
American military aviation after the United States entered World War I.  Desperate to prove their 
value to their superiors in the U.S. Army and Congress, airmen worked tirelessly to show what 
air power was capable of.  During the conflict, one American emerged as the most vocal 
proponent of American air power.  That man, William “Billy” Mitchell, developed into the most 
visible embodiment of that mindset as a result of his interactions with General Hugh “Boom” 
Trenchard, commander of the Great Britain’s Royal Flying Corps in France.  Mitchell’s time 
with Trenchard was particularly important because it helped convince him that air power was 
more than just a support branch for the ground forces.  Mitchell's transformation from measured 
supporter of air power to the most urgent and enthusiastic proponent for the advancement of air 
power was only the most conspicuous evidence of what was happening among the majority of 
the aviators in the U.S. Army.   
The State of American Military Aviation 
The U.S. Aviation Section entered World War I a largely hollow force due to the way in 
which Congress and the U.S. Army had treated the fledgling service between 1907 and 1916.  
The National Defense Act of 1916 improved the situation somewhat by authorizing the Aviation 
Section to expand.  As a result, the Aviation Section had formed 24 squadrons by the time 
Congress declared war on Germany on April 2, 1917.  However, of those 24 squadrons, only the 
1st Aero Squadron was fully organized, trained, and equipped.150   
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In addition to the lack of trained personnel, the Aviation Section faced a shortage of 
doctrine and a dearth of leaders able to execute what little doctrine there was.  Brigadier General 
Benjamin Foulois, who was one of the first U.S. military aviators, was also one of the few U.S. 
Army officers with enough aviation experience to properly develop doctrine.  Foulois, however, 
was not particularly interested in such things.  Consequently, Lieutenant Colonel William “Billy” 
Mitchell quickly developed into the Aviation Section’s leading thinker.  During World War I, 
Mitchell proved to be one of the Aviation Section’s best leaders and its primary architects of 
tactics and doctrine.   
In addition to being an excellent theorist, Mitchell was, arguably, one of the most 
intriguing individuals in American military history.  Historian C.V. Glines asserts that Mitchell 
“was a crusader who had the vision to understand the potential of air power long before his 
contemporaries.”  Glines also maintains: “To most, he was a hero, without whose dire warning 
the United States might have never been able to field the world’s largest air force in time to fight 
World War II.”151  Another historian, Walter J. Boyne, contends: “Mitchell proved to be the 
brutal backing block behind whose slashing efforts other men would act as quarterbacks to 
advance the concept of an independent air force.”152  
Mitchell certainly was a “crusader” and a “brutal backing block” throughout his career in 
the U.S. Army.  He was also a theorist who had the ability to imagine what possibilities the 
future might hold for air power.  During World War I, Mitchell used that ability, as well as his 
skills in managing personnel and resources, to develop some of the Aviation Section’s earliest 
doctrine.  His work in France during World War I requires especially close scrutiny because it 
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had a lasting impact on the Aviation Section and its successor organizations—the United States 
Air Service, United States Army Air Corps, United States Army Air Forces, and the United 
States Air Force.153  Thrust into a conflict that held seemingly limitless possibilities and 
unending challenges, Mitchell excelled at putting theory into practice.  In less than two years, 
Mitchell led the effort to craft an airpower strategy that enabled the U.S. Air Service to 
successfully compete in the air war over the Western Front.  More importantly, he met with 
French and British air power leaders who, shaped his theories on the employment of air power.  
Thus, Mitchell’s experiences during World War I provided the foundation that he, as well as 
other air power leaders who followed, built upon throughout the interwar years. 
  
Mitchell’s Early Career 
Mitchell’s background contributed significantly to his approach toward leadership, his 
self-confidence, and his interactions with others.  Born on December 29, 1879, in Nice, France, 
Mitchell began his military career at the age of 18 when he joined the United States Army on 
May 14, 1898.  During Mitchell’s junior year at Columbia College (later renamed George 
Washington University) the United States declared war on Spain.154  Like many other young men 
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of his generation who had been regaled with tales of the American Civil War, Mitchell was eager 
to serve his country and experience new things.155   
Mitchell enlisted in the First Wisconsin volunteer regiment as a private.  Mitchell’s 
father, a Civil War veteran who had served in the 24th Wisconsin and as a member of the United 
States House of Representatives and the United States Senate, thought that his son was better 
suited for a commission.  Consequently, with more than a little help from his well-connected 
father, the younger Mitchell received his commission as a second lieutenant within three weeks 
of signing on as an enlisted man.156   
Mitchell transferred to the U.S. Signal Corps shortly after receiving his commission 
because he thought that it suited his talents.  After joining the Signal Corps, Mitchell took charge 
of all the telephone and telegraph lines within the camp that his unit occupied in Florida as they 
waited to deploy to support the Spanish-American War.  Much to Mitchell’s dismay, the conflict 
ended while Mitchell and his unit were still in Florida.  Despite the disappointment of not being 
able to demonstrate his bravery in battle, Mitchell retained a strong desire to continue his 
military service and begged his superiors to send him to Cuba as part of the occupation forces.157   
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As he had done shortly after joining the U.S. Army, Mitchell’s father used his status as a 
U.S. senator to help his son achieve his goal of going to Cuba.  Working as a Signal Corps 
officer in Cuba, Mitchell led the effort to set up a communications system on the island.  Within 
four months of arriving, Mitchell and his troops had installed 136 miles of telegraph wire in 
Santiago Province.  While at work in Cuba, the always adventurous Mitchell heard rumors of the 
difficulties in the Philippines and once again lobbied his superiors to send him to assist in putting 
down the Filipino Rebellion.158   
In August of 1899, Mitchell received orders to proceed to the Philippines.  Upon arrival, 
Mitchell was assigned to the division commanded by General Arthur MacArthur, the father of 
General Douglas MacArthur.   In the Philippines, Mitchell oversaw the construction of telegraph 
lines.  His assignment in the Philippines was not without great risk.  On several occasions, 
Mitchell experienced the hand-to-hand fighting that typified the conflict.  In April 1901, after 
approximately two years of grueling work, he returned to the United States.159   
Shortly after Mitchell returned to the U.S. he was promoted to first lieutenant in the 
Signal Corps, a position which granted him a coveted “regular army” commission.  Shortly after 
his promotion, Major General Adolphus Greely, Chief of the Signal Corps, selected Mitchell to 
go to Alaska to survey the construction of a communications systems designed to connect the 
remote Alaska Territory to Canada and the rest of the U.S.  Over the next two years, most of 
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which he spent in the harsh, isolated, and largely unpopulated Alaskan wilderness, Mitchell and 
his troops built a nearly 1,700-mile telegraph line.160  
Following his arduous two-year tour in Alaska, Mitchell moved to Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas, home to the Army’s Infantry and Cavalry School, Staff College, and Signal School.  At 
Fort Leavenworth, Mitchell served as an assistant instructor at the Signal School and as a Signal 
Company commander.161  During that assignment, which lasted from 1903 to 1909, Mitchell first 
delved into the rapidly evolving world of air power.  During that time, he produced a study 
entitled “The Signal Corps with Divisional Cavalry and Notes on Wireless Telegraphy, 
Searchlights and Military Ballooning.”162  Although Mitchell’s duties at Fort Leavenworth did 
not involve any direct contact with the recently developed airplane, largely because they 
remained few and far between throughout that period, he had cultivated an intense interest in 
aviation that lasted throughout the rest of his life.   
In 1909, Mitchell left Fort Leavenworth and returned to the Philippines.  Mitchell’s 
second tour in the Philippines was far different than his first tour.  Mitchell conducted frequent 
trips to the many islands between the Philippines and Formosa, an island to the north controlled 
by the Japanese.163  As part of his reconnaissance tours, Mitchell spent a great deal of time 
studying the Chinese, Japanese, and Russian military, as well as visiting some of the key 
battlefields of the recent Russo-Japanese War.  Like many other U.S. military personnel familiar 
                                                 
160 Hurley, Crusader for Air Power, p. 9. 
 
161 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
 
162 Ibid., p. 11. 
163 Formosa is commonly known as Taiwan.   
 
81 
 
with the tensions in the area, Mitchell asserted that the U.S. would soon come into conflict with 
Japan.164 
Mitchell’s first fourteen years of military service provided him with a great deal of 
experience that served him throughout the remainder of his life.  Mitchell had matured a great 
deal during his time in the Army.  As historian Roger G. Miller noted in Billy Mitchell: Stormy 
Petrel of the Air, the Army had given Mitchell a “worldwide view, trained him to think in terms 
of mass warfare, hardened him in guerilla combat, and taught him an appreciation for rapid 
technical advances.”165  He also discovered that military service was something he excelled at.  
Most importantly, he developed an interest in learning and planning that served him well over 
the remainder of his military career. 
Enter Aviation 
In March 1912, the U.S. Army selected Mitchell to serve on the Army’s General Staff in 
Washington, D.C.  During his time on the General Staff, which Secretary of War Elihu Root had 
established to improve the U.S. military following the Spanish-American War, Mitchell came 
into frequent contact with young members of the Aeronautical Division such as Lieutenant 
Henry “Hap” Arnold, whom he had met at the U.S. Army flying school in College Park, 
Maryland.   
Tensions that had developed between U.S. Army leaders and the Aeronautical Division, 
who felt neglected by their superiors, came to a head the following year.  In 1913, Congressman 
James Hay of Virginia introduced a bill that, if passed, would have “created an ‘air corps’ 
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equivalent in stature to the infantry, cavalry, or artillery.”166  Beginning in August 1913, the 
House Military Affairs Committee held hearings to determine whether such a move was needed.  
The committee asked Mitchell to testify because of his experience in the Signal Corps and on the 
General Staff.  During his testimony, Mitchell displayed little of the outspokenness that would 
later gain him national fame.  He argued that all U.S. Army aviation assets should remain part of 
the Signal Corps because the aircraft observations were a key component of the existing Signal 
Corps communication system.167  Mitchell, quite contrary to his later views, maintained that, “If 
we are going to try and build up aviation in this country, what’s the use of trying to create a 
separate branch…causing all sorts of complications?  I believe it would set aviation back to 
create a separate organization.”168  As a result of the testimony delivered by Mitchell, as well as 
several others, the House Military Affairs Committee decided that all U.S. Army aviation assets 
would remain in the Signal Corps.169  
By the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, Mitchell had become thoroughly 
occupied with his duties on the General Staff.  Handling information that arrived from U.S. 
military personnel stationed throughout Europe, Mitchell provided maps for the daily briefings 
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given to the War Department, the White House, and Congress “that portrayed the progress of the 
various armies from day to day.”170  Mitchell followed developments in aviation during the war 
through the reports of Major George O. Squier, who served as a U.S. military attaché in London, 
England, during the first two years of the conflict. 
In 1915, the U.S. War Department generated a report on the state of U.S. military 
aviation at that time.  The unnamed author of the report argued that the primary role of all Signal 
Corps aviation assets was supporting the Army’s ground forces.  The author also maintained that 
Signal Corps aircraft could be used for coastal defense if the U.S. Navy did not defeat invading 
forces.  While the author of the report was never disclosed, historian Burke Davis conjectured 
that Mitchell had written the report.171  Although significant, for historical purposes at the very 
least, the report did not have a substantial impact on either the U.S. Army or U.S. Navy.  As for 
Mitchell, he made no public statements on Signal Corps aviation during the year.  Thus, it is 
almost impossible to directly link Mitchell with the report. 
In 1916, Mitchell became directly involved with the Aviation Section for the first time.  
In the spring of 1916, significant difficulties between aviators and their non-flying superiors 
rocked the Signal Corps Aviation School in San Diego, California.   The disagreements, verging 
on insubordination at times, led the War Department to relieve Colonel Samuel Reber as the 
Chief of the Aviation Section on May 5, 1916.  The War Department selected Mitchell to serve 
as the temporary head of the Aviation Section until Colonel George Squier could return to the 
U.S. after completing his duties in London.  When Squier returned the following month, Mitchell 
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became his assistant.  In Mitchell’s characteristic style, he devoted a great deal of energy toward 
learning as much as he could about aviation.172 
Shortly thereafter, Mitchell began taking flying lessons to understand better the duties 
associated with his new posting.173  Mitchell even took the flying lessons in his free time and at 
his own expense, suggesting how deeply he believed he needed to understand his men in order to 
lead them better in the Aviation Section.  Mitchell recalled that he “used to take a boat down the 
Potomac River from Washington [D.C.] to Newport News, Virginia, on Saturday night, fly all 
day Sunday, and be back in the office on Monday.”174  Although he did not earn his wings while 
attending the Glenn Curtiss Aviation School, the lessons did provide him with valuable insight 
into the rigors, as well as the dangers, of aviation. 
 
Bound for France 
In January 1917, the War Department asked Squier to send an observer from the Aviation 
Section to Europe to determine how the British and French air forces had organized and 
equipped their pilots to fight the German Air Service.  Mitchell, always confident in his own 
abilities, argued that he was the right man for the task because he was one of the few military 
men to understand that World War I had already changed the nature of modern warfare forever.  
Mitchell later asserted: 
It was almost impossible to awaken the slow-working minds of our regular army officers 
to any action.  A few took a passing interest, but there was practically no effort made to revise 
the old military system we had been using since the Civil War.  In spite of the fact that foreigners 
were ordering a great number of aircraft in this country and taking many of our best young men 
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into their services, we still sat by and did practically nothing.  I therefore decided to seek service 
in Europe and learn as much as possible about the trend of affairs before this country entered the 
war.  I was sure in my own mind that when we did, we would have to be controlled, taught and 
armed by the Europeans as we knew nothing about that kind of warfare ourselves.175 
Due in equal parts to his experience and persuasiveness, not to mention the fact that he 
spoke fluent French, Mitchell was selected for the job and left the U.S. on March 19, 1917 
aboard the ship Alfonso XIII bound for Corunna, Spain.176  On April 2, 1917, two weeks after he 
arrived, the U.S. Congress declared war on Germany.  Reaching Paris eight days later, on April 
10, 1917, Mitchell reported to Major James A. Logan and Major Marlborough Churchill, the two 
U.S. Army officers in charge of all U.S. Aviation Section observers in France.  Mitchell 
immediately recognized the assistance Logan’s and Churchill’s presence provided U.S. forces 
stating:  
Long before our actual declaration of war, they had laid out in remarkable detail plans 
which included the designation of ports at which American troops should be debarked, the 
railroads they should use, the areas to which they should be assigned for training, what their 
organization should consist of, their points of supply, locations for hospitals, military schools, 
parks for motor vehicles, horses and mules.  They thoroughly realized that our regular army, 
bound by red tape and obsolete traditions, would be unequal to the task of organizing, training 
and handling the vast hordes we were about to throw into the contest.  French and British officers 
of experience had to direct that.177 
After meeting with Logan and Churchill, Mitchell promptly began to establish a 
headquarters from which he could oversee all U.S. aviation matters in France.  Years later, 
recalling the experience, Mitchell said: “I began the arrangement of an office for handling 
aviation.  No funds were available from Washington, nor would they allot any, even after 
repeated cables.”  Fortunately for Mitchell, as well as the Aviation Section, the French Army 
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decided to provide him with two officers, Captain Raulin and Captain Benedict, to help him get 
things started.  With the help of his French aides, Mitchell prepared what he referred to as a 
“scheme of organization” for the anticipated American aviation forces.  According to Mitchell, 
he and his staff compiled “a list of all equipment needed, showing the kinds of airplanes, types of 
engines and instruments, and an estimate of the raw materials required for the make-up of such 
planes, including armament and radio, with notations on the probable time it would require to 
construct them.”178   
As part of his work, Mitchell argued that the U.S. should use French airplanes because 
there were no U.S. airplanes in Europe.  Furthermore, Mitchell knew that the French continued 
to produce new, state-of-the-art aircraft at a fast pace while the U.S. aviation industry had only 
just begun to increase its production because the U.S. declaration of war was so recent.179  
Lieutenant Lucien Thayer, a U.S. Air Service pilot and official historian during the conflict, 
assessed the state of the U.S. aviation: “In the United States the aviation industry was still in its 
infancy.  There were no American-made planes which possessed military combat value.  The few 
airplanes that were being produced there were fit only for primary training.”180  
On April 20, 1917, Mitchell sent the completed paperwork to Washington, D.C. hoping 
for a swift response.  But no reply came from the War Department, which was quite busy 
readying the U.S.’s entry into combat in World War I.  As a result, Mitchell met with French 
Secretary of Aviation Daniel Vincent to discuss boosting the number of French airplanes being 
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produced.  Following their meeting, Vincent ordered French airplane factories to increase 
production to meet the anticipated U.S. demand.  Mitchell maintained, quite correctly given the 
state of the U.S. aviation industry at the time, that Vincent’s initiative probably saved the U.S. 
Aviation Section because without his help, as Mitchell remembered the matter, the “air force 
would have been totally without equipment until just before the Armistice, when the first suitable 
American planes began to arrive.”181   
Soon after meeting with Vincent, Mitchell requested permission to participate in French 
Army operations near Chalons in order to witness how the French employed air power at the 
front.  Upon arriving, Mitchell was immediately impressed by the quality of the men and the 
machines at the French aerodromes, as well as the precision flying performed by the experienced 
and combat-tested French pilots.  Mitchell recalled that the French pilots “were encouraged to do 
all the acrobatic flying possible, to keep their hand in….  Their flying appeared to me to be 
excellent.”182  In particular, Mitchell was most impressed by the quality of the French aircraft, 
which far outperformed the underpowered airplanes he had flown in America.   
Mitchell’s visit to the French aerodrome near Chalons left him with the impression that 
the French Air service was “very efficient…due to their excellent planes, their splendid 
mechanics and their well-trained aviators.”183  However, Mitchell also came away from the front 
with the somewhat frightening realization that the U.S. lacked many of the things needed for the 
fight its men were about to enter.  Assessing the state of the U.S. Air Service in the spring of 
1917, Mitchell later explained in his memoirs: “Where we were woefully deficient in equipment 
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was very apparent after only a few hours at the front: it was in aircraft, artillery, machine guns, 
anti-aircraft guns, bombs, grenades; in fact, about everything.”184   
Despite the difficulties facing the U.S. Air Service, Mitchell understood that the one asset 
that the U.S. possessed that the British, French, and Germans did not was manpower.  In a letter 
to a fellow officer who was still in the United States, Mitchell expressed the French Air Service’s 
view toward the potential benefits of U.S. assistance.  Mitchell wrote:  
The command of the air is of vital importance to the success of all movements on a big 
scale.  To date it is a hand to hand struggle for the supremacy thereof.  The reports of no German 
machines in the air and so forth are intended so far as I can see for popular consumption; the 
truth of the matter is that neither the French nor the British nor the Germans have that supremacy 
established indisputably.  It is a case of the continual struggle for the superiority…The main fact 
is that the French feel that at sea and in the air the United States ought to help at once.185 
The month after his visit to the French aerodromes at Chalon, Mitchell met with a man 
who would have a substantial impact on the future of military aviation.  In May, Mitchell met 
with Major General Hugh “Boom” Trenchard at the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) headquarters 
near Abbeville, France.  Much like Mitchell, Trenchard began flying late in his military career in 
order to gain experience he believed was necessary to properly lead the aviation forces over 
which he had charge.186  Mitchell, who shared many traits with his British colleague, was struck 
with Trenchard’s commanding presence and maintained that his “judgment inspired my 
immediate confidence and his whole personality my deep respect, and we became fast friends at 
once.”187   
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Busy with a multitude of tasks, Trenchard did not immediately appreciate Mitchell’s 
presence, especially since the inquisitive American had a bevy of questions for the RFC leader.  
Mitchell, however, quickly reversed Trenchard’s attitude by telling the general that “he had such 
an excellent organization that it should not need his leadership for the space of a day or two.188  
As result of Mitchell’s persuasiveness, Trenchard agreed to spend the next few days educating 
Mitchell on the realities of the air war over the Western Front.  During their brief time together, 
Mitchell was deeply impressed by Trenchard’s desire to remain on the offensive at all costs.  
Trenchard asserted: 
It is sometimes argued that our [RFC] aeroplanes should be able to prevent hostile 
aeroplanes from crossing the line, and this idea leads to a demand for defensive measures and a 
defensive policy.  Now is the time to consider whether such a policy would be possible, desirable 
and successful.  It is the deliberate opinion of all those most competent to judge that this is not 
the case, and that the aeroplane is an offensive and not a defensive weapon.  Owing to the 
unlimited space in the air, the difficulty one machine has in seeing another, the accidents of wind 
and cloud, it is impossible for aeroplanes, however skillful or vigilant their pilots, however 
powerful their engines, however mobile their machines, and however numerous their formations, 
to prevent hostile aircraft from crossing the line if they have the initiative and determination to 
do so.189 
Trenchard continued his discussion with Mitchell by stating that “British aviation has 
been guided by a policy of relentless and incessant offensive.”  Of course, Trenchard’s insistence 
on the offensive at all times proved costly, such as at the first Battle of the Somme and during 
“Bloody April” of 1917.  While the offensive did grant the RFC some measure of success in 
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attacking targets behind German lines, the overall impact of Trenchard’s policy included the loss 
of many well-trained aircrews and the airplanes they flew.190   
Immediately after departing Trenchard’s headquarters, Mitchell worked with the staff of 
the French Army Group on a letter addressed to the French Minister of War that outlined the 
possible contributions of U.S. air power.  On May 23 1917, French Premier Alexandre Ribot 
included the figures from the Army Group’s letter in a message to Washington D.C.  Known as 
the “Ribot Cable,” the French Premier’s request stated: 
It is desired that in order to cooperate with the French aeronautics, the American 
government should adopt the following program: the formation of a flying corps of 4,500 
airplanes -- personnel and material included-- to be sent to the French front during the campaign 
in 1918.  The total number of pilots, including reserve, should be 5,000 and 53,000 mechanics.  
2,000 planes should be constructed each month as well as 4,000 engines by the American 
factories.  That is to say, that during the first six months of 1918, 16,500 planes (of the last type) 
and 30,000 engines will have to be built.  The French Government is anxious to know if the 
American Government accepts this proposition, which would allow the Allies to win the 
supremacy of the air.191 
Unfortunately, Ribot’s cable did not specify the types of airplanes to be built.  On May 
17, 1917, Mitchell sent a message to Washington that included specifications for the types of 
airplanes that the Aviation Section would need.  Mitchell’s letter stressed that bombardment and 
fighter aircraft were the most crucial types of airplanes needed.  Reaching Washington on June 4, 
1917, Mitchell’s letter apparently got little attention.  As a result, reconnaissance aircraft were 
slated to be built in numbers that far exceeded those of bombardment of fighter aircraft.192 
By the end of May 1917, Mitchell reassessed the state of U.S. aviation in Europe.  
Mitchell maintained that his “own little air force was in excellent shape.  We had all the 
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information we needed, our plans of organization worked out, and everything written up as to 
how we could work.”  However, Mitchell and the Aviation Section had only one airplane in the 
entire country at the time although there were “several hundred Americans in the French aviation 
schools.”193  At the same time, Major General John J. Pershing, who was still in the United 
States, expressed his dismay regarding the lack of readiness of the Air Service.  Pershing 
assessed that the state of aviation “was such that every American ought to feel mortified to hear 
it mentioned.  We could not have out a single squadron in the field.”194   
In June 1917, the advance elements of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) began to 
arrive in France.  As the AEF began to establish bases throughout the unoccupied sections of the 
war-torn country, Mitchell continued to work with French and British air forces in order to build 
up the Air Service of the American Expeditionary Forces (Air Service, AEF).  Of particular 
importance to the future success of the U.S. Air Service was the Inter-Allied Board which was 
established to “apportion the equipment and fix the method by which it should be handled.”195   
Around the same time, on June 6, 1917, Mitchell sent a message to Washington D.C. 
requesting materials the French aviation industry was in short supply of including “soft and hard 
steels and chrome-nickel…aluminum, bronze, cast iron, brass and copper, and woods.”196  
Mitchell, having met with French aviation leaders, understood the difficulties that the French had 
when it came to obtaining raw materials.  However, Mitchell’s request was largely ignored 
because American authorities decided to build the American-designed and American-
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manufactured Liberty engine.  Mitchell, however, did not waste much time fretting over the 
situation and returned to the front. 
After securing larger facilities for his staff in Paris, Mitchell left for the Royal Naval Air 
Service (RNAS) base of operations at Dunkirk, France.  Led by Wing Captain C.L. Lambe, a 
prewar acquaintance of Mitchell’s, the RNAS unit’s mission was to attack German shipping and 
the many German-occupied ports on the coast of Belgium.  During the trip Mitchell saw his first 
large bombardment airplanes, the cumbersome two-engine Handley-Page bombers.  Used mostly 
at night, due to their slow speed and immense silhouette, the Handley-Pages were nonetheless 
effectively employed by the RNAS against numerous targets in and around Bruges, Belgium.  
Many of the British officers Mitchell met were convinced that the Handley-Page and the 
prototype Super Handley-Page would be capable of hitting targets as far into Germany as the 
Essen district.197 
Following his time at Dunkerque, Mitchell returned to Paris shortly before Pershing and 
his staff arrived on June 13, 1917.  Pershing’s arrival developed into quite an event and received 
so much publicity that French airplanes flew over the city to dissuade any aggressive German 
airmen from disrupting the festivities.198  Pershing’s staff included many men of talent, one of 
whom was Major Townsend F. Dodd.199   
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Dodd, serving as Pershing’s aviation officer in France, had a great deal of experience in 
aviation and had served with Pershing in Mexico during the Punitive Expedition to capture 
Pancho Villa.200  Mitchell met with Dodd soon after the AEF’s arrival in Paris and learned that 
the American aviation industry had made few appreciable gains since his departure from the U.S.  
Dodd informed Mitchell that he did not foresee any “efficient airplanes” arriving from the United 
States for a least a year.  Dodd, referring to the Chief Signal Officer’s office as a “madhouse” 
because of the immense amount of activity needed to get the U.S. Army on a wartime footing, 
explained to Mitchell: “Some civilians had been called in who were great industrial organizers 
and it was hoped something would be forthcoming from them.”  Yet, Dodd made it clear that the 
U.S. Army was “perfectly helpless to cope with the aviation problem.”201   
Mitchell had anticipated such delays and scheduled a meeting among Pershing, Dodd, 
and himself to discuss the situation.  Both Dodd and Mitchell argued that the Air Service should 
be allowed to operate independently and that a “board of officers” should be established to deal 
with the numerous challenges of equipping and organizing the aviation squadrons as they arrived 
in France.  Pershing accepted both of the recommendations proposed by Mitchell and Dodd.  
Following the first meeting of the board, two separate telegrams were composed for Pershing to 
send to Washington.  In the first cable, Pershing was to have argued that:  
To harmonize and concentrate all efforts I strongly favor establishment of air service 
department whose head shall be member of executive cabinet charged with all matters pertaining 
                                                 
200 Dodd, who had earned his pilot’s wings in 1914, helped develop one of the first bombsights used by the U.S. Air 
Service, and had been the commander of the 1st Aero Squadron for a brief time. In addition, Dodd was a proponent 
of separating the Air Service from the Signal Corps.  James J. Cooke, The U.S. Air Service in the Great War, 1917-
1919 (London: Praeger Publishers, 1996), p. 19. 
 
201 Mitchell, Memoirs, p. 135. 
 
94 
 
to American Air Service.  His assistants to be Chief of the Army Air Service, Chief of the Navy 
Air Service and members of the munitions Board or corresponding organization.202 
 
In his second cable, Pershing stated:  
I strongly urge the importance of having all aviation matters in Europe handled through 
these Headquarters, both the matters that originate in Europe either in the American service or in 
the European governments and those matters that originate in the United States and that are 
handled in Europe either by the American Air Service or by the European governments.203 
The officers on the board decided that Pershing’s first cable was not forceful enough to 
achieve the desired results.  As a result, they decided to send the second cable which did result in 
action on the part of the War Department.  In fact, an “American aviation mission” was quickly 
sent to Europe under the command of Major Raynal C. Bolling.204   
 Bolling was a nearly perfect choice to lead a team to Europe.  In 1915, Bolling 
had organized and commanded the Motor Machine Gun Company on the New York National 
Guard that attended the military training camp at Plattsburgh, New York, that same year.  Shortly 
thereafter, he and other members of the New York National Guard formed the 1st Aero 
Company, New York National Guard.  On 23 June 1916, Bolling went to Mineola to begin 
training the novice pilots in the 1st Aero Company.   Energetic recruiting efforts over the next 
few months further increased the size of the unit from 30 to 45 members.205   
Following the U.S. declaration of war on Germany in April 1917, Secretary of War 
Newton Baker selected Bolling to head a team of experts that investigated and recommended 
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what airplanes and equipment the US government should produce.  The group included Captain 
V.E. Clarke, Captain E.S. Gorrell, Commander W.G. Westervelt and Lieutenant W.G. Childs of 
the US Navy, Howard Marmon of the Nordyke and Marmon Company, Herbert Hughes of the 
Packard Motor Company, C.H. Heilman of the Northway Motor Company, W.B. Hurley of the 
Midvale Steeel Company, R.A. Vail of the Dodge Motor Company, and Stay of the Aluminum 
Castings Company.   Known as the “Bolling Mission,” the group prepared for travel to Europe in 
mid-June 1917.206   
The Bolling Mission arrived in England on 27 June 1917.  Having the “full powers to 
represent the Secretary of War in matters pertaining to the production program in the United 
States,” Bolling’s group began discussions with the British Ministry of War.  According to the 
Air Service’s official historian, the members of the Bolling Mission “pursued a double-barreled 
project.”  On one hand, they procured foreign airplanes to train American airmen in and on the 
other, they and selected the “types of motors and planes to be produced in American 
factories.”207  Boiling, Marmon, and Gorrell met with British authorities to discuss the issue of 
royalties.  The British agreed to “an even exchange of manufacturing rights” as long as the U.S. 
provided the raw materials.208 
After arriving in Paris following the completion of several investigative trips, the men on 
the Bolling Mission went their separate ways after General Pershing informed Bolling that he 
needed him to help get the Air Service, AEF, ready for war.  Before Bolling dove headlong into 
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his duties with the Air Service, he issued his reports.  In a letter received by General Foulois on 
15 August 1917, Bolling stated: 
In our opinion these American needs may be divided into two periods: First period, from 
the present time to July 1, 1918.  Second period, subsequent to July 1, 1918,  With every 
confidence in the ultimate performance of the American production program our investigations 
of production experience over here and of the sea tonnage situation have convinced us that 
airplanes and engines produced in America cannot be actually delivered at the front in any great 
quantity prior to July 1, 1918.  Subsequent to July 1, 1918, we believe that American production 
will not only take care of our needs, but may become a larger factor in maintaining the air forces 
of our Allies.  In considering the period between now and July 1, 1918, due weight must be 
given to the experience of all foreign countries and manufacturers in the delays in airplane and 
engine production which were not and could not be foreseen…. 
 
After long and careful consideration of this subject, we and all others here have come to 
the very strong conviction that most of the airplanes and engines for American use at the front 
and for our training here between now and July 1, 1918, must be produced either in France or 
Italy were effective and successful methods of production are already in full operation.  Because 
we consider this imperative and absolutely essential to prevent failure of our air campaign next 
year, an arrangement has been made with the French Government under which they are to 
produce for us the airplanes and engines....209 
 
In the end, Bolling and his group recommended that the Italian Caproni bomber serve as 
the model for the first U.S. production bombardment aircraft.  Mitchell fully supported the 
selection of the Caproni but it soon became clear that the U.S. aviation industry did not yet have 
the capability to produce a significant number of airplanes in the foreseeable future.210  
Consequently, Bolling’s group recommended that the Air Service should rely on British-
manufactured airplanes mated with American-made Liberty engines.211  Mitchell did not favor 
relying on the Liberty/DH-4 combination, arguing that the French were more than capable of 
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meeting the Aviation Section’s requirements.  Angry at what he viewed as incompetence among 
those in Bolling’s group, Mitchell vented his frustration, exclaiming: “There must have been a 
lot of inside work somewhere by the English manufacturers to put this thing over on the 
Americans.”212  Disappointed with the politics within the Aviation Section, Mitchell returned to 
the front to focus on preparing his men for combat. 
Mitchell’s first stop on his return to the front was the aerodrome occupied by the 
Lafayette Escadrille, a group comprised of Americans who flew for the French.213  Accompanied 
by Dr. Edmund L. Gros, the man partially responsible for the formation of the Lafayette 
Escadrille, Mitchell intended to recruit American airmen who had flown with the French into the 
Air Service, AEF.214  After inspecting the Lafeyette’s aerodrome, Mitchell and Gros returned to 
Paris just as large numbers of American troops began arriving in France at the beginning of July 
1917.  Mitchell later observed: “With the appearance of our troops on the streets of Paris and 
with the Commander in Chief and his staff established in their headquarters here, we considered 
that we had formally entered the war.  Our air force consisted of one Nieuport airplane which I 
used myself and that was all.”215  
When Mitchell returned to Paris he learned that Pershing had not approved the 
recommendations of the “board of officers” regarding the separation of the Aviation Section 
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from the Signal Corps.  Consequently, the board lobbied Pershing to send Captain Harold Fowler 
back to the U.S. to “acquaint” the Aircraft Production Board with the immediate needs of the Air 
Service, AEF.216  After Fowler left for the U.S., Mitchell continued trying to ready the untested 
men of the Air Service, AEF for their first combat missions.  Mitchell contended that the 
Aviation Section needed a single leader “who would be Commander in Chief; and not have 
every Tom, Dick, and Harry in the United States, who were neither pilots nor had ever seen an 
armed German, prescribe what should be done against the enemy.”217 
By August 1917, Mitchell and his staff had received word that Congress had passed laws 
to expand dramatically the size of the Aviation Section.218  Mitchell was pleased that the 
Aviation Section was finally getting the recognition he thought it deserved, but he was 
discouraged to hear that it would remain part of the Signal Corps.  Mitchell argued that the 
Aviation Section remaining part of the Signal Corps “meant inefficiency in its worst form, as the 
Signal Corps had developed into a political organization at the top.”219   
Mitchell’s comments point toward his growing desire to centralize power within the 
Aviation Section.  He believed that centralized control would allow the Aviation Section to 
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function more effectively because it helped ensure that one individual, or a group of individuals, 
would have oversight over their service’s activities and operations.220   
Although Mitchell remained committed to the idea of centralizing control within the Air 
Service, AEF he had to focus on the immediate tasks at hand.  Having learned of the Aviation 
Section’s coming expansion, Mitchell met with many officers who had just arrived in France 
because they had more detailed knowledge of the political debates in regarding aviation that 
recently occurred.  The officers informed Mitchell that the Airco DH.4 and Liberty engine 
combination, initially proposed by the Bolling Mission, had been selected over the French-built 
Salmson, which Mitchell had recommended.221   Despite his disappointment with the decision, 
Mitchell had little time to protest because he had just been selected as Commander of the Air 
Service, A.E.F.  Upon receiving his new assignment Mitchell sent Major Churchill to the small 
town of Chaumont to find a suitable building to house their new headquarters closer to the 
front.222  
At the beginning of September, the newly promoted Colonel Mitchell and his staff at 
Chaumont began to busily prepare for the arrival of large numbers of Aviation Section 
personnel.  During the same period General Pershing selected a General W.L. Kenly to serve as 
the Chief of the Air Service on his staff in order to “coordinate the fighting air force on the line 
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with the service of supply, deal with the representatives of other countries regarding aeronautical 
matters and communicate with the United States on these subjects.”223  Mitchell was pleased that 
Pershing had selected Kenly because it allowed him “to handle the fighting on the line without 
interference.”  Mitchell also had a good opinion of General Kenly.224  Primarily, Mitchell 
appreciated Kenly’s desire to learn all that he could about the Air Service and about the AEF’s 
operations in France as well as the General’s willingness “to do anything in his power to” to 
assist Mitchell and his staff.   
With Kenly’s selection as Chief of the Air Service, Mitchell became the Commander of 
the Air Service, Zone of Advance.225  As previously indicated, Mitchell was not at all displeased 
with his new job because it gave him command of the Air Service forces closest to the front, 
allowing him to personally direct the training of his flying officers before they entered combat.  
With his new command in hand, Mitchell coordinated his efforts with those of both Bolling (who 
was in charge of logistical considerations) and Kenly (who lobbied Pershing on the Air Service 
AEF’s behalf) in order to prepare the largely inexperienced men of the Air Service, AEF for the 
major operations they were soon tasked to undertake.226   
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As part of the immense effort, Mitchell, Kenly, and Bolling established a board to 
“conduct mental and physical examinations for transferring to the United States service all 
Americans in the French army and French flying schools.”227  To help build their state of 
readiness even faster, Mitchell made it a policy for his officers to fly with French Air Service 
units as frequently as possible in order to provide them with real combat flying experience.  
After all, many of the officers on Mitchell’s staff had very little flying experience of any sort and 
even fewer had been in an airplane over enemy lines.   
While Mitchell had the drive and enthusiasm needed to ready his men for war, he lacked 
a sufficient number of aircraft for them to fly.  By October 1917, Mitchell had only a single 
squadron under his command, the 1st Aero Squadron (1 AS), which was being trained by the 
French Air Service at Avord, France.  Furthermore, the 1 AS did not have any airplanes of its 
own to fly.  To solve his dilemma, Mitchell enlisted the help of his friends in the French Air 
Service who provided a number of new two-seat SPAD (Société Pour L'Aviation et ses Dérivés) 
airplanes to the Air Service, AEF.228   
By early November 1917, the outlook for the Air Service began to improve.  By that 
point in the war, the Air Service, AEF had several schools throughout Great Britain and France 
that were used train new aviation cadets in “pursuit, observation, and bombardment aviation.”  
At the same time, Brigadier General Benjamin Foulois arrived in France with a large number of 
experienced Aviation Section officers.  Mitchell, who quickly developed into one of Foulois’ 
fiercest critics, argued that Foulois and his men were ill-prepared for the task to which they had 
been assigned.  He stated: “A more incompetent lot of air warriors had never arrived in the zone 
                                                 
227 Mitchell, Memoirs, p. 157. 
 
228 Cooke, The U.S. Air Service in the Great War, p. 27. 
 
102 
 
of active military operations since the war began.  Foulois, I am told, had orders from the 
President to General Pershing to put him in charge of aviation in Europe, even though he was no 
longer an active pilot.”229  In particular, Mitchell was distressed that Foulois’s arrival meant that 
Kenly would no longer be the Chief of the Air Service.230  Arguing that Foulois “meant well,” 
Mitchell asserted that the general “was not at all conversant with conditions in Europe.”231  
 Foulois and his staff arrived at Mitchell’s headquarters in Chaumont on November 27, 
1917, and began a complete reorganization of the Air Service, AEF.232  Further compounding 
Mitchell’s attitude toward Foulois’s arrival was his decision to remove Lieutenant Colonel 
Bolling as the Assistant Chief of the Air Service and to cancel many of the contracts he had 
secured with French aviation manufacturers.233  Mitchell retained his post throughout the 
reorganization, but he was informed that he would soon become the commander of the Air 
Service of the 1st Army Corps.234   
On November 4, 1917, Mitchell began to receive a small portion of the Air Service, AEF 
assets belonging to the 1st Army Corps.  The 1st Aero Squadron reached the “zone of advance” 
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and was sent to Amanty, France, to serve as the “nucleus of training for future observation 
squadrons.”  Mitchell asserted that the Air Service, AEF had finally begun “to get a number of 
well-instructed American pilots, whose flying had been perfected in the interior but who had no 
service against the enemy.”235   
Once again, the lack of equipment and airplanes hindered the initial training of the 1st 
Aero Squadron.236  Angry at what he viewed as a lack of support, Mitchell met with General 
Pershing to try to rectify the matter.  At their meeting, Mitchell told Pershing that he thought it 
wise to send half of the pilots to serve with the Royal Flying Corps or the French Air Service in 
order to gain the much-needed combat experience they would not otherwise receive.  Mitchell 
argued that service with either the British or French air forces would “provide pilots whom we 
could use as flight commanders, squadron and group commanders, as soon as our men became 
sufficiently trained and were provided with airplanes.”237  While some U.S. airmen did fly with 
RFC and French Air Service squadrons, the total number was not nearly as large as Mitchell had 
hoped. 
In December 1917, Mitchell assessed for Pershing the progress he believed that he had 
made since his arrival, as well as the overall situation within the Air Service, AEF.  Mitchell 
argued that he and his staff “had done everything possible during the past year to create an 
American Air Service worthy of the name and representative of our country.”  Yet, Mitchell 
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argued that the Air Service’s development was restricted by politics.  Mitchell later asserted in 
his memoirs: 
As it was such a new and spectacular branch of service, it attracted the public fancy, and 
had been seized upon by politicians anxious to gain as much out of it as possible.  There were 
just as many politicians in the army as out of it.  The men who actually did the work in the air 
were the younger ones, who had not yet reached the positions they were entitled to in accordance 
with their ability.  So it happened that the upper positions were filled by incompetents from the 
army and a few from civil life.238 
Although Mitchell was certainly less than pleased with certain developments within the 
upper-level of the Army and the Air Service, he nonetheless devoted significant thought and 
energy to his job.   
As progress continued in training new airmen during the latter part of 1917 and the early 
months of 1918, Mitchell continued to fly and study the situation at the front.  On February 19, 
1917, Mitchell took the acting Chief of Staff of the 1st Army Corps, Lieutenant Colonel Stewart 
Heintzlman, up in his airplane.  Mitchell recalled: “This was the first time that any American 
General Staff Officer had flown over the enemy lines, and also the first time an airplane bearing 
American insignia had been piloted by an American over the lines.  To be sure, the plane was 
French but it carried our colors, the concentric circles of red, white and blue, with a white 
center.”239   
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In addition to his tours of the front, Mitchell oversaw the arrival and employment of the 
first American air unit to enter into active hostilities against the Germans.  Interestingly, the first 
“air unit” Mitchell observed was the 2nd Balloon Squadron’s Company B.  Always eager to 
demonstrate air power resources to others, Mitchell took General Hunter Liggett, commander of 
the U.S. Army’s 1st Corps, to the front to oversee the balloon operations.240   
In early March 1918, Mitchell visited Villacoublay, France, to examine newly produced 
French airplanes.  Mitchell had long lobbied to use French-built aviation products, and he was 
particularly interested to see the first American-built Liberty 12-cylinder engine put into a 
French-built Breguet airframe.  The tests went well, but Mitchell argued that more testing would 
have to be done before the Air Service would “take it to the front.”   
Shortly after his visit to Villacoublay, Mitchell learned that the 1st Aero Squadron was 
going to receive two-seat SPAD’s equipped with the proven Hispano-Suiza engine.241  Although 
Mitchell had previously admired the engine with which the SPAD was equipped, he contended 
that the airplane itself was “dangerous” as it had been “discarded” by the French Air Service.  
Mitchell, always critical of Foulois, blamed the Chief of the Air Service for the arrival of the 
SPAD.  He argued that Foulois, due to his high position within the Air Service, “was no longer 
able to fly himself and did not know the danger of this aircraft.”242   
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Despite his disgust with what he viewed as a complete disregard of his opinions by 
Foulois, Mitchell continued his tours of the burgeoning network of Air Service bases that had 
recently sprung up throughout the French countryside.  Assessing the Air Service’s situation in 
the spring of 1918, Mitchell maintained that it was making significant strides in spite of its 
materiel shortcomings. Mitchell, in one of his more enthusiastic moods, stated that he “could see 
no reason why we could not assemble a large mass of aerial maneuver and strike, one day 
opposite the British front and the next day opposite Verdun, or clear into Germany as far as the 
Rhine.”243  The Air Service, however, was not quite ready to attempt such large-scale 
penetrations into the skies over German territory.  
By April 1918, the German Army had begun another push in an attempt to resolve the 
war before American troops could strike in large numbers.  At nearly the same time the 94th 
Pursuit Squadron and the 91st Army Observation Squadron arrived in the Toul sector ready to 
assist their British and French counterparts.244  Three days later, on April 1, 1918, the 1st 
Observation Squadron flew the first official U.S. Air Service mission of the war over hostile 
territory.245   
As commander of aviation for the 1st Army Corps, Mitchell controlled all three 
squadrons, and he argued that he did his best to put experienced pilots in “key positions.”  
Mitchell’s selection of men such as Raoul Lufbery, who first flew with the Lafayette Escadrille, 
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was fortuitous for the Air Service, AEF, as it provided the newly formed squadrons with the 
opportunity to coalesce under men with combat flying experience.  However, the Air Service 
remained under French direction.  Consequently, Mitchell had to persuade the Commander of 
French Aviation of the Eighth French Army to set aside a sector for the Air Service squadrons to 
defend.  Mitchell’s units were assigned the land between the Meuse and Moselle rivers.246 
Saint Mihiel 
Mitchell’s first large-scale test as Chief of Air Service, 1st Army, came in mid-September 
1918, during the Battle of St. Mihiel.   The struggle at St. Mihiel had been long-simmering.  
After the defeat of German Army at the First Battle of the Marne on September 12, 1914, 
General Erich von Falkenhayn and General Hermann von Strantz decided to try to capture the 
French fortress of Verdun.  On September 24, 1914, the French 3rd Army halted the advance of 
the German Fifth Army under von Falkenhayn’s command.  However, the 3rd Army initially 
failed to stop von Strantz’s V Corps, which allowed the Germans to capture the town of St. 
Mihiel.  The capture of St. Mihiel created a new battle line 24 miles wide along the base and 14 
miles deep.  The V shape protrusion in the line became known as the St. Mihiel salient. It 
featured rugged, heavily wooded areas along the Meuse River, as well as the Woevre Plain, 
which contained the detached heights Loupmont and Montsec and afforded high ground and 
good visibility for the entrenched German forces.247   
The French First Army attempted, unsuccessfully, to retake the St. Mihiel salient in 
February 1915 and, again, in April 1915.  The French attacks failed, at least in part, because of 
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the two strong defensive lines that the German had constructed to fortify the salient.  The first, 
known as the Wilhelm line, was near the French line at the front.  The second, the Schrorer line, 
was five kilometers to the rear of the Wilhelm line, extending from the town of St. Mihiel to the 
base of the salient.  French and British forces attacked the salient many more times over the next 
several years without success.  However, the arrival of U.S. forces in the summer of 1917 
convinced Allied leaders that another attempt to take the salient might finally succeed. 
In July 1918, General Ferdinand Foch, the Supreme Allied Commander, tasked the 
American Expeditionary Force with pushing back the St. Mihiel salient in order to achieve a 
breakthrough against German forces in the area.  General Pershing, in command of the U.S. First 
Army and the entire AEF, moved quickly to implement Foch’s plan.  As the Chief of Air 
Service, First Army, the task of planning the air battle at St. Mihiel was Mitchell’s.   
St. Mihiel proved to be critically important to the Air Service for several reasons.  To 
begin with, St. Mihiel was the first battle of the war that involved significant numbers of U.S. 
troops.  In addition, the battle marked the first use of a combined air force, operating under the 
command of an individual, employed in conjunction with a ground offensive.  Lastly, St. Mihiel 
was the largest air battle of WWI, employing more aircraft than in any other battle during the 
war.  Approximately 2,000 aircraft flew during the battle—approximately 1,480 Allied aircraft 
against roughly 500 German aircraft.248 
The overall Allied strategic offensive plan on the Western front called for reducing the 
salient because it often interfered with railroad communications.249 One rail line, the Paris-Nancy 
railroad, ran through the St. Mihiel salient. The St. Mihiel offensive can generally be broken into 
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two phases. The planning phase occurred from 10 August 1918 to 11 September 1918 and the 
attack phase occurred from 12 through 16 September 1918.  The objectives of the St. Mihiel 
offensive were the opening of the Paris-Nancy railroad, the securing of a suitable line from 
which to launch the planned follow on offensive into Meuse-Argonne, and the seasoning of 
American forces in their first real test of the war. The ground attack, planned by General 
Pershing, called for a converging attack on two sides of the salient with the main attack 
occurring against the southern face.  In addition, a third force performed a holding attack directly 
against the front of the salient.250   
The air campaign, created by Mitchell, complemented the ground plan to a large degree. 
On August 20, 19198, Mitchell presented his plan to Pershing.  Mitchell explained that his forces 
would focus on three main tasks: “one, to provide accurate information for the infantry and 
adjustment of fire for the artillery of the ground troops; second, to hold off enemy air forces from 
interfering with either our air or ground troops; and third, to bomb the back areas so as to stop 
the supplies for the enemy and hold up and movement along his roads.”   To achieve those three 
main goals, Mitchell divided his plan of attack into four main phases—preparation phase, night 
preceding the attack, day of the attack, and exploitation.  Further refining his plan, Mitchell 
assigned air assets for each phase into three categories: observation, pursuit, and bombardment.  
The preparation phase of the plan entailed extensive reconnaissance of German positions.  The 
second phase of the plan, which, focused on the activities to be conducted the night prior to the 
main attack, entailed bombardment attacks on German troop positions and other strategic 
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targets.251  The third phase, the main attack phase, involved numerous bombardment and pursuit 
missions aimed at neutralizing German air defense, destroying German aerodromes, and 
protecting Allied forces as they moved deep within German lines.  The fourth and final phase, 
the exploitation phase, involved exploiting any openings created the by the Allied ground forces, 
to include engaging targets of opportunity such as retreating enemy troops.252 
Due in part to Mitchell’s planning and good relationship with Britain’s Royal Air Force, 
France’s Armée de l'Air (Army of the Air), and Italy’s Corpo Aeronautico Militare (Military 
Aviation Corps) St. Mihiel became the “greatest concentration of aircraft during the war” with 
over 1,480 British, French, and Italian airplanes involved.253   At zero hour on September 12, 
1918, Mitchell had either direct or indirect control of 701 pursuit, 366 observation, 323 day 
bombers, and 91 night bombers.254  According to most estimates, the combined American, 
British, and French forces had a ten-to-one numerical advantage in pursuit aircraft.  As a result, 
the Allied air force enjoyed air superiority throughout the battle despite the arrival of German 
Air Service reinforcements.   
Even with that advantage, bombers remained vulnerable to German pursuit aircraft such 
as the Fokker DVII.   For example, the 1st Day Bombardment Group lost 31 bombardment 
aircraft during the offensive.  The Allies responded by employing a baiting strategy in which day 
bombers and observation aircraft drew out the German pursuit planes, which quickly fell prey to 
nearby allied fighters.  By the second day of the offensive, Allied forces had gained enough 
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ground to open the Paris-Nancy rail line, which allowed for the follow-on Meuse-Argonne 
campaign. 
To his credit, Mitchell did not sit on the sidelines throughout the battle.  Instead, Mitchell 
directly participated in the battle that he had helped plan.  Mitchell could have used his rank and 
status as commander to avoid endangering himself but he flew over German lines a few times 
during the battle.  During those five days, Mitchell conducted reconnaissance flights to help 
ascertain the positions of German ground forces and to gather information on the strength and 
activities of the German Air Service.  Although he was not the first commander to risk his life in 
order to fight with his men, Mitchell’s direct participation was noteworthy.  Shortly after the 
battle, Mitchell’s superiors lobbied the War Department to award him the Distinguished Service 
Cross for his selfless courage during the build-up to the battle, as well as the battle itself.255 
By the end of the battle, American airmen had fired 30,000 rounds of ammunition, 
dropped 75 tons of bombs, and destroyed 12 balloons, and 60 enemy aircraft during the four-day 
battle. Results could have been even better if not for the limitations on flying brought on by 
weather, which created the worst flying conditions in France that American airmen had faced up 
to that point.  Cloud cover often masked the retreat of German troops, which hampered attacks 
on strategic targets, as well as targets of opportunity. Nevertheless, the effort at St. Mihiel proved 
to be an overall success.  Air power contributed to the success of troops on the ground with the 
Allies losing only 7,000 men over the course of the four-day battle—a low number for a major 
offensive in WWI.  
Following the end of the Battle of St. Mihiel, Mitchell stated: “Thirty thousand officers 
and men handled the airplanes.  They were disposed on fourteen main flying fields and a great 
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many substations, while three large supply points handled the material for the Americans, 
French, British and Italians.”  More importantly, Mitchell argued: 
It was the greatest concentration of air power that had ever taken place and the first time 
in history in which an air force, cooperating with and army, was to act according to a broad 
strategical plan which contemplated not only facilitating the advance of the ground troops but 
spreading fear and consternation into the enemy’s line of communications, his replacement 
system and the cities behind them which supplied our foe with the sinews of war.256 
 
Although Mitchell exaggerated the significance of the attacks on targets behind German lines, he 
was correct in his overall assessment of the air forces contributions to the battle.257   
 During the Battle of St. Mihiel, the combined allied air forces had done a great deal to 
keep the German Air Service from being effective.  Mitchell’s air forces had largely 
accomplished their three main tasks despite the fact that poor weather conditions kept Mitchell’s 
forces from achieving their maximum effectiveness.258  In a letter to Mitchell, General Pershing 
lauded the accomplishments of the combined air forces: 
Please accept my sincere congratulations on the successful and very important part taken 
by the Air Force under your command in the first offensive of the First American Army.  The 
organization and control of the tremendous concentration of Air forces, including American, 
French, British, and Italian units, which had enabled the Air Service of the First Army to carry 
out successfully its dangerous and important mission, is as fine a tribute to you personally as is 
the courage and nerve shown by your officers signal proof of the high morale which permeates 
the service under your command.259 
St. Mihiel verified many of the tactics and the theories that Mitchell had developed 
during his time in France.  The battle showed him that large numbers of aircraft could be 
concentrated in one general area in order to conduct a coordinated assault against multiple enemy 
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targets.  It also showed that the General Pershing and the War Department that the Air Service 
could work in conjunction with U.S. Army ground forces.  Most importantly, St. Mihiel proved 
to Mitchell that the Air Service could work effectively as a semi-independent force under the 
control of aviators.   
Meuse-Argonne 
Following St. Mihiel, the next large-scale involvement of U.S. Air Service came during 
the Meuse-Argonne offensive, which lasted from September 26, 1918, until the end of the war on 
November 11, 1918.  The U.S. became involved in the offensive after General Pershing had 
agreed to help the French expel German forces from the Argonne forest.   To honor his 
agreement, General Pershing directed the U.S. First Army to move from its position near St. 
Mihiel to the Argonne, which was located to the north.   The effort complicated by the fact that 
Pershing had used many of his most experienced troops at St. Mihiel.  This meant that the 
soldiers and Marines fighting in the Argonne had less combat experience than their counterparts.  
The upcoming offensive also required the U.S. Army to relocate massive amounts of men and 
materiel to the Argonne area in short order.  Directed by the logistical skills of Colonel George 
C. Marshall, the U.S. First Army built ammunition dumps and supply points, moved hundreds of 
pieces of artillery, and laid miles of wire for the command and communications network.260   
Mitchell and his men were once again tasked to support the movement of Allied ground 
troops.   Yet, Mitchell had fewer forces at his disposal than he had had at St. Mihiel.  A number 
of British and French squadrons had rejoined the armies that they had supported prior to St. 
Mihiel.  As a result, Mitchell had approximately 200 bombardment aircraft and 600 smaller 
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aircraft under his command during the Meuse-Argonne offensive.261  To compensate for the 
smaller number of aircraft at his disposal, Mitchell massed his air forces at the center of the 50-
mile front in order to attempt to “destroy the German stores of ammunition and supplies in the 
area behind the army; to attack any infantry reserves coming up, and also to force the air fighting 
well into German territory.”262   Despite the fact that a large number of Allied aircraft had 
returned to their armies, Mitchell had the assistance of a small number of French squadrons, the 
British Independent Force led by General Trenchard, and two Italian bombardment squadrons.   
The most substantial attack of the offensive came on October 9, 1917, when 22 U.S. and 
six French divisions attacked entrenched German positions.  The German army had built 
extensive fortifications throughout the Argonne which made the effort to remove them all the 
more difficult.  On the first day of the offensive, Mitchell’s forces, which included 322 French 
aircraft laden with approximately 39 tons of bombs, attacked numerous positions behind the 
German lines.  A few hours later, British IF forces dropped another 40 tons on other German 
targets.  The total of 79 tons of bombs dropped on October 9, 1917 was significant when 
contrasted against 138 tons the Air Service dropped during the war.263   
Less than one week later, on October 15, 1918, the immense effort at the Meuse-Argonne 
had reduced the number of Allied aircraft in the campaign to approximately 580.  The number of 
serviceable pursuit aircraft had decreased from 300 to roughly 150 spread amongst three pursuit 
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groups.264   The losses did not surprise Mitchell because he knew that the German Air Service 
remained a formidable force even at that stage in the war. 
Like St. Mihiel, the Meuse-Argonne Offensive proved to Mitchell that the Air Service 
could operate well as a semi-independent force.  It also showed that the Air Service personnel 
had the ability to work well with other air forces.  Finally, the offensive validated Mitchell’s 
belief that airmen had the skills, knowledge, and ability to plan and execute a successful air 
power campaign against a well-trained enemy. 
The End Draws Near 
Near the end of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, on October 21, 1918, General Pershing 
promoted Mitchell to the position of Commander of the Air Service, Army Group, which gave 
him command of the entire Air Service, AEF.265  However, Mitchell had little time to explore the 
potential of his new position.  Less than one month later, on November 11, 1918, the “War to 
End All Wars” came to an abrupt end.  
An Abrupt End 
The fact that World War I was about to end was not a foregone conclusion throughout 
most of 1918.  Yet, the situation facing Germany and its allies was grim.  On September 29, 
1918, members of the Oberste Heeresleitung (Supreme Army Command) and Imperial 
Chancellor Count Georg von Hertling informed Kaiser Wilhelm that the German Empire could 
not win the war.  Within days of the meeting, Prince Maximilian of Baden replaced von Hertling 
as Imperial Chancellor.266   Almost immediately, Prince Maximilian began the arduous task of 
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negotiating an armistice with the Entente, which, after the Bolshevik takeover in Russia, 
consisted of France, Great Britain, the United States, and Italy.267  Maximilian’s job proved to be 
extremely difficult given the tensions at the time.  President Wilson, responding to Maxmilian’s 
overtures, stated that the United States expected Germany to leave all occupied territory, to stop 
all hostile submarine operations, and for Kaiser Wilhelm to abdicate his throne.  In a telegram 
sent on October 23, 1918, President Wilson stressed: “If the Government of the United States 
must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now, or if it is 
likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the German 
Empire, it must demand not peace negotiations but surrender.”268 
Upon reading Wilson’s telegram, Erster Generalquartiermeister (First Quartermaster 
General) General Erich von Ludendorff vehemently argued that Germany had to redouble its 
efforts in the war in order to avoid having to submit to the terms set by the U.S. government.  
However, before Ludendorff’s call for action could achieve any effect, the German government 
replaced him with General Wilhelm Groener.   Shortly thereafter, on November 9, 1918, Kaiser 
Wilhelm abdicated his throne.  Two days later, just 5 o’clock in the morning on November 11, 
1918, the German representatives signed their names to the Armistice.269   Thus, at 11 o’clock in 
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the morning on November 11, 1918, an eerie and log-awaited calm descended over the 
battlefields of Europe.   
What Might Have Been 
Shortly before the end of the conflict, on October 21, 1918, General Pershing promoted 
Mitchell to the position of Commander of the Air Service, Army Group, which gave him 
command of the entire Air Service, AEF.   However, Mitchell had little time to explore the 
potential of his new position due to the end of the war.  
 Mitchell wanted to expand the air war in some new directions if the Allies launched a 
new offensive in the spring of 1919.  An example of what might have been came in October 
1918, when Mitchell discussed using airplanes to drop soldiers from the U.S. Army’s First 
Division behind German lines with parachutes.  During a meeting with General Pershing, 
Mitchell argued that the First Division “could assemble at a prearranged strong point, fortify it 
and we could supply them by aircraft with food and ammunition…. Then we could attack the 
Germans from the rear, aided by an attack from our army on the front and support the whole 
maneuver with our great air force.”270   
In addition to the plan to deliver paratroopers, Mitchell considered employing large 
numbers of bombardment aircraft to strike industrial targets deep within Germany.  Mitchell 
asserted that the Air Service and its allies “had all preparations complete to carry the war into the 
heart of Germany in the spring of 1919.  The air weapons that would have been used would have 
caused untold sufferings.  Chemical weapons most certainly would have been brought into play; 
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gases for destroying cattle and sheep, and incendiary projectiles for burning the crops and 
forests.”271   
Conclusion 
Mitchell’s experience in Europe, both before the arrival of the A.E.F. and after, taught 
him a great deal about air power.  He was deeply affected by the time he spent among the 
French, British, and American ground troops fighting in the trenches.  Witnessing the futility of 
trench fighting firsthand, Mitchell argued that what changed him “most forcibly was the utter 
helplessness of the infantry when attacking over open ground, against modern machine guns and 
cannon.  Neither side had yet developed a system which would protect the individual foot 
soldier, so with him it was simply a case of being sacrificed for an infinitesimal gain.”272  
Consequently, Mitchell focused his energy and effort on establishing the strongest foundation for 
the U.S. Air Service that he could while in France in order to help break the stalemate in the 
trenches.   
To do so, Mitchell met with nearly every important European aviation expert and air 
power advocate at his disposal.  Although other Air Service officers had met with British and 
French air officers throughout the war, Mitchell was unique in that he sought out Trenchard and 
others.  He did so in order to learn how their service’s operated and why they did what they did.  
More than any other U.S. airmen, Mitchell sought out knowledge in order to prepare for the Air 
Service’s arrival in hopes that it might be able to achieve a breakthrough.   
Mitchell also did a great deal to help make the airplane a more potent and more flexible 
weapon of war.  Although he did not yet argue that air power could end a war on its own, he 
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came to regard it as something with tremendous potential that would play a significant role in 
future conflicts.  Therefore, the importance of Mitchell’s endeavors in World War I cannot be 
overstated because the conflict forced him to focus his many skills on the most important task 
that he had faced up to that point in his life—helping win World War I with air power.  
Basically, Mitchell’s experiences during World War I transformed him from an air power 
proponent into a true believer in air power who devoted the rest of his life to his goal of helping 
airmen achieve control of air power.  
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Chapter 3 – Vociferous Crusader for Air Power: Mitchell Leads the Fight for 
Independence  
Mitchell’s experiences during World War I turned him from a modest supporter of air 
power into a true believer of air power who demanded an independent air force.  He not only 
adopted the “us versus them” mindset that had developed among American airmen prior to the 
conflict, he came to embody it.  In the years immediately after the war, the Air Service—with 
Mitchell leading the charge—struggled to achieve control of airpower.  Under Mitchell’s 
guidance, numerous Air Service officers worked to redefine their service’s role within the 
existing defense establishment.  While not always successful, Mitchell and these men helped to 
reshape the Air Service into an organization that could both defend the borders of the United 
States and bring air power to an enemy’s door step. 
To achieve their goals, Mitchell and his fellow Air Service officers weathered stiff 
resistance from their own leaders, their fellow U.S. Army colleagues, their counterparts in the 
U.S. Navy, and members of Congress.  Interestingly, that tension did not lessen their desire for 
an independent service.  Instead, it increased their sense of alienation and fueled their drive for a 
separate service.  The energy that Mitchell and other like-minded Air Service officers poured 
into their effort to educate their civilian and military superiors, as well as the American public, 
on the strengths and possible future benefits of air power demonstrates how determined they 
were for airmen to gain control of air power. 
Postwar Difficulties 
When World War I ended, the U.S. Air Service was as large as it had ever been with 45 
squadrons, 457 serviceable aircraft, and 195,023 men deployed in Europe.   As with their 
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counterparts in the Army, Navy, and Marines the officers and men serving with the Air Service 
did not escape the extensive demobilization process then underway.  Like their fathers and 
grandfathers before them, these young Americans laid down their weapons and returned to their 
pre-war lives.  For many, the transition to civilian life proved to be rather quick, while for others 
the process took up to a year or more.  Much to the dismay of Mitchell and others, the Air 
Service rapidly decreased in size to from the wartime peak of nearly 200,000 to 15,875 men by 
the middle of 1919.273 
Despite the drawdown, a number of key leaders remained in the Air Service following 
the war.  Mitchell, one of the best known members of the Air Service, was one of those men.  
After the signing of the Armistice, General Mason Patrick, the chief of the Air Service, AEF, 
selected Mitchell to lead the Air Service’s forces assigned to the U.S. Third Army, the force that 
occupied Germany immediately after the war.  However, Mitchell’s tenure with the Third Army 
proved to be quite brief.  Five months later, in March 1919, Major General Charles C. Menoher, 
Director of the Air Service, asked Mitchell if he would like to come to Washington, D.C. to 
serve as the head of the Operations and Training Group at the Air Service Headquarters.274  
Always eager for a new challenge, Mitchell agreed to take the new assignment because it would 
put him in to a position to shape Air Service doctrine.    
In his new position, Mitchell oversaw all training, research and development, and created 
plans to move the Air Service forward in the post-war period.  Fresh from the battlefields of the 
Western Front, Mitchell was intent on retaining the power and prestige that both he and the Air 
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Service had earned during the war.  In fact, Mitchell had renewed energy as he pushed to 
transform the Air Service into an independent air force similar to Great Britain’s Royal Air 
Force, which had gained its autonomy during the war.  To do so, Mitchell faced superior officers 
in the Air Service and the U.S. Army who lacked his vision.  Unable to envision air power as 
Mitchell did, they firmly believed that aviation would never be anything more than an auxiliary 
to the infantry.275   
Mitchell’s intense desire to achieve results, as well as his tendency to avoid telling 
General Charles T. Menoher, Chief of the Air Service, what he was doing, caused significant 
problems early in his tenure.  Lieutenant Colonel Oscar Westover, Menoher’s gifted assistant, 
vehemently argued that Menoher should fire Mitchell for bypassing the chain of command.  
Fortunately for Mitchell, Menoher was reticent to fire him due to his fame and his abilities.  
Menoher may also have put up with Mitchell’s overzealous initiative because he ultimately 
believed in much of what his subordinate was saying.  Despite believing that military aviation 
needed to remain part of the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy, Menoher had strong opinions on the 
future of air power.  On July 28, 1919, General Menoher explained that one day military aircraft: 
may cruise through the air o’er land and sea for protracted periods of time, supplying 
themselves from aerial ‘colliers’ subject to tactical control by wireless and directional control by 
radio, and with sufficient ammunition transports to sustain active combat operations sufficient to 
accomplish the complete demolition of land or water craft, or the destruction through aerial 
combat of similar forces of the enemy.276 
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Thus, Mitchell remained in his position in spite of his frequent tendency to dispense with caution 
in his quest for results.277   
 
Mitchell came to believe that aviation needed to be free from the constraints of direct 
Army and Navy control shortly after arriving in France to prepare for the arrival of the Air 
Service, AEF.  However, Mitchell had largely kept his views confined to his fellow Air Service 
officers prior to the end of World War I.  Once the war ended, Mitchell took the first important 
steps toward becoming a more visible public figure by using the notoriety that he had gained 
during the war to try and change the status quo.  In early 1919, Mitchell began pushing for a 
cabinet level Department of Aviation that would be equal to, rather than subordinate to, the War 
and Navy Departments.  Mitchell maintained that the proposed department would control all 
aspects of aviation in the U.S., including military aviation, commercial aviation, and even the 
delivery of airmail.278   
For Mitchell, the effort to establish an independent air force was not just a way to gain 
greater rank and authority for himself.  Rather, he believed that an independent air force was an 
absolute necessity for the U.S. because most U.S. military leaders at the time were too mired in 
tradition to properly develop the Air Service into anything other than an auxiliary force with a 
relatively limited mission—usually one designed to assist the parent service only.  To reinforce 
his point that growth could not occur within the existing structure, Mitchell stated that “to entrust 
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the development of aviation to either the Army or the Navy is just as sensible as entrusting the 
development of the electric light to a candle factory.”279  Simply, Mitchell argued that the Air 
Service needed to be centrally controlled by airmen because non-aviators did not have the 
education, training, or experience to do it. 
Fortunately for Mitchell, whose enthusiasm had a tendency of agitating those he was 
trying to persuade, he was not alone in his desire for greater autonomy for the Air Service.  
Benjamin Foulois, who had significant differences with Mitchell during World War I, strongly 
supported his outspoken colleague’s argument that an independent Department of Aviation had 
to be established in order to free the Air Service from U.S. Army control.  When testifying 
before the Senate Military Subcommittee during a hearing on the creation of a Department of 
Aeronautics, Foulois endured two hours of intense questioning from the panel of five senators on 
the committee.  Foulois passionately argued, based on his extensive experience, that, both prior 
to and during World War I, the U.S. Army had frequently neglected the Air Service and would 
continue to do so in the future.  Foulois boldly asserted that there was not “one single case on 
record where a General Staff officer of the United States Army has contributed to the technical 
or mechanical development of aviation.” Foulois also maintained that the U.S. Navy had no 
desire to provide the necessary money and resources for the development of military aviation 
because most admirals remained focused on the development and use of large battleships and 
cruisers.  To support his argument, Foulois pointed out that the Air Service had virtually been 
gutted after World War I.280   
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After unleashing his critiques of the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy, Foulois addressed the 
highly important subject of commercial aviation, arguing that the U.S. was in great danger of 
falling behind in developing a commercial aviation sector.  He stated that “the United States at 
present is doing nothing from a material standpoint, but it has done a lot of serious thinking 
about aviation in the past, and is still thinking.”  Foulois asserted that while thinking was helpful, 
it needed to be replaced with concrete action if the U.S. hoped to lead the world in commercial 
aviation.281   
Mitchell and Foulois faced stiff opposition in their quest to gain Air Service 
independence.  Secretary of War Newton Baker, in his annual report to the President, presented 
the War Department’s perspective on the Air Service’s proper place within the existing military 
structure.  Baker argued that the Air Service should remain under the control of the U.S. Army.  
Baker, unconvinced by the predictions made by Mitchell and others, maintained that the Air 
Service should refrain from expanding its scope of operations since there was no concrete 
evidence that such an expansion was needed.  In particular, Baker argued that Air Service 
officers should not focus their energies on aerial bombing because such attacks had proven 
ineffective throughout World War I.282  Baker stated:  
The practice was a part of the ruthlessness with which the Central Empires sought to 
terrify England and France into submission.  Instead it may be said that the willingness of the 
enemy to slaughter women and children, and to destroy property of no military value or use, 
demonstrated to England and France the necessity of beating so brutal a foe, and it is most likely 
that history will record these manifestations of inhumanity as the most powerful aids to 
recruitment in the nations against which they were made.283   
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Baker presented a strong argument in favor of keeping the Air Service from focusing on 
aerial bombardment.  Yet, neither Mitchell, Foulois, nor anyone else in the Air Service had 
advocated the type of terror bombing Baker so passionately argued against.  Mitchell had 
planned on attacking targets deep within Germany in the event that World War I had continued 
past November 1918.  However, while Mitchell would soon do so, he had not stated or intimated 
that such bombing was intended to directly attack German civilians in order to elicit public 
outcry that might bring an end to the war.  Therefore, Baker’s report appears to have been 
designed to maintain the status quo by stating that Air Service personnel intended to undertake 
missions for which they had never argued.284   
The official Air Service doctrine at the time largely followed the contents of Baker’s 
report.  An Air Service manual written in 1919 by Colonel Edgar Gorrell, assistant chief of staff 
of the Air Service, argued that the Air Service’s most important task was assisting the infantry 
because “When the infantry loses, the Army loses.”285  Yet, Gorrell, who had written extensively 
on strategic bombing while stationed in France during 1917-1918, did not simply adhere to the 
War Department’s dictates.  Instead, he asserted that the Air Service had the capability to assist 
the infantry better than any other branch of the Army because its attacks on the enemy had a 
greater effect on enemy morale than similar sized attacks from ground forces.  Simply put, the 
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Air Service’s ability to instill fear in the enemy by attacking quickly and departing just as fast 
was its most outstanding feature.286  
Despite opposition from the War Department and, to a lesser extent, Air Service 
leadership, Mitchell and Foulois had the support of many military officers, as well as from a few 
government officials.  Several members of Congress, likely influenced by the growing interest in 
aviation among Americans, joined the fight for Air Service independence beginning in 1919.  
Between 1919 and 1920, various senators and representatives in the U.S. Congress introduced 
eight separate bills aimed at creating a Department of Aeronautics that would oversee all military 
and civilian aviation throughout the U.S.  Of those eight bills, two stood out most prominently.  
They were Senate Bill 2693 (S. 2693) introduced by Senator Harry S. New and House 
Resolution 7925 (H.R. 7925) introduced by Representative George H. Curry. 
Senator Harry New of Indiana introduced S. 2693 on July 31, 1919.  New’s legislation 
proposed the creation of a Department of Aeronautics that would manage all aviation for the 
United States Coast Guard, Navy Department, the United States Post Office, the War 
Department, and all commercial entities.  By direction of the President, the Department of 
Aeronautics would assign all aviation units to both the Navy Department and the War 
Department.  The head of each department would retain control over their aviation assets.  
However, most importantly of all, Senator New proposed creating a United States Air Force that 
would contain all the military personnel assigned to the Department of Aeronautics.287 
Representative George Curry’s bill, H.R. 7925, differed very little from New’s.  Curry’s 
legislation also called for the creation of a Department of Aeronautics to supervise all military 
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and commercial aviation.  Curry also argued for the establishment of an aeronautical academy 
and aircraft factories.  Like S. 2693, H.R. 7925 proposed the establishment of a U.S. Air Force 
that contained a staff function that would develop national defense plans and a line function that 
would serve as a combat force.288 
After reading both S. 2963 and H.R. 7925, Secretary of War Baker assembled a board of 
U.S. Army officers to examine the usefulness of creating a U.S. Air Force similar to that 
proposed by both New and Curry.  The board, which included one Air Service officer and four 
U.S. Army artillery officers, begin exploring that issue on August 12, 1919.  Led by General 
Menoher, the board conducted a detailed analysis of both bills.  When doing so, the board read 
all the written evidence that had been used to draft each of the two bills.  The board also spoke 
with numerous key individuals within both the military and the civilian sector.  Finally, in order 
to get a sense of their usefulness in battle, the board requested reports from U.S. Army 
commanders who had utilized aviation assets in combat during World War I.289   
After they finished collecting and reviewing all the data at their disposal, the board 
members recommended that a single agency should oversee the procurement of all U.S. 
government aircraft.  However, Menoher’s board maintained that a separate Department of 
Aeronautics was unnecessary at that time.  They maintained that the Air Service should remain 
part of the Army to ensure that the two trained together and remained well integrated.  In 
concluding their report, the board stated that, “Whatever may be the decision as to a separate 
Aeronautical Department, the military air force must remain under the complete control of the 
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Army and form an integral part thereof both in peace and war.”  While extremely disappointing 
to many Air Service officers, the Menoher Board’s report reflected General Menoher’s personal 
desire to work within the existing U.S. military structure and to avoid problems whenever 
possible.290 
Following the release of the Menoher Board’s recommendations, the U.S. Congress held 
a hearing on each of the bills that proposed a Department of Aeronautics.  All but one of the Air 
Service officers who testified during the various hearings argued that separation from the U.S. 
Army would be beneficial for all parties.  During his testimony, Mitchell expressed his belief 
that a Department of Aeronautics was the best way to advance aviation in the U.S. because the 
Air Service was no longer the small auxiliary force that it had been before World War I.  
Mitchell, stressing his belief in centralized control, argued that that the primary authority on 
military aviation in the U.S. must rest within the Air Service because only its leaders had the 
skill and expertise in aviation.   Others argued that not having centralized control of aviation 
assets led to unnecessary purchases.  Citing his experience during World War I, Mitchell 
passionately argued that the Royal Air Force had accomplished great things after achieving its 
independence from the British Army.  Finally, Mitchell suggested that Air Service independence 
would allow for greater cooperation between military and civilian aviation in the U.S.291   
Many U.S. military officers and some civil servants continued to strongly oppose the idea 
of separating the Air Service from the U.S. Army under any circumstances.  These opponents 
argued that separating the Air Service would degrade cooperation between it and the other 
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branches of the U.S. military, especially the U.S. Army.  Some, such as General Menoher argued 
that such a move would only weaken both the U.S. Army and the Air Service because it would 
rob Army commanders of direct control over much needed aviation assets.  Secretary Baker, who 
agreed with Menoher, maintained that there was no proof that centralizing aviation assets would 
facilitate cooperation between military and civilian aviation.  Opponents of separating the 
Aviation Section also stated that few in the U.S. Navy’s aviation section believed that an 
independent Air Service or a Department of Aeronautics was a wise idea.292   
Ultimately, only one of the eight bills introduced to either create a Department of 
Aeronautics or to separate the Air Service from the Army met with any success.  On October 30, 
1919, Senator New introduced Senate bill 3348 (S. 3348).  Introduced in the wake of the 
Menoher Board’s report, New’s updated legislation differed slightly from S. 2693.  New 
proposed that the Department of Aeronautics would consist of four divisions: Civil and 
Commercial Aeronautics, Military Aeronautics, Supplies, and Research.  New’s bill continued to 
argue for the creation of a U.S. Air Force that support both the Army and Navy.293  On 
December 8, 1919, S. 3348 went to the U.S. Senate.  When formally presenting the legislation 
before his fellow senators, New urged his fellow senators to act in order to reverse the neglect 
that military and commercial aviation had experienced since the end of World War I.  New 
reiterated his belief that placing all civilian and military aviation under once department would 
both save money and ensure future growth.   
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New’s legislation met with opposition from several senators who disagreed with aspects 
of his revised bill.  Senator Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee argued that including the Post Office 
Department’s air-mail service as part of the Depart of Aeronautics was unwise and unnecessary.  
Basing his criticism on the US Postmaster General’s assessment of the situation, McKeller 
maintained that placing the air-mail service in a largely military organization would quickly 
degrade the air-mail service’s superb record.294  Senator Reed Smoot of Utah and William Borah 
of Idaho also opposed New’s bill.  They argued that consolidating all aviation assets would not 
save the amount of money that New believed it would.  Senator John Williams of Mississippi 
asked New if the new department would only complicate things during a war.  Senator Peter 
Gerry of Rhode Island asserted that the U.S. Navy had been treated as little more than an 
afterthought throughout the bill.295  Having come up against stiff opposition, New’s bill faded 
into the background as the members of Congress focused their attention on a bill reorganizing 
the U.S. Army. 
The effort to reorganize the U.S. Army following World War I was a substantial problem 
facing Congress.  During the conflict, the U.S. Army had had approximately 5,000,000 men in 
uniform.  Congress needed to determine the number of soldiers who would remain in uniform.  
During the lengthy hearings that followed, the question of whether to create a separate 
Department of Aeronautics once again came to the fore. After some discussion, Congress 
decided to act.  In Section 13a, Congress made the Air Service part of the U.S. Army’s combat 
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force, increased the number of personnel, improved flight pay, and specified that officers with 
flying experience had to command all flying units. 296  
Although the legislation did not make the Air Service an independent branch of the U.S. 
military, it did increase the service’s prominence within the U.S. military.  That fact aside, the 
legislation was a severe disappointment to many Air Service officers who felt that they would 
remain subject to the whims of ground commanders for the foreseeable future.  The legislation 
allowed Mitchell to keep his brigadier general star but the rank was only his as long as he 
remained Menoher’s deputy.  Both General Pershing and General Patrick argued that Mitchell 
had not received his due but neither man could persuade the Congress or the War Department to 
permanently promote Mitchell.297   
Failure Breeds Determination 
Dissatisfied with the results of the recent congressional debates, the Air Service officers 
altered their tactics.  During the House Committee on Military Affairs hearing for the fiscal year 
1921 Army appropriations bill, Mitchell testified that the current organizational scheme led to 
significant duplication of effort between the Air Service and their counterparts in the U.S. Navy.  
He argued the U.S. military could save approximately $11,000,000 by fixing the situation.  
Specifically, Mitchell stated that he thought that “it ought to be put in the Law that all air 
operations from shore bases not attached to the fleet should be conducted by the Army Air 
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Service, and that all air service attached to the fleet should be handled by the Navy.  Of course, 
all the air service should be combined into one force, but if that is not done, the above 
suggestions should be followed.”298   
Mitchell’s suggestion did not fall upon deaf ears.  The U.S. Army appropriations bill 
included a clause which stated that the Air Service should control all air operations launched 
from land while U.S. Navy aviation would control all air operations attached to a fleet.  
However, Secretary of War Newton Baker and Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. 
disagreed with the definitive demarcation of responsibilities.  As a result, the Senate amended the 
bill to read that “naval aviation shall have control of all aerial operations attached to a fleet, 
including shore stations whose maintenance is necessary for operations connected with the fleet 
for construction and experimentation and for training of personnel.”299 
The Air Service’s push for centralized control increased resistance from traditionalists 
who also redoubled their efforts to thwart the push for greater autonomy.  As the Assistant Chief 
of Air Staff, Intelligence Historical Division concluded in 1944, throughout early 1920s the Air 
Service faced “certain powerful administrators of the War and Navy departments who saw the air 
arm as a threat to their own spheres of authority.”   The Assistant Chief also maintained: “It was 
to the advantage of these men to keep aviation in a subordinate role where it could do no harm to 
the status quo.  They were reluctant to encourage any experiments which might make aviation a 
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separate element of national defense instead of an auxiliary of the established Army and Navy 
defense forces.”300 
To help combat the powerful forces aligned against them, Mitchell and many of his 
fellow Air Service officers turned to the American public in an attempt to use public opinion to 
help upset the balance of power within the U.S. defense establishment.  To achieve that goal, the 
Air Service officers began a multi-faceted attack designed to illicit maximum public support.  
The effort included increasing the institutional knowledge of every Air Service officer while 
simultaneously building public support for the Air Service through newspaper and magazine 
articles, public speeches, Congressional testimony, and well-publicized demonstrations of 
aviation’s increasing technological progress.301  
The Battle Begins 
Although many Air Service officers worked to gain greater autonomy for their service, 
none was as influential as Billy Mitchell.  Except for Captain Edward “Eddie” Rickenbacker, 
Mitchell was the most recognizable face of the Air Service after World War I.  The development 
of Air Service theory, doctrine, and practice during the early 1920s was largely driven by 
Mitchell’s actions in the public arena.  Without Mitchell, the Air Service would likely have 
remained a much weaker element of the U.S. Army. 
To fully understand the level of Mitchell’s involvement in post-World War I Air Service 
legislation requires some explanation of his activities immediately following the armistice.  In 
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January 1919, Mitchell served at the Headquarters, American Army of Occupation in Coblenz, 
Germany.  The following month, on February 1, 1919, Mitchell briefly stopped in England as he 
made his way back to the U.S. to serve the assistant Directory of Military Aviation.  The 
following day, he met with General Hugh Trenchard.  As head of the Royal Air Force, Trenchard 
maintained control of all British military aviation, which included all Royal Navy aircraft.  On 
February 4, 1919, Mitchell met at lunch with Trenchard and Winston Churchill, Great Britain’s 
Secretary of State for War and Air.  Surprisingly, Mitchell did not discuss what he and his well-
known friends talked about during their visits.  However, as historian James Cooke argues in 
Billy Mitchell, when Mitchell left London he was unabashedly a “full-fledged apostle for an 
independent air arm.”302  
Following his pivotal meeting with Trenchard and Churchill, Mitchell returned to the 
United States onboard the RMS Aquitania, the sister ship of the RMS Mauretania and the ill-
fated RMS Lusitania.  A large number of military men were aboard the vessel, including 
Lieutenant Commander Jerome C. Hunsaker, a U.S. Navy officer who was well-versed in 
aviation.  In fact, Hunsaker was the U.S. navy’s foremost expert on aircraft design.  During their 
return voyage, Hunsaker and Mitchell spoke at length about aviation.  Hunsaker recalled that 
Mitchell and his staff were “fully prepared with evidence, plans, data, propaganda posters, and 
articles to break things wide open for air power as the sole requisite of the national defense in the 
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future.”  While he personally found Mitchell to be a “politician in uniform,” he understood that 
Mitchell had the charm and desire to achieve concrete results for the Air Service.303    
After returning to the U.S., Mitchell quickly came to the conclusion that dropping bombs 
on naval vessels would generate the publicity and interest he so desperately sought.  Mitchell’s 
position as the chief of the Air Service Operations and Training Division placed him in a 
conspicuous position.  As a result, Captain Nobel Irwin, U.S. Navy, told the General Board of 
the Navy, a group composed of senior admirals who provided guidance to the Secretary of the 
Navy on everything from Navy policy to ship construction, that Mitchell would be able to help 
the answer the question of whether the U.S. coast should be the dividing line between U.S. 
Army’s and the U.S. Navy’s coastal defense responsibilities.  The General Board subsequently 
called for Mitchell to appear before it to elaborate on Irwin’s claim that Mitchell “strongly 
advocates a united air service and made remarks that the Navy interfered with the Army’s work 
abroad.”304    
On April 3, 1919, Mitchell testified before the General Board of the Navy.  During the 
meeting, Mitchell argued that “a Ministry of Defense, combining Army, Navy, and Air Force 
under one general director” would eventually develop in the U.S. in place of the existing system.  
The members of the General Board then raised the issue of the threat that aircraft posed to 
surface vessels.  Mitchell and the General Board did not come to any agreement on the issue.  
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Rather, they all agreed that further testing was required before any clear course of action could 
be taken.305  
During his testimony, Mitchell raised the issue of the inherent problems of using 
floatplanes as combat aircraft.  Instead of floatplanes, Mitchell argued that an aircraft carrier 
would make much more sense given the limited capabilities of the floatplanes used at that time. 
Somewhat to his surprise, Mitchell quickly discovered that he had several supporters within the 
U.S. Navy who believed that aviation had developed to a point where it had changed naval 
warfare.  Admiral William Fullam, Admiral William Sims, and Admiral Brad Fiske all felt that 
aircraft would play a pivotal role in future naval battles.  Admiral Sims, Commander of the U.S. 
Navy in European Waters, 1917-1919, argued that aircraft carriers would become essential 
components of all naval fleets in the near future.  Admiral Fiske, who championed the 
development of torpedo aircraft prior to World War I, agreed, maintaining that aircraft carriers 
would forever change naval warfare.306   Despite their support for some of Mitchell’s idea, none 
of the three admirals argued that the U.S. Navy should cede any control of its aviation assets. 
The three admirals were not the only U.S. Navy officers to argue that aviation had 
changed the status quo for all naval forces.  One month after Mitchell’s testimony before the 
General Board, Lieutenant Commander B.G. Leighton published a pamphlet titled “Possibilities 
of Bombing Aircraft.”  In his work, Leighton argued that aircraft had the capability to locate, 
engage, and destroy surface vessels.  Another U.S. Navy officer, Lieutenant Commander H.T. 
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Bartlett, agreed with Leighton’s theories and maintained that an ample number of ships were 
available for such tests.307    
Several U.S. Navy officers clearly believed that aircraft were extremely important to their 
service.  Yet, the U.S. Navy would not immediately undertake any tests that would provide data 
on their theories.  Mitchell, always aggressive in pursuit of a goal, was determined to prove that 
it could be done.  Shortly after having testified before them, Mitchell once again met with the 
General Board of the Navy to discuss the possibility of conducting bombing tests in Chesapeake 
Bay.  To make his case to the General Board, Mitchell relied on the knowledge of one of his 
subordinates. 
In October 1919, Major Lewis H. Brereton, an Air Service member on Mitchell’s staff 
who had graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, produced a thorough study on coastal 
defense.  Using Brereton’s study as the foundation of his argument, Mitchell asserted that the 
U.S. Army General Staff had overlooked the role that aviation could play in coastal defense.  
Specifically, Mitchell maintained that the U.S. military could use aviation assets to help locate 
and destroy enemy aircraft carriers before their aircraft could bypass the tradition lines of coastal 
defense (the surface fleet, U.S. navy coastal defenses, and U.S. Army costal defenses) and have 
“practically unhindered access to this country.”308  
The General Board of the Navy was not the only target on Mitchell’s list.  On February 
10, 1920, Mitchell testified before the LaGuardia subcommittee on aviation headed by 
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Representative Fiorello LaGuardia of New York.  During his testimony, Mitchell presented his 
plan for using aircraft to support the coastal defense of the U.S.  Mitchell’s proposal involved 
using a dirigible to find the enemy, an air attack to neutralize enemy air forces, and then a direct 
air attack against the enemy’s surface fleet.  Mitchell argued that such an attack would “render 
surface craft incapable of operating to the same extent that they have heretofore, if it does not 
entirely drive them off the surface of the water.”  Historian Alfred Hurley, who wrote an 
extensive biography on Mitchell, argued that “Without realizing it then, Mitchell had become the 
agent the Navy needed to make it aviation conscious.”309  
Mitchell’s assertion did indeed spur the U.S. Navy to conduct its own bombing tests.  In 
October 1920, Mitchell and several other U.S. Army officers watched U.S. Navy aircraft drop 
bombs on the aging battleship U.S.S. Indiana.   Mitchell was not pleased by the tests, which he 
saw as a farce because the U.S. Navy did not drop live bombs on the ship.  Instead, U.S. Navy 
aircraft dropped bombs filled with sand while detonating charges placed both in and around the 
ship.  Immediately after the test, the U.S. Navy’s Director of Naval Gunnery’s released a report 
on the test.  In the report, the director concluded that “the entire experiment pointed to the 
improbability of a modern battleship being either destroyed completely or put out of action by 
aerial bombs.”310 
The U.S. Navy appeared to have won the argument.  However, on December 11, 1920, a 
British newspaper, The London Illustrated News, published two grainy pictures of the U.S.S. 
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Indiana.  Despite their poor quality, the images helped ignite a heated debate over an aircraft’s 
ability to sink a battleship.  Seizing the moment, Mitchell used the release of the photos to 
further his efforts.  In the December 21, 1920, edition of the New York Tribune, Mitchell stated 
that “neither coast defense guns nor a defending fleet of battleships need fire a gun in repelling 
the attack of a foreign fleet if we have a properly organized Air Force.”311  To further aid his 
effort, Mitchell sought help from friends and acquaintances in the U.S. Congress, the newspaper 
industry, and the Air Service.  Mitchell’s staff provided critical assistance to their boss by 
writing articles and editorials for various newspapers throughout the U.S.  Due to his celebrity 
status, Mitchell articles garnered the largest audiences.  The American Legion Weekly, the New 
York Times, and other popular publications of the period frequently ran Mitchell’s persuasive 
articles, which had a significant impact on the American public perceptions of air power. 
 
As Mitchell worked to educate the American public, U.S. Congress, and his fellow 
military officers about the merits of aviation, the War Department issued General Order No. 18, 
on August 14, 1920.  General Order No. 18 authorized the Air Service to establish a service 
school dedicated to training airmen.  Aware of the importance of professional military education 
to their goal of centralized control and independence, Air Service leaders immediately moved to 
create a school of their own using existing U.S. Army and U.S. Navy service schools such as the 
Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the U.S. Navy War 
College in Newport, Rhode Island.  In essence, General Order No. 18 authorized the Air Service 
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to establish a school that could educate officers in the intricacies of aviation and aerial 
warfare.312   
General Mitchell and General Foulois had the requisite battlefield and leadership 
experience, but each man had too much rank to serve as the head of the Air Service School.  
Recognizing that fact, the Air Service assigned Major Thomas DeWitt Milling as the officer-in-
charge of the Field Officers Course at the Air Service School.  Milling, a protégé of Mitchell 
who received his initial flight training from the Wright Brothers, proved to be an excellent 
candidate for the job due to his experience prior to, and during, World War I.313   
DeWitt worked to enable the Air Service School to meet its primary mission of teaching 
officers the tactics and strategies unique to air power.  Milling also oversaw the Air Service 
School’s secondary mission of developing and codifying doctrine for the Air Service, something 
that was virtually nonexistent at the time.  To build the new curriculum, Milling relied heavily on 
the few existing works on air power in circulation by early 1920.  Not surprisingly, the writings 
of Mitchell and Douhet provided the bulk of the initial reading for both the students and the 
instructors.314   
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The first class, which had eight students and nine instructors, began one month after the 
bombing of the U.S.S. Indiana, on 1 November 1920.315  For their studies, the Air Service School 
students relied upon memoirs, manuals, newspapers, and other sources that detailed the use of 
airpower in World War I.  Planned to be nine months long, the class ended in May 1921 when 
the Air Service assigned the students and their instructors to the 1st Provisional Air Brigade (1 
PAB), which was created to assist Mitchell during Project B.  Milling and other faculty members 
at the Air Service School agreed to let the class join the 1 PAB because they believed that 
Mitchell’s tests would be excellent training for the students.316   
Mitchell devised Project B to test the effectiveness of airplane attacks on naval vessels. 
Project B had the support of Secretary of War Newton Baker and Secretary of the Navy Josephus 
Daniels.  Daniels, a U.S. Navy man to the core, supported the tests because he believed that they 
would prove that aircraft presented no danger to naval vessels.  Prior to the tests, Daniels stated 
that he “would be glad to stand bareheaded on the deck or at the wheel of any battleship while 
Mitchell tried to take a crack at me from the air.  If he ever tries to aim bombs on the decks of 
naval vessels, he will be blown to atoms long before he gets close enough to drop salt on the tail 
of the Navy.”317 
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Mitchell and the men of the 1 PAB began their tests in July 1921.  On July 18, 1921, the 
1 PAB, in conjunction with U.S. Navy aircraft, targeted the German cruiser SMS Frankfurt, 
which had served in World War I.318  On the first pass, U.S. Navy aircraft dropped 250-pound 
bombs, while the 1 PAB dropped 300-pound bombs.  The relatively low-yield bombs caused 
little damage to the well-armored SMS Frankfurt.  As a result, on the second pass the U.S. Navy 
airplanes dropped 550-pound bombs and the 1 PAB dropped 600-pound bombs.  The larger 
bombs proved successful and caused the Frankfurt to rapidly take on water and begin to sink.319   
While the U.S. Navy aviators were pleased with the results of the test, more traditionally 
minded Navy officers reacted to the sinking of the SMS Frankfurt as they had the sinking of the 
U.S.S. Indiana.  They claimed that the ship was too old and battle-worn to put up much of a 
fight.  They argued that the 1 PAB’s success in sinking the Frankfurt would not have happened if 
the ship had the thicker armor used on more-modern battleships.  Mitchell, always ready to raise 
to a challenge, proceeded to ask the U.S. Navy to allow the 1 PAB to bomb the German 
battleship SMS Ostfriesland, another trophy of World War I.320  The U.S. Navy acquiesced to 
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Mitchell’s request, but required that the 1 PAB drop light-weight bombs from the relatively high 
altitude of 10,000 feet.321   
The attack on the Ostfriesland began two days later, on the morning of July 20, 1921.  A 
number of people watched the attack from the U.S.S. Henderson, including Secretary of War 
John Weeks, Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby, General Pershing, Major General Menoher, 
and numerous members of the American press and the international press.322  During the first 
attack on the Ostfriesland, the 1 PAB dropped 33 230-pound bombs on the vessel, which 
remained stationary throughout the attack.  Of the 33 bombs dropped, eight hit the ship, which 
was subsequently inspected in order to assess the damage.  The inspectors discovered that the 
attacks had inflicted significant damage to the hull of the Ostfriesland, causing the ship to list to 
port. 
Following the inspection, the 1 PAB initiated the second attack armed with 230-pound 
and a third and fourth attack with aircraft carrying 600-pound bombs.  Five of the 600-pound 
bombs hit the ship but caused little visible damage.  However, several of the bombs that had 
missed the ship exploded near enough to the haul to cause substantial damage below the water 
line.  The damage below the waterline flooded portions of the ship, causing the vessel to list 
approximately five degrees to port (the left-hand side of the ship when facing the front of a 
vessel).  A storm developed before the fifth wave of aircraft could engage.323 
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The following morning, July 21, 1921, the 1 PAB began the fifth attack on the 
Ostfriesland.    At 8:52 am that morning, one of the aircraft hit the ship with a 1,000-pound 
bomb.  Shortly thereafter, two additional bombs struck the ship.  As on the previous day, 
inspectors went aboard to assess the damage, determining that the bomb had caused minimal 
damage except for a hole in the starboard that flooded more water into the ship.   Three hours 
after the fifth attack, the Ostfriesland was down five feet at the stern (back or rear of a ship) and 
one foot at the bow (front of a ship).  Less than twenty minutes later, at 12:19PM, the sixth attack 
commenced.  During that attack, the 1 PAB dropped six 2,000-pounds bombs on the ship.  All 
six failed to hit the ship directly but three detonated close to the hull, causing the ship to begin 
sinking rapidly ten minutes after the end of the sixth attack.  Another ten minutes after that, at 
12:40PM, the Ostfriesland finally sank.324 
The 1 PAB’s success caused a significant amount of distress among many in the U.S. 
Navy and joy among many in the Air Service.  On August 5, 1921, Senator William Borah of 
Idaho pondered the usefulness of spending approximately $24 million to complete the six U.S. 
Navy battleships then under construction.  Known as “The Great Opposer” for his tendency to 
place personal principles over party loyalty, Borah argued that the bombing tests showed that 
“with sufficient airplane and submarine protection this country was perfectly safe from 
attack.”325   
Others in the House of Representatives and the Senate strongly disagreed with Borah, 
believing that the bombing tests had been far from conclusive given the fact that Mitchell’s 
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report and the U.S. Navy’s report presented very different conclusions.  Thus, the Senate passed 
a resolution that directed Secretary of War John W. Weeks to provide them with Mitchell’s 
classified report on the bombings.  Vice President Calvin Coolidge responded to the Senate’s 
request on January 4, 1922.  In his reply, Coolidge explained that President Warren Harding 
determined the “transmission of the report in question incompatible with the public interest.”326  
Borah and others responded quickly, arguing that Mitchell’s report “might materially affect the 
reputation of some of this who have been passing upon the efficiency of modern battleships but it 
would also be interesting to the tax payers” given the enormous expense involved with building 
large naval vessels.327 
Senator Borah and his fellow senators were not the only ones interested in the results of 
the bombing tests.  Nearly two months after the Senate received Coolidge’s reply, Congressmen 
Charles Curry introduced House Resolution 1615 (H.R. 1615).  In the new bill, Curry argued that 
the U.S. needed a Department of Air that would oversee all civilian and military aviation in the 
U.S.  Curry’s bill included the establishment of a United States Air Force that would operate 
independently and support both land and sea forces depending on the needs of the commander or 
the conflict.  Like similar bills introduced after World War I, H.R. 1615 never gained much 
traction because a strong resistance to such changes remained in the both the U.S. government 
and U.S. Military.  To illustrate that point, President Warren Harding, in a message included in a 
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report of the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, asserted that the Air Service should 
remain part of the Army.328 
The Fallout 
The bombing tests, particularly the widespread public belief that the Air Service had 
proved itself, did not immediately alter the Air Service.  The second Air Service School class 
began in October 1921 with little fanfare.329  However, the tests 1 PAB conducted did have a 
significant impact on the second class, as well as all subsequent classes.  News of the tests had 
reached the American public when someone in the press leaked Mitchell’s report on the bombing 
tests.  The leak shook up the Air Service and caused some harm to Mitchell’s standing among his 
superiors because many of them felt that Mitchell had facilitated the leak. 330  
General Mason Patrick, who assumed command of the Air Service on October 5, 1921, 
immediately worked to soothe the tensions between the Air Service, the U.S. Army, and the U.S. 
Navy.  To further satisfy Mitchell’s critics, General Patrick sent Mitchell, aircraft designer 
Alfred Verville, and Lieutenant Clayton Bissell on an inspection tour of Europe.  While in 
Europe, Mitchell met Guilio Douhet, a man whose airpower theories had only just begun to gain 
a foothold in the United States.  By all accounts, including Mitchell’s, the two men had a great 
deal in common.  As a result, Mitchell’s brief trip to Europe did not have the effect that General 
Patrick had hoped for.  Bursting with energy and enthusiasm after his return to the United States, 
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Mitchell began to provide translated copies of Douhet’s Command of the Air to several of his 
acquaintances in the Air Service.331   
The Air Service School Evolves 
As Mitchell worked to centralize control of airpower, the Air Service continued to focus 
on the arduous task of turning the Air Service School into an educational center on par with the 
U.S. Army and U.S. Navy schools that served as its model.  In 1921, General Patrick wrote to 
Major Milling explaining that junior officers would make up the bulk of the student body at the 
Air Service School because the Air Service simply did not have enough field grade officers to fill 
all of the school’s slots.  Milling, aware of the lack of field grade officers within the Air Service 
following the end of World War I, had little problem finding energetic junior officers willing to 
attend the school.  In early 1922, the Air Service Board made things official by declaring that Air 
Service officers of all ranks could attend the Air Service School if they so desired.  The board’s 
decision led the Air Service to change the name of school to the Air Service Tactcal School 
(ASTS) in November 1922.332 
In the months prior to the name change, the Air Service School had begun to discuss not 
only Air Service tactics but also U.S. Army and U.S. Navy tactics in order to give students a 
broader perspective on how the U.S. military fought.  The arduous nine month course included 
twenty subjects and over 1,300 hours of instruction.  The courses covered topics such as 
Aeronautical Engineering, Armament and Gunnery, Anti-Aircraft Defense, Balloons and 
Airships, Bombardment, Employment and Associated Units, Combat Orders, Navigation, 
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Meteorology, Organization of the Army, Observation, Photography, Pursuit, Staff Duties, and 
Supply.333   
A few months later, in early 1923, the Air Service further altered the ASTS curriculum 
by adding 126 hours of required “Practical Flying” to the course of study.  At first, Air Service 
leaders assumed that all Air Service officers would arrive at the school being well acquainted 
with flying.  However, it became apparent within several years of the Air Service School’s 
founding that many Air Service officers did not fly as frequently as they might have liked.  Thus, 
Air Service leaders argued that adding flying hours to the ASTS curriculum would force Air 
Service officers to become more comfortable with flying.  The new course demanded that ASTS 
students had to fly at least twice each week in order to meet the 126 hour requirement.334   
Problems Arise 
Shortly after the Air Service changed the ASTS curriculum, General Patrick provided his 
response to Major General Peter Harris, the Adjutant General of the U.S. Army.  General Harris 
had asked that General Patrick submit a plan to improve the Air Service.  In his reply to General 
Harris, sent on February 6, 1923, Patrick argued that the Air Service would work best if it 
focused on two main tasks.  The first task required the Air Service to support ground 
commanders with observation aircraft and balloon.  The second task required Air Service attack, 
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bombardment, and pursuit units to operate independently of ground forces in what he called the 
“Air Force.”  Patrick then stated that the Air Service would be unable to man and equip an “Air 
Force” with its current manpower pool.335   Finally, Patrick explained that the Air Service should 
handle all coastal defense missions launched from land while the U.S. Navy aviation would carry 
out all missions launched from the sea.  Patrick maintained that a clear separation of duties 
between the two services would benefit both by preventing duplication of effort.336  In his report, 
General Patrick essentially attempted to satisfy both the traditionalists and the Air Service 
officers, who sought greater centralized control. 
The month after General Patrick sent his reply to General Harris, the U.S. Army formed a 
board, headed by Major General William Lassiter, to deliberate on Patrick’s report.  Following 
their initial discussions, the Lassiter Board convened hearings in order to gather the testimony of 
several aviation professionals.  Once the hearings ended, the members of the Lassiter Board 
released their report, in which they argued: “The aircraft industry in the United States is entirely 
inadequate to meet peace and war time requirements.  It is rapidly diminishing under present 
conditions and will soon practically disappear.”  The Lassiter Board made several 
recommendations designed to improve the Air Service over a period of ten years.  One 
recommendation included a $25 million a year operating budget for the Air Service.  The 
Lassiter Board also recommended that the number of Air Service personnel should be increased 
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to 31,500 (25,000 enlisted, 4,000 officers, and 2,500 aviation cadets).   A third recommendation 
suggested that the Air Service should have 2,500 aircraft, 38 balloons, and 20 airships.337    
In addition to the aforementioned recommendations, the Lassiter Board proposed that the 
Air Service adopt aspects of General Patrick’s plan, including having some Air Service units 
operate independently from the U.S. Army.  Specifically, the group suggested that the U.S. Army 
should incorporate Air Service squadrons at the division (10,000 to 15,000 personnel), corps 
(25,000 to 50,000 personnel), and field army (over 80,000 personnel) level.  The group then 
recommended that General Headquarters have an Air Service reserve attached to it.  Those 
forces could then be used to either support ground forces or to fight independently in order to 
provide the commander with maximum flexibility.  Finally, the Lassiter Board proposed 
establishing a third force that would serve as a largely independent air force that would be 
“compact, complete, and always available for action at some distance from the ground forces.”338 
Secretary of War Weeks approved the Lassiter Board’s report.  He then sent the report to 
the Joint Army and Navy Board for review and comment.  The U.S. Navy members on the Joint 
Board voted against the Lassiter Board’s report due to the fact that it would weaken naval 
aviation in favor of strengthening the Air Service.339  As a result, the Lassiter’s Board’s 
recommendation’s never achieved the status of official legislation.  However, the War 
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Department largely adhered to the recommendations until the passage of the Air Corps Act in 
1926.340   
Despite never officially becoming law, the Lassiter Board’s report sparked further debate 
on the future of the Air Service.  In early 1924, Congressmen John Nelson of Wisconsin 
introduced the first of several pieces of legislation aimed at determining whether the 
Manufacturer’s Aircraft Association was responsible for the Air Service’s poor state.341  In 
March 1924, Nelson achieved his goal when the U.S. Congress passed House Resolution 192 
(H.R. 192), which called for the establishment of a committee to examine the finances of the Air 
Service and all other aviation branches funded by the U.S. government.  To comply with H.R. 
192, Frederick Gillett, the U.S. Speaker of the House, selected nine Congressmen to form a 
committee.  Titled the Select Committee of Inquiry into Operations of the U.S. Air Services, 
commonly called the Lampert Board, the group of men began their arduous task on October 4, 
1924.   
To their credit, the nine Congressmen did not take their task lightly.  Over a period of 
approximately 11 months, the Lampert Board interviewed over 150 people.  The Congressmen 
also expanded their investigation to include the organization of the Air Service itself.  Although 
the committee was not officially tasked to do so, it is likely that they felt that discovering more 
about the organization of the Air Service would enable them to better understand the full-scope 
of the situation it faced.  Thus, the Lampert Board spoke with numerous Air Service officers, 
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including General Mitchell.  Naturally, some within the War Department, particularly the 
Department of the Navy, objected to both Mitchell’s presence and his testimony.342   
Given his typical style, Mitchell’s testimony proved to be both enthralling and highly 
provocative.  Many in attendance were particularly shocked to hear that, according to Mitchell’s 
estimate, the U.S. military’s aviation forces where only the fifth most powerful in the world.343  
Mitchell also explained the General Patrick had said just as much to his superiors on the General 
Staff, only to be ignored.  Ultimately, Mitchell argued that the organization of the Air Service 
was as it was in order to assist those with “vested interests against aviation.”344   
 As Mitchell struggled to convince Congress, U.S. military leaders, and the American 
public that airmen should centrally control airpower, the Air Service faced a more immediate 
problem.  By June 1924, it had become apparent to many Air Service leaders that the biggest 
problem facing the ASTS was a lack of qualified and experienced instructors.  The majority of 
the Air Service’s combat veterans had returned to civilian life following World War I.  A few 
remained but not nearly enough go around.  Thus, the ASTS commandant spoke to General 
Patrick about the problems he faced when trying to secure instructors for the ASTS.  He 
explained to Patrick that he believed that all ASTS instructors should be assigned to teach at the 
ASTS for no less than two years in order to help stabilize the situation.  More importantly, he 
argued that there needed to be a four-month period during which outgoing and incoming 
instructors would work together in order to ensure a seamless transition that did not significantly 
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impact the students.  Most importantly, especially given the intended purpose of the ASTS, he 
recommended that all instructors had to have graduated from the ASTS or other U.S. Army 
schools of the same level as the ASTS or higher.345  In August 1924, General Patrick approved 
the ASTS recommendations.  Thereafter, all ASTS instructors had either graduated from the 
ASTS or one of the other U.S. Army General Service Schools.  In addition, the overlap between 
outgoing and incoming instructors was mandatory.346   
The difficulties that the ASTS faced during the first few years of its existence did not 
immediately cease.  For example, the shortage of instructors continued throughout much of 1925 
despite the efforts of ASTS and Air Service leadership.  The fact that many ASTS instructors 
often came and went for short visits and temporary duties assignments did not help the situation.   
However, General Patrick and others maintained that outside duty allowed ASTS instructors to 
remain connected to important aviation developments occurring outside the insulated confines of 
the school.347  The fact that instructors actively retained a connection outside the school 
undoubtedly helped both the instructors and students keep pace with the rapid aviation 
developments during the 1920s. 
Trouble for Mitchell 
As leaders at the Air Service Tactical School struggled to improve the school, General 
Mitchell continued his efforts to gain Air Service independence.  In January 1925, Mitchell 
testified before the Lampert Committee.  During his testimony, Mitchell argued that the General 
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Staff had influenced the testimony of many of the U.S. Army officers who had testified in front 
of various Congressional committees.  He also argued that a small but powerful group within 
both the War Department and Congress had harmed the United States by adhering to the status 
quo.  Mitchell stated: “It is a very serious question whether airpower is auxiliary to the Army and 
the Navy, or whether armies or navies are not actually auxiliary to airpower.”348 
The End  
Mitchell had pushed the limits of acceptable behavior toward superiors throughout much 
of his career in uniform.  Typically, Mitchell avoided serious consequences because of his 
charm, persuasiveness, and leadership abilities.  However, things came to a head on September 
5, 1925, when Mitchell criticized his superiors after two well-publicized incidents.  The first 
involved the aircrew of two U.S. Navy seaplanes who failed in their attempt to fly across the 
Pacific Ocean.349  The second involved the U.S. Navy airship U.S.S. Shenandoah, which crash 
near Caldwell, Ohio, on September 3, 1925.350   
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four had survived and stripped fabric from the PN-9s lower wing.  John Rodgers, “The First Navy Pacific Flight,” 
National Aeronautics Association, October 9, 1925. 
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Shortly after hearing about both incidents, Mitchell went on the attack in an effort to 
prove his point that the status quo was not working.  Mitchell stated: “These incidents are the 
direct result of the incompetency, criminal negligence and almost treasonable administration of 
the national defense by the Navy and War Departments.”  He also added: “The bodies of my 
former companions in the air moulder under the soil in America, and Asia, Europe and Africa, 
many, yes a great many, sent there directly by official stupidity.”351 
Mitchell had finally gone too far.  Within days, the War Department accused Mitchell of 
violating the ninety-sixth Article of War which dealt with “all conduct of a nature to bring 
discredit upon the military service.”352  Mitchell’s attorney, U.S. Representative Frank Reid of 
Illinois, immediately asserted that Mitchell was simply exercising his 1st Amendment right to 
free speech.  Reid argued that Mitchell’s critiques of the War Department were intended to help 
improve the U.S. military rather than heap scorn on his superiors.  Reid went further, stating: 
“Rome endured as long as there were Romans; America will endure as long as there are 
Mitchells.”353   
The prosecution did not agree.  The trial judge advocate argued that Mitchell’s right to 
speak freely did not allow him to publically criticize his superiors because such behavior would 
lead to the breakdown of good order and discipline within the ranks.  The judge advocate also 
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stated: “Discipline and control under such a view of law would vanish and the Army become a 
mob.”354 
Mitchell’s trial, which began in early November 1925, received national coverage.  In 
fact, the trial was front-page news among the majority of American newspapers for many weeks.  
Many of them painted Mitchell as a hero who had done what he had to do to help the Air Service 
survive.   Mitchell’s defense team did much the same.  They argued that Mitchell had done 
everything he had done to help the Air Service.  To support their claims, the defense called on 
more than 40 witnesses, including Major Henry “Hap” Arnold, World War I ace Eddie 
Rickenbacker, and Major Carl Spaatz.355   
The prosecution argued that Mitchell’s enthusiasm for airpower and his desire to advance 
the Air Service did not excuse his insubordinate behavior.  Major Allen Gullion, one of the 
prosecuting judge advocates, argued that Mitchell was a dangerous “megalomaniac” who was 
concerned more about himself than his service.356  Gullion stated: “Is such a man a safe guide?  
Is he a constructive person or is he a loose talking imaginative megalomaniac?”357   
After seven weeks of testimony, the court-martial board issued their verdict on December 
17, 1925.  Two-thirds of the members of the board decided that Mitchell was guilty. The 
remaining one-third determined that Mitchell was not guilty.  Unfortunately for Mitchell, the 
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odds were not in his favor.  Major General Robert Lee Howze, who presided over the trial, read 
the verdict.358  Howze stated: “Upon secret written ballot the court sentences the accused to be 
suspended from rank, command and duty with the forfeiture of all pay and allowances for five 
years.”  Howze, aware of the amount of public support Mitchell enjoyed, was careful to point out 
that the court had been generous because of Mitchell’s contributions to the national defense.  
Howze stated: "The Court is thus lenient because of the military record of the Accused during 
the World War."359  
As mentioned previously, not all the members of the court-martial board agreed with the 
verdict.  Major General Douglas MacArthur, the youngest members of the board, voted to acquit 
Mitchell.360  MacArthur, a close friend of Mitchell’s for many years, argued that “a senior officer 
should not be silenced for being at variance with his superiors in rank and with accepted 
doctrine.”361  Others, especially those connected to the Air Service, also maintained that Mitchell 
should have been acquitted.  Shortly after hearing about the verdict, Congressman Fiorello 
LaGuardia, a former Air Service officer who commanded a squadron of Caproni Ca.44 
bombardment aircraft during World War I, quickly introduced a bill designed to limit the 
sentence for violating the 96th Article of War to 30 days.362 
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Mitchell appreciated the support that he received from his friends, colleagues, and 
supporters.  However, he was in no mood to fight the verdict, especially after he received word 
that previously supportive newspapers and others had turned against him.  In a post-trial 
editorial, the Milwaukee Journal, Mitchell’s hometown newspaper, asserted: “The extreme 
charges that Colonel Mitchell made were not justified by the evidence before the court.”363  
General Pershing had also turned against Mitchell.  Pershing, who likened Mitchell’s 
insubordination to the Russian Revolution of 1917, stated: “There seems to be a Bolshevik bug 
in the air.”364 Angry and dejected, Mitchell resigned his commission as a U.S. Army officer on 
February 1, 1926.365   
Conclusion 
Mitchell’s court-martial and resignation from the U.S. Army ended his tenure as the Air 
Service’s most visible and forceful proponent.  However, Mitchell’s efforts on behalf of 
American airpower had not gone to waste.  He continued to influence American public opinion 
on airpower until his death in 1936.  Most importantly, Mitchell had developed a sizeable corps 
of followers during World War I and throughout the early 1920s.   Those followers, many of 
them in the Air Service, carried Mitchell’s theories and doctrine forward long after their mentor 
had left uniformed service.   
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Evidence of such support came almost immediately after Mitchell’s trial.  Major Arnold, 
who headed the Air Service’s Information Division, used his unit’s resources to promote his 
views on airpower.  By doing so, Arnold was putting himself at risk.  After hearing the verdict, 
Secretary of War Dwight Davis ordered General Mason Patrick to keep his men in line.  General 
Patrick subsequently ordered all Air Service officers who had either testified for Mitchell, or 
helped him in any way during the trial, to keep a low profile.  Patrick hoped that staying out of 
the limelight would keep the Air Service, as well as himself, out of trouble with the War 
Department.366  Clearly, Arnold had not followed Patrick’s directive. 
Upon learning that Arnold had defied him, General Patrick asked him if he would rather 
resign or face a court-martial.  Arnold stated that he wanted a court-martial, but Patrick feared 
that another trial would hurt the Air Service’s already-damaged reputation.  General Patrick 
decided to place a letter of reprimand in Arnold’s personnel file and sending him to Fort Riley, 
Kansas, to command the 16th Observation Squadron and to keep him far away from Washington, 
D.C.367 
Arnold’s actions were but one example of the level to which Mitchell’s ideas had 
penetrated the Air Service.  Rising stars such as Arnold were only the most high-profile evidence 
of Mitchell’s influence on his service.  The majority of Air Service officers had embraced much 
of what Mitchell had advocated, especially his belief that the Air Service needed to have 
centralized control of airpower in order for American airpower to develop properly.  As leaders 
of the Air Service and instructors at the Air Service Tactical School during the 1920s and 1930s, 
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those men inculcated the fundamental elements of Mitchell’s concepts and theories into nearly 
every airman who followed.   
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Chapter 4 – Pulling Back the Throttle: Airmen Reassess Their Approach  
I have always carried the impression that if the War Department actually knew, and knew the 
impact of the thing that we were doing, that the whole thing would have been closed up and we 
would have all been put in jail. –Major General Donald Wilson368 
 
 
 The men of the United States Air Service found themselves in a difficult position at the 
beginning of 1926.  William “Billy” Mitchell, the Air Service’s most vocal leader, had resigned 
his U.S. Army commission on February 1, 1926.  His departure created a large void that other 
Air Service officers began to fill.  Many of these officers had been acolytes and contemporaries 
of Mitchell.  Therefore, they already had the “us versus them” mindset that had energized 
Mitchell.  For the rest of the 1920s and throughout the 1930s, these airmen continued to push for 
an independent air force.  However, they saw that Mitchell’s aggressive approach had not 
worked.  Thus, although they retained the same commitment to the independence of air power, 
they acted and spoke in a less abrasive way, hoping that this more restrained approach would 
better serve their larger purpose. 
The Air Corps Act 
Air Service officers, especially William “Billy” Mitchell, had long argued that their 
service would benefit from more control over air power and greater, if not total, independence, 
from the U.S. Army.  On July 2, 1926, several months after Mitchell resigned from the military, 
the U.S. Congress passed Public Law 69-446.  Often referred to as the Air Corps Act, Public 
Law 69-446 was based on the recommendations provided by the Morrow Board, which President 
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Calvin Coolidge had appointed in September 1925 to determine the "best means of developing 
and applying aircraft in national defense."369   
The Air Corps Act, which changed the name of the Air Service to the Air Corps, was an 
important step forward for American aviation.  The act required that 90 percent of the officer 
corps, including the chief of the Air Corps and at least two of his subordinates, be rated pilots.  
This requirement was particularly important because it guaranteed that aviators would lead the 
Air Corps.370  The act also specified that an air section would be attached to every division in the 
U.S. Army.  Finally, the act authorized a five-year plan that would increase the size of the Air 
Corps to 1,518 officers, 200 flying cadets, 16,000 enlisted men, and 1,800 aircraft.371 
Although the Air Corps Act seemed to provide much of what airmen wanted, it did not 
satisfy most of the men in the Air Corps.  Despite requiring at least 90 percent of the officers to 
be rated pilots, the Air Corps Act felt like a hollow victory to many airmen.  They were happy 
that the Air Corps would grow, but they were less pleased with having an air section attached to 
every U.S. Army division because it kept them under the control of U.S. Army ground force 
commanders.  Most importantly, many airmen were angry that the Air Corps Act did not create a 
separate air arm. 
One man who was okay with the Air Corps Act was General Mason Patrick, the Chief of 
the Air Corps.  General Patrick, who wrote a large portion of the Air Corps Act, had argued that 
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the Air Service should be semi-independent within the War Department much like the Marine 
Corps was within the Navy Department.  However, Patrick was a pragmatist, who understood 
that his superiors were fiercely determined to keep the status quo.  As a result, Patrick was not 
going to make the same mistakes that Mitchell had.  He was not going to push too hard because 
he knew it would only further alienate his superiors.  Historian Herman S. Wolk argues that 
Patrick “moved slowly and deliberately, knowing that any sudden, all-out burst toward real 
independence would be certain to fail.”372  He also understood that, although it did not grant 
greater autonomy or complete independence, the Air Corps Act ensured that the Air Corps would 
expand under the leadership and guidance of aviators.  As a result, he embraced the act and 
encouraged his subordinates to do the same.373 
General Patrick’s most important asset was his temperament.  Patrick was more patient 
and, when contrasted with Mitchell, he seemed even more so.  Although Patrick believed that 
airpower would be most effective under the control of aviators, he knew that it would take time 
to convince U.S. Army leaders of that fact.  As a result, General Patrick and Brigadier General 
James Fechet, the Assistant Chief of the Air Corps, focused their efforts on expanding the Air 
Corps’ within the existing framework.374 
To accomplish their goal, General Patrick and General Fechet concentrated on 
reinvigorating Air Corps training and education in an effort to develop airmen who understood 
air power and, more importantly, could explain its merits to non-aviators.  Thus, Air Corps 
Tactical School (ACTS) became increasingly important to the Air Corps as a whole.  Shortly 
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after the passage of the Air Corps Act, Patrick and Fechet initiated a five-year expansion plan 
that was designed to increase the number of Air Corps units in order to accommodate the Air 
Corps’ increased manpower authorization.  The program included a significant expansion of 
Langley Field that would substantially change the character of the installation.  General Patrick, 
worried that the build-up of Langley Field would disrupt the ACTS, contemplated moving the 
school to Miller Field on Staten Island, New York.  The ACTS Commandant, Lieutenant 
Colonel C.C. Culver argued that Miller Field was not the best choice.  Instead, Culver suggested 
several others locations including Richmond, Virginia; Washington, D.C.; Montgomery, 
Alabama; San Antonio, Texas, and Fort Riley, Kansas.375 
A Bold New Direction for Airpower 
As General Patrick and his staff worked to find a new home for the ACTS, the staff of the 
school focused on defining what made the Air Corps distinct from the other branches of the U.S. 
Army and the U.S. military.  In a text published in 1926, the ACTS began to clearly distinguish 
their service from all others within the U.S. military.  Titled “Employment of Combined Air 
Force,” the authors of the text argued that aviation had changed warfare forever since aircraft 
could strike the enemy’s cities, industrial centers, fuel storage facilities, and others targets that 
had previously been extremely difficult and costly to reach using land forces.  Essentially, the 
authors maintained that the airpower could decrease the duration of wars by “achieving the 
military objective with the least possible cost.”376    
The authors of “Employment of Combined Air Force” had essentially codified for the 
first time what Douhet, Mitchell, and Trenchard had advocated for close to two decades—an air 
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force could hit the heart of enemy territory and destroy its will and ability to fight.  Yet, like their 
well-known predecessors, the authors of the text had little to no evidence to back up their claims.  
However, they did persuasively argue that airpower’s ability to hits targets deep within enemy 
territory far surpassed that of any other military asset.   
The text “Employment of Combined Air Force” also included a strong emphasis on 
bombardment aviation.  Throughout World War I, pursuit aircraft served as the primary 
offensive weapon of the belligerent air forces.  Zeppelins and various bombardment aircraft had 
a significant impact on a few occasions but pursuit aircraft clearly held the upper hand 
throughout the conflict.  Yet, as Billy Mitchell’s air attacks on naval vessels had demonstrated, 
bombardment aircraft had the potential to be the decisive weapons in future wars.  Fully agreeing 
with Mitchell’s logic, the authors of the text argued that the best way to gain and maintain air 
superiority was to destroy the enemy’s air force before it ever left the ground.377    Pursuit 
aircraft could achieve that goal but attack aircraft and bombardment aircraft were much better 
suited for such a task.  As a result, the authors stressed that attack and bombardment aircraft 
would be the key aircraft in any air force.378 
“Employment of Combined Air Force” was not the only groundbreaking text the ACTS 
put forth in 1926.  The bombardment text of 1926 stressed the importance of daylight bombing 
when attacking small targets because the light would allow the attack to be more precise.  Thus, 
for the first time in the institution’s history, the ACTS officially advocated what would become 
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known as daylight precision bombing.  Of course, the aircraft and equipment needed to 
successfully undertake such missions did not exist in 1926.  As a result, the bombardment text 
continued to emphasize night bombing as the most effective means of destroying an enemy 
target without substantial loss to the attacking air force.379    
A Change of Leaders 
 While the ACTS instructors worked to strengthen curriculum at the school, General 
Patrick decided that he was ready to retire from military service in December 13, 1927.  Many 
men in the Air Corps appreciated what Patrick had accomplished.  Captain Ira Eaker, who served 
as Patrick’s executive assistant in Washington in 1924, believed that Patrick’s temperament had 
helped reestablish damaged relationships in the wake of Mitchell’s court-martial.  Eaker 
explained that Patrick repaired the Air Corps’ relationship with the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy 
by working “through the established organization, not over or around it.” Eaker also argued that 
Patrick’s quiet charm was important.  He stated that Patrick “had the great faculty of being able 
to talk to military leaders, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chiefs of the other services, the 
Secretary of War, and senior members of the Congress.”380  Benjamin Foulois, who assumed the 
position of assistant chief of the Air Corps upon Fechet’s promotion, echoed Eaker’s sentiments.  
Foulois argued that Patrick had “brought discipline and order out of the chaos that Mitchell had 
created by his constant insubordination.”381 
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 General Fechet assumed command of the Air Corps from General Patrick on December 
14, 1927.  Like General Patrick, Fechet believed that air power would function best under the 
control of airmen.  However, also like Patrick, Fechet believed that the best way to achieve such 
control was to work diligently to show civilian and military leaders what air power was all about.  
To achieve that goal, Fechet followed Patrick’s example throughout his tenure as the Chief of the 
Air Corps.   
 To accomplish his of goal of gaining greater independence for the Air Corps, Fechet 
worked to strengthen his service, help the American people understand what air power was 
about, and convince Congress that the Air Corps could do all that Mitchell and others had 
claimed.  To do this, Fechet relied heavily on the skills and experience of Brigadier General 
Foulois.  Foulois had extensive operational and organizational experience that was almost 
unmatched.  Although he had not been an ace pilot, he had plenty of time at the controls of an 
airplane.  Most importantly, Foulois had been heavily involved in aviation for nearly two 
decades.382   
 Shortly after he started the new position, Foulois studied the Air Corps’ budget estimates.  
He determined that the budget estimates did not include all the necessities because 
“inexperienced budget makers who were not fliers had been too general in their fund 
requests.”383  Foulois responded by tasking his staff to apply greater rigor to the estimates and 
come up with more-exacting figures.  Foulois maintained that he had re-examined the figures 
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because he wanted “those above the Air Corps with the power of cutting our requests to know 
what they were cutting.”384 
After re-examining the budget figures for 1928, Foulois met with General Fechet to 
discuss the five-year expansion plan that Congress had authorized as part of the Air Corps Act.  
Fechet and Foulois determined that they had to focus their efforts on building the Air Corps into 
an organization that could do more than theorize about the potential of air power.  Both men 
wanted the Air Corps to become an organization that could demonstrate that airpower was an 
indispensable asset to the nation.385  To achieve their goal, Fechet and Foulois focused on 
developing new aircraft, increasing Air Corps participation in U.S. Army exercises, and training 
Air Corps officers.  They believed that all three of those things were needed to help the Air 
Corps achieve greater autonomy.   
Fechet and Foulois understood that the addition of new aircraft was important because 
the Air Corps needed new and more capable aircraft to accomplish the missions that the planners 
and thinkers at the ACTS had devised in their offices and classrooms.  They also knew that air 
forces throughout the world, both friendly and unfriendly to the United States were actively 
developing new aircraft.  Most importantly, they believed that new aircraft were essential to 
proving to the War Department that the Air Corps could be a decisive force in future conflicts.386 
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The two seasoned airmen also thought that the Air Corps needed to participate in more 
exercises in order to train airmen and to show U.S. Army leaders what airpower could do, both in 
alone and in cooperation with ground forces.  Foulois that exercises were important because they 
allowed the Air Corps to test new tactics and equipment under conditions that were close to those 
experienced during combat.387   
The third focus area for Fechet and Foulois was the education and training of Air Corps 
officers.  Both men believed that their men needed to be knowledgeable about every aspect of 
airpower, including the aircraft, the flight gear, the existing theories on the employment of 
airpower, the challenges of working with ground forces, and much more.  They also wanted their 
airmen to be able to promote airpower wherever they went.  Finally, Fechet and Foulois worked 
to get officers from other branches of the U.S. military to attend the Air Corps Tactics School.  
They did so with the hope that those officers would spread throughout the U.S. Army and the 
U.S. Navy.388  
The ACTS 
Fechet’s focus on his airmen greatly improved the ACTS.  However, instructors at the 
school realized that Langley Field, Virginia, was expanding, which created a problem for the 
ACTS.  Langley Field simply did not have the space or the facilities to continue to house the 
ACTS.   As a result, Fechet’s men in the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps (OCAC) met and 
discussed other potential locations for the school.  Initial possibilities included Miller Field, New 
York; Richmond, Virginia; Boiling Field, Washington D.C.; Maxwell Field, Alabama; Fort 
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Riley, Kansas; and San Antonio, Texas.  By the end of 1928, the OCAC had determined that 
Maxwell Field represented the best of all available options.  The Following month, January 
1929, the OCAC selected a group of officers to determine what needed to happen at Maxwell 
Field to facilitate the move.389 
The officers on the board recommended that Maxwell Field could be expanded by 
approximately 1,000 acres to accommodate a “Tactical School” of 75 students, a squadron 
officer course of 50 students per class, and a composite group formed from attack, bombardment, 
observation, and pursuit squadrons.390  The group provided their recommendations to the OCAC, 
which then forwarded them to Congress.  On the last day of the 1930 session, Congress 
authorized $200,000 for the Air Corps to purchase 750 acres adjacent to Maxwell Field.  That 
money came only months after Congress had authorized $689,000 for new construction at 
Maxwell Field which included a new landing field, headquarters building, operations building, 
four hangars, warehouses, officer quarters, nine enlisted barracks, and the ACTS schoolhouse.391   
The Air Corps initially planned to relocate the ACTS to Maxwell in the summer of 1929.  
However, construction delays led to an almost two-year wait.  Finally, on April 15, 1931, the 
U.S. Army Adjutant General signed the order that officially transferred the ACTS from Langley 
Field to Maxwell Field.  From June 25, 1931, to July 15, 1931, the men assigned to the ACTS 
completed the first stage of the move to Maxwell  Field.  The relocation was important because it 
provided the ACTS with room to expand—something that was lacking at Langley Field.  In 
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addition, Maxwell Field’s distance from Washington, D.C. provided the men of the ACTS with a 
measure of psychological space that provided them the greater intellectual freedom they 
sought.392 
Foulois has the Stick 
Ultimately, the policies set in motion by Fechet and Foulois helped the Air Corps expand 
during Fechet’s tenure as the Chief of the Air Corps.  However, the growth during that period 
proved to be very minimal.  For example, in 1927, the year Fechet assumed command, the ACTS 
graduated 20 officers.  The number improved each year with 24 students graduating in 1928, 24 
in 1929, and 31 in 1930.  A total of 39 in 1931, which was Fechet’s final year at the head of the 
Air Corps.393   New aircraft were introduced during Fechet’s tenure as well.  They included the 
Curtis P-1 Hawk pursuit airplane, the Boeing P-12 pursuit airplane, and the Curtis O-1 Falcon 
observation airplane, and the Keystone LB-6 and LB-7 bombardment aircraft. 
In spite of the slow growth, the Air Corps had survived the bad press that followed 
Mitchell’s court-martial.  On December 21, 1931, General Foulois assumed command of the Air 
Corps following Fechet’s retirement the day before.394  Although Fechet had done an excellent 
job of improving the Air Corps, his efforts were somewhat constrained by his desire to move 
forward cautiously.  Foulois, who could be cautious when needed, believed that he had to press a 
little harder in order for the Air Corps to gain greater independence from the U.S. Army.   
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The Real Work Begins 
 As part of the continuing effort to gain greater control of air power, Foulois focused on 
improving the ACTS.  During Foulois’ tenure, the officers assigned to the ACTS began the 
arduous task of creating a cohesive air power doctrine.  From the very start, they relied upon the 
guidance of their predecessors and mentors as they moved forward with their arduous task.  This 
was particularly true for the officers who had served under Billy Mitchell.  Laurence S. Kuter 
argued that Mitchell’s “Notes on the Multi-Motored Bombardment Group, Day and Night” 
served as the “basis of instruction in the Air Corps Tactical School from its inception.”  Kuter 
stated: “In 1932, the then Lieutenant K.N. Walker [Kenneth Newton Walker], who was one of 
General Mitchell’s very capable aides, became instructor in bombardment aviation at the Air 
Corps Tactical School.”  Kuter also mentioned that Captain Robert Olds, a former aide to 
Mitchell, was an influential instructor who taught bombardment aviation courses at the ACTS.   
Kuter asserted that, largely because of Walker and Olds, “Mitchell’s work has continued, 
expanded, augmented, and separated into its several components, including tactics and 
techniques of attack aviation, tactics and techniques of bombardment aviation, and the 
employment of air forces.”395 
 Many of Kuter’s colleagues agreed with his observations and opinions regarding 
Mitchell’s influence on the ACTS.    In his work on the ACTS, historian Robert T. Finney 
argued: “When instructors at the school [ACTS] began to graft the concept of the primacy of the 
bomber onto the concept of air warfare and strategic air operations, they were consciously or 
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unconsciously providing the covering for the skeleton built by Mitchell.”396  Indeed, when one 
examines the various theories and doctrines developed at the ACTS during the 1920s and 1930s, 
it is clear that Mitchell had a tremendous impact on the officers who followed him. 
Commandant Curry 
 Although Mitchell provided the doctrine and Foulois fought for funding and manpower, 
Major John F. Curry was the man who supported the officers at the as they worked to develop air 
power doctrine and strategy.  Curry proved to be the strong and capable leader that the ACTS 
needed to thrive.  His tenure as the ACTS commandant lasted through 1935.  During that that 
relatively brief period, Curry accomplished a great deal.  To begin with, he helped increase the 
average size of an ACTS class from 30 students to 65 students.  Curry also headed the Air Corps 
Board, which had been created by the Air Corps Act, and served as Maxwell’s Field’s 
commander.397   Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Curry served as a mentor for many of the 
officers who taught at and attended the ACTS. 
Curry had previously served as the assistant commandant at the ACTS while the school 
was located at Langley Field, Virginia.  During his tenure as the assistant, Curry worked to 
ensure that ACTS students had the best training opportunities possible.  By 1931, in no small 
part to Curry’s efforts, as well as those of Fechet and Foulois, the planned U.S. Army War 
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College exercises for the year had been altered to “inject more aviation into the situation.”  
However, ACTS faculty and students who participated in the exercises claimed that aircraft were 
largely utilized in the combat zone only.  Thus, they were unable to attack troop concentrations, 
industrial targets, and supply areas located in the rear beyond the combat lines.  ACTS officers 
argued that such restrictions tied their hands because the full impact of air power could not be 
applied.  Angry that his men were being constrained, Curry argued that such exercises were not 
providing ACTS officers with training that was equal to the level of effort they had to put forth 
in order to participate, especially after the school moved from Langley Field to Maxwell Field.398    
When he assumed command of the ACTS, Curry played a significant role in the 
development of Air Corps theory and doctrine.  In 1933, Curry argued that the Air Corps had to 
acquire new aircraft because he believed that it was “unthinkable to confine our aerial operations 
to the limited range of present pursuit aviation.”  Curry wisely did not throw all of his support 
behind either pursuit or bombardment aviation.  Instead, he stated that the men of the ACTS and 
the Air Corps had to decide how pursuit aircraft would be used in future operations.  Curry 
stated: “The questions to be determined are: is protection of our formation necessary, and (if so) 
what should be the proportion between a given number of planes available, how can we deliver 
the greatest amount of high explosives?”399 
Although Curry allowed his men the leeway to debate important doctrinal issues, he was 
not an ineffective commander.  In fact, his greatest attribute was his ability to lead.  According to 
James MacGregor Burns, “leadership is leaders inducing followers to act for certain goals that 
                                                 
398 The War College typically held maneuvers at Fort DuPont, Delaware.  Therefore, the distance between the 
ACTS’s new campus and the exercise location had increased substantially.  Finney, History of the Air Corps 
Tactical School, p. 23. 
 
399 Finney, History of the Air Corps Tactical School, p. 76. 
 
176 
 
represent the values and the motivations –the wants and needs, the aspirations and 
expectations—of both leaders and followers.  And the genius of leadership lies in the manner in 
which leaders see and act on their own and their followers’ values and motivations.”400  Curry 
did just that throughout his tenure at the ACTS.401 
 Haywood Hansell believed that Curry’s leadership was critical to the development of air 
power doctrine at the ACTS.  Hansell stated that the ACTS “was blessed with a group of gifted 
leaders and independent thinkers—Robert Olds, Kenneth Walker, Harold Lee George, Donald 
Wilson, Muir “Santy” Fairchild—names honored by the Air War College, Air Command and 
Staff College, Air Force Academy, and throughout the modern Air Force.”  However, Hansell 
stated: 
…there was another stalwart leader who has received less recognition, though he should 
be listed among the best.  This was John F. Curry, Commandant of the Air Corps 
Tactical School from 1931 to 1935, a period when the principal texts were prepared for 
Air Warfare and Principles of Air Force Employment.  Much of the basic strategy of 
American air power was developed under his regime.  At a time when the War 
Department was threatening dire punishment from above, Curry protected the freedom 
of his faculty.  He made possible the development of doctrine of air power which formed 
the basis for the creation of the Army Air Forces (AAF) and its employment in World 
War II.  Under his leadership the school bridged the transition from broad generalities of 
pioneering air prophets to more pragmatic application of air power in attainment of 
specific objectives.402  
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A Rift Opens 
 Although Curry did not advocate for either bombardment or pursuit aviation during his 
time at the ACTS, there were many instructors and students at the school who did.  One such 
man was Claire Lee Chennault, who proved to be the most well-known and most vocal of the 
American advocates of pursuit aviation throughout the 1930s.  Chennault, who joined the Signal 
Corps in 1917, became an aviator with the Air Service during World War I.  After the end of the 
conflict, Chennault remained in the Air Service because he had fallen in love with flying.  In 
1930, Chennault became the Chief of the Pursuit Section at the ACTS.  Much like Mitchell 
before him, Chennault possessed a strong personality and even stronger opinions on the 
importance of pursuit aviation.  His aggressiveness and charisma helped invigorate debate within 
the ACTS and, simultaneously, increased interest in the Air Corps among the American people 
and their civilian representatives.403   
 Chennualt, an unrelenting advocate of pursuit aviation, faced a daunting challenge when 
he arrived at the ACTS.  As late as 1930, ACTS instructors had taught their students that pursuit 
aircraft were essential to the survival of bombardment aircraft because they could intercept and 
attack enemy fighters.  However, within months of moving to Maxwell Field, ACTS 
bombardment instructors began to argue that bombardment aircraft did not require fighter escorts 
because the latest Air Corps bombers flew faster, at higher altitudes, and with greater weaponry 
than their pursuit counterparts.  Largely ignoring the possibility of advancements in pursuit 
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aircraft technology and capabilities, many ACTS instructors argued vociferously that bombers 
would be able to reach their targets.404   
 To counter their arguments, Chennault developed his theory of defensive pursuit.  
Defensive pursuit, according to Chennault’s vision, allowed pursuit aircraft to operate either 
offensively or defensively in order to gain air superiority by intercepting and destroying enemy 
aircraft.  Chennault’s theory, which ran contrary to those of Douhet, Mitchell, and Trenchard, 
also stressed that pursuit aircraft could further weaken an enemy air force before it ever left the 
ground by destroying or damaging enemy airfields.405   
 While at the ACTS, Chennault wrote “The Role of Defensive Pursuit.”  Chennault’s 
work proved to be both highly influential and controversial among those at the ACTS and the Air 
Corps.  Throughout the work, Chennault never argued that bombardment aircraft were not an 
extremely useful asset for the Air Corps.  In fact, he argued that bombardment aircraft were 
particularly useful when used to attack “industrial establishments, and lines of communication 
and supply which contribute to the enemy’s ability and will to resist.”406  Chennault also asserted 
that using large numbers of bombardment aircraft “against factories, lines of communication, 
mobilization centers, centers of wealth and population, and harbors” could potentially limit or 
entirely destroy an enemy nation’s ability to fight.407  Essentially, Chennault agreed on most of 
the major points that proponents of bombardment aviation had championed since the days of 
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Douhet and Mitchell.  The difference between Chennault and his opponents centered on the fact 
that he had a far more inclusive, or perhaps more flexible, view of airpower.   
 One of the points on which Chennault had great difficulty convincing his colleagues 
concerned the vulnerability of bombardment aircraft.  He argued that despite the advantages that 
the newest bombardment aircraft had over their pursuit aircraft counterparts they were not 
immune from attack.  Chennault maintained that bombardment aircraft required huge amounts of 
petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) and munitions to complete their missions.  Both POL and 
munitions would have to be loaded in the United States prior to the attack, if the target was close 
enough to the U.S., or loaded at overseas locations which the U.S. military did not possess in 
sufficient quantities or locations throughout the 1930s.408  Chennault believed that the use of 
pursuit aircraft could help mitigate some of those issues. 
In addition to his work inside the classrooms at the ACTS, Chennault championed the 
virtues of pursuit aircraft by fostering the school’s aerial demonstration team, which Lieutenant 
Colonel Curry had established shortly after taking over as commandant.  Chennault saw the team 
as a means to an end.  As described in his memoirs, Chennault used the team to “show his fellow 
officers that three planes could execute with accuracy and precision the most violent and difficult 
maneuvers necessary for successfully attacking and destroying a formation of heavily armed 
bombers.”409  Chennault also hoped that his team would impress “the importance teamwork and 
formation flying in fighter tactics” upon his colleagues.410 
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 To build his team, Chennault sought out the best pursuit pilots in the Air Service.  In 
1932, Chennault selected Sergeant John H. Williamson, Sergeant William C. McDonald, and 
Lieutenant Haywood S. Hansell for his team.  Chennault selected the three men because they 
alone were able to keep pace with him as he performed a series of acrobatic maneuvers in his 
aircraft, which they had to mirror as closely as possible.  In total, Chennault and his team had 
more than 24 years and 11,000 flying hours of experience.411 
 As their cohesion and performance as a team improved, Chennault conducted impromptu 
airshows to the military men and civilians stationed at Maxwell Field.  As described by historian 
Jerome A. Ennels in “’Those Daring Young Men’: The Role of Aero Demonstration Teams in 
the Evolution of Pre-World War II Pursuit Tactics, 1932-1937,” the “slick, fast little bi-planes of 
the Trapezers dove, rolled, spun, climbed, looped, and side-slipped with daring disregard for 
speed or danger.”412  The performance they provided no doubt amazed many in attendance on 
those days.  More importantly, such events helped impress Chennault’s intended audience, the 
faculty and students of the ACTS.   
 Shortly after the formation of the team, the ACTS, at Chennault’s urging, used the 
techniques that he had pioneered with his aerial demonstration team to train less-experienced 
pilots in the intricacies of aerial maneuvers designed to “increase the firepower against an enemy 
plane.”  ACTS students operated in elements of three airplanes during initial training, flights of 
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nine during follow-on training, squadrons consisting of three flights of nine aircraft during the 
third training phase, and groups composed of four squadrons during the final phase of training.413   
 After flying on regular basis throughout 1932 and 1933, Chennault decided to test his 
team’s skills at the Cleveland National Air Races held in September 1934.  The team impressed 
the audience and the reporters in attendance, one of whom stated that they had accomplished “in 
formation virtually everything other pilots did solo.”414  The performance had the impact that 
Chennault had desired with newspapers nationwide extolling the team’s virtues.  In addition, 
several movie companies visited Maxwell Field to capture the team’s performances on film for 
nationwide distribution.415 
 Although Chennault thought that he had made a positive impact on the Air Corps, he was 
beginning to grow tired of being an outcast at the ACTS.  As a result, he retired from the Air 
Corps in 1937 at his permanent rank of captain.  Chennault claimed that he had retired because 
of hearing loss.  However, many of his close friends maintained that Chennault’s frequent 
disagreements with both his colleagues and superiors had all but forced him to retire.  The strain 
associated with being an outcast among his peers must have caused Chennault significant mental 
and physical stress.  Historian Jeffrey Benton contended that Chennault left the service “broken 
in spirit and body from the constant debate about how airpower should be used.”416   
Regardless of the cause, Chennault’s departure from the Air Corps left a huge void that 
could not be easily filled.  Historian Phillip S. Meilinger argued that once the “firebrand 
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Chennault” had left the ACTS, “pursuit doctrine decisively receded into the background, and 
strategic bombardment became the gospel of American air power.”417 
 There were other airmen who believed that pursuit aviation was being neglected at the 
ACTS.  One of these men was Lieutenant Elwood Richard “Pete” Quesada, who had enlisted in 
the Air Corps in September 1924.  After completing pilot training, Quesada commissioned as a 
second lieutenant.  Several years later, in January 1929, Quesada gained fame for participating in 
the exhausting and record-breaking Question Mark flight with Major Carl Spaatz, Captain Ira 
Eaker, First Lieutenant Harry Halverson, and Master Sergeant Ray Hooe.418   
 Quesada arrived in Montgomery, Alabama, on August 17, 1935, to attend the ACTS.  He 
arrived at an unfortunate time considering his strong support of pursuit aircraft, which had fallen 
out of favor with many instructors at the ACTS.  Historian Thomas A. Hughes maintains that by 
1935 “pursuit education had fallen to an all-time low, receiving just 56 hours of class time to 
bombardment’s 310 hours.”  However, as Hughes explains, pursuit tactics continued to be 
taught.  It fact, it accounted for “nearly 50 percent of total instruction” at the ACTS.419 
 Despite his strong support of pursuit aviation, Quesada did not become Chennault’s 
ardent disciple.  In fact, Quesada “found the clean thought and internal logic of bomber ideas 
more sound.”420   To his credit, Quesada did not devote his energies to either the pursuit or 
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bombardment advocates.  Instead, Quesada approached airpower as a pragmatist.  He admitted 
that the ACTS had become “oriented toward strategic bombardment while I was there.”  He 
maintained that he “thought it was overstated then, but it didn’t result to me getting in any debate 
at Maxwell.  I did not become a jealous advocate of it either way.”421 
 Others within the Air Corps shared Quesada’s pragmatism.  While Quesada was at the 
ACTS, General Oscar Westover spoke at Maxwell Field.  Westover, the fourth Chief of the Air 
Corps, knew that his superiors in the U.S. Army and the War Department continued to view the 
Air Corps as an auxiliary force that existed in order to assist the ground forces.  In his speech, 
Westover stressed the need for cooperation between the Air Corps and the U.S. Army.  He 
stated: 
Whatever we may think of air power, we as soldiers must always be in line with our 
superiors.  Without that loyalty which makes our profession a profession, we cannot 
accomplish a fraction of what we might otherwise do.  The fact is that nobody knows 
what the potential for independent air operations is, but I do know what the damage to 
Army solidarity can be if we persist in our public disputes with the Army.  As soldiers, 
we must always submit everything to our loyalty up and down the ranks, it is the only 
thing that makes an effective fighting force.422 
 
Although Westover’s counsel was wise, especially given the tensions of the period, few 
of his subordinates had any intention of curbing their enthusiasm.  To many of them, their 
superiors in the U.S. Army and the War Department simply did not understand that the Air Corps 
had far more to offer than just reconnaissance, observation, and close air support.  As a result, 
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they were unwilling to end their public debates with the U.S. Army because they believed that 
doing so would keep the Air Corps from gaining the centralized control that they desired.423 
The Bomber Mafia 
 General Westover’s speech might have had a greater impact on the men of the ACTS if 
he had delivered it one to two years earlier.  However, by the time he delivered his speech most 
of the instructors at the school had become ardent supporters of bombardment aviation.  They 
had increased their focus on bombardment aviation at approximately the same time that the 
school moved from Langley Field to Maxwell Field in 1931.  Four years later, all but a few of 
the instructors had joined the “Bomber Mafia,” which was the derogatory term for them coined 
by their opponents in the Air Corps and the U.S. Army.424 
 The development of the Bomber Mafia during the 1930s happened relatively quickly.  
While Mitchell had long argued that bombardment aircraft would one day play a vital role in 
defeating an adversary’s military, the views did not begin to dominate the Air Corps until the late 
1920s.   Bombardment aviation had played a relatively minor role in World War I, but far more 
effort went into observation, reconnaissance, close air support, and pursuit aviation.  As a result, 
the Air Service’s focus on pursuit aviation during the 1920s made sense given the limited 
capabilities of bombardment aircraft then in use.   
 The ACTS supported the service’s focus on pursuit aviation throughout the 1920s.  For 
example, in Employment of Combined Air Force, the ACTS argued that “pursuit in its relation to 
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the air service…may be compared to the infantry in its relation to the other branches of the 
Army.  Without pursuit, the successful employment of the other branches is impossible.”425   
Pursuit aviation maintained its status due to the fact that the U.S. Army ultimately controlled the 
Air Service.  General Foulois did push back against his superiors in an effort to move 
bombardment aviation up in importance at various times.  However, he did so cautiously because 
he would have risked being quickly replaced if he became too vociferous on the matter.  Instead, 
Foulois, as well as the majority of his subordinates, chose a very diplomatic approach toward 
increasing the size and importance of bombardment aviation.426 
 The Bomber Mafia began with Billy Mitchell, whose charm, enthusiasm, and 
persuasiveness had a significant impact on the younger officers around him.  Throughout the 
1920s, Mitchell’s young acolytes helped increase the importance of bombardment aviation 
within the Air Service.  As they began to gain positions of greater responsibility, authority, and 
influence within the Air Corps and the ACTS, charismatic men such as Kenneth Walker, Robert 
Olds, Major Donald Wilson and Captain Harold L. George used their personalities to rapidly 
increase the number of bombardment advocates.   
Kenneth Walker 
Of all the members of the Bomber Mafia, Captain Kenneth Walker was arguably the 
most vocal.  Walker had enlisted in the Aviation Section of the Signal Enlisted Reserve Corps on 
December 15, 1917 but did not serve overseas during World War I.  Over the next few years, 
Walker served as a pilot, instructor, and supply officer at the Air Service Flying School at Fort 
Sill, Oklahoma.  Following that assignment, Walker transferred to the Philippines where he 
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served as the commander of the Air Intelligence Section at Camp Nichols and, later, flew with 
the 28th Bombardment Squadron.  Walker’s time in the squadron sparked his lifelong support for 
bombardment aviation.427   
After the end of his assignment in the Philippines, Walker transferred to Langley Field, 
Virginia.  While at Langley, Walker served on the Air Service Board before becoming the 
commander of the 11th Bombardment Squadron and the 2nd Bombardment Group.  In December 
1928, Walker left relinquished command of the 2nd Bombardment group so that he could attend 
the ACTS.428  Historian Martha Byrd argues that “All of Walker’s prior experience with bombers 
came into focus when he was a student at the Air Corps Tactical School.”  She maintains that 
“Under instructors that included Major Courtney H. Hodges and Capts George Kenney and 
Robert Olds, classroom lectures deviated from the operational record to enter the realm of the 
theoretical—what might happen if.”429   
While at the ACTS, Walker participated in the U.S. Army V Corps maneuvers held in 
Ohio.  Although they were brief, the maneuvers helped bolster Walker’s view of bombardment 
aviation.  During the exercise, Walker and his fellow ACTS students demonstrated the value of 
having airmen on the ground assisting the commanders of the ground forces.  For example, 
Major Walter H. Frank, the ACTS’s assistant commandant, served as the chief air umpire during 
the maneuvers.  Frank, thoroughly impressed by what he witnessed, asserted: “There is 
considerable doubt among the umpires as to the ability of any air organization to stop a well-
organized, well flown air force attack.”  Frank and his colleagues came to that conclusion based 
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on the tremendous difficulties that defending pursuit aircraft had when trying to locate and 
engage incoming bombardment aircraft.  Simply put, the maneuvers all but proved to Frank that 
“a well planned air force attack is going to be successful most of the time.”430  
Following the maneuvers, Walker continued his studies at the ACTS.  During his time at 
the school, Walker found a kindred spirit in Captain Robert Olds.  Olds, a former aide to Billy 
Mitchell, had a profound influence on Walker’s views on airpower.  According to Byrd, Olds 
and Walker “embraced all that Mitchell stood for—the independent air mission, the dominance 
of bombardment, even the need for aggressive advocacy.”  The close relationship between Olds 
and Walker likely played a significant part in Walker joining the ACTS faculty within months of 
having completed his studies in June 1929.  While at the ACTS, Walker and Olds helped form 
the original nucleus of the Bomber Mafia.   
Shortly after starting his new job at the ACTS, Walker began writing a new 
bombardment text for use at the school.  Wasting little time, Walker sent the polished draft of the 
text to the Chief of Air Corps for review in March 1930.  Several months later, in October 1930, 
Walker authored an article in the Coast Artillery Journal.  Titled “Driving Home the 
Bombardment Attack,” Walker’s article was essentially a condensed version of the ACTS 
bombardment text that was still under review by General Fechet.  In the article, Walker stressed 
the importance of bombardment aircraft flying in formation in order to maximize both fire power 
and mutual protection.  He maintained that pursuit aircraft could further increase bombardment 
aircraft’s chances of reaching their targets.  However, he ultimately believed: “It is generally 
conceded, by those who are competent to judge, that an air attack well launched is most difficult 
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to stop.”  In order to have any chance of doing so, Walker asserted that the “most efficacious 
method of stopping a bombardment attack would appear to be an offensive against the 
bombardment airdrome.”431  
General Fechet approved Walker’s bombardment text in December 1930.  Two months 
later, in February 1931, the Air Corps published the text.  Walker’s bombardment text had a 
profound impact on the ACTS, the Air Corps, and, more than a decade later, the U.S. Army Air 
Forces in World War II.  Essentially, Walker’s text reiterated many of the arguments that 
Mitchell, Douhet, Trenchard, Olds, and many others had made over the previous two decades.  
The influence of those men, especially Mitchell and Olds, was readily apparent throughout 
Walker’s work, which argued that bombardment aviation was the primary component of the Air 
Corps.  Walker also reinforced his belief that bombardment aircraft, while not invincible, would 
reach their targets under all but the conditions.  In fact, Walker was so confident in the strength 
of bombardment aviation that he maintained that “bombardment personnel, indoctrinated with 
the wall to reach and destroy the objective, will not be turned from their mission by the 
threatened or actual antiaircraft defenses of the enemy.”432    
Walker’s text also dealt with the concept of destroying key enemy targets in order to 
quicken their defeat.  Referred to as vital centers, key strategic nodes, industrial centers, and 
other terms throughout the 1920s, Walker’s theories on disabling key enemy targets had been 
discussed by most of his predecessors.  Therefore, he did not break new ground when he asserted 
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that “there will probably be certain vital objectives comparatively limited in number which, if 
destroyed, will contribute most to the success of the combined arms of the nation.”433  
Despite his intense focus on bombardment aviation, Walker was ultimately a pragmatic 
man.  He believed that everyone in the Air Corps needed to put the overall needs of the service 
above their personal attitudes toward one type of aviation or another.  Walker, the man who 
spent many hours debating Chennault, wrote a letter to his friend Carl Spaatz detailing his 
thoughts on the internal conflicts that had developed within the Air Corps.  He explained to 
Spaatz that the sometimes bitter debate troubled him greatly.  He stated: “Take your own case. I 
know damned well that you are confident in your ability to command a bombardment, 
observation or attack group as well as a pursuit group.  Where then, is there to be found a place 
for this fetish of overspecialization?”434 
  In spite of his opinion that “overspecialization” was bad for the Air Corps, Walker 
continued to champion bombardment aviation over all other types.  In 1933, Walker published 
“Bombardment Aviation: Bulwark of National Defense.”  In that article, Walker stated that 
“whenever we speak in terms of ‘air force’ we are thinking of bombardment aviation.”   Walker 
thoroughly believed that “a determined air attack, once launched, is most difficult, if not 
impossible to stop when directed against land objectives.”  He also maintained that the Air Corps 
needed to be “a force with a distinct mission, of importance co-equal to that of the Army and the 
Navy.”435 
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By the late summer of 1933, Walker’s time at the ACTS came to an end.  In August 
1933, Walker entered the Command and General Staff School (CGSS) at Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas.  Despite leaving the ACTS, Walker’s influence within the Air Corps did not wane.  
Rather, he shifted his efforts toward convincing others that the Air Corps needed to have a 
greater degree of autonomy, if not complete independence, from the U.S. Army.436 
Robert Olds 
 After Walker, Robert Olds was probably the most visible member of the Bomber Mafia.  
Old, who joined in the Signal Enlisted Reserve Corps in 1917, became part of the faculty at the 
ACTS in 1928.  He remained at the school until 1931 when he left to serve as the operations 
officer for the 2nd Bombardment Group, Langley Field, Virginia.  While at the ACTS, Olds 
became one of the founding members of the Bomber Mafia.437  Described by Haywood Hansell 
as “personable and charismatic,” Olds had worked closely with Billy Mitchell throughout 1925 
at both the Morrow Board hearings and the courts-martial that end Mitchell’s military career.  
The close working relationship that the two shared contributed greatly to Olds’ views on 
airpower.   
Olds’ views, already influenced heavily by his discussions with Mitchell, were further 
enhanced by his personal and professional friendship with Kenneth Walker.  Their colleagues at 
                                                 
436 On Jan. 5, 1943, Walker, a brigadier general, was reported missing in action following a mission over the 
Japanese held island of Rabaul, New Britain, Papua, New Guinea. Witnesses explained that they had last seen 
Walker’s aircraft leaving the target area with one engine on fire and several Japanese fighters on chasing after it. 
Walker, whose body was never recovered, was awarded the Medal of Honor in 1943. Staff, “Brigadier General 
Kenneth Newton Walker,” Air Force, January 2003. 
 
437 Olds son Robert “Robin” Olds, Jr., achieved greater fame than his father did.  The younger Olds served as a 
fighter pilot in World War II and Vietnam.  During World War II, Robin Olds received official credit for destroying 
twelve German aircraft.  Two decades later, above the Vietnamese jungle, Olds downed four more enemy aircraft.  
Olds retired from the Air Force on 1 June 1973 as a brigadier general.  Olds, Robin, Fighter Pilot: The Memoirs of 
Legendary Ace Robin Olds, pp. 6-25. 
 
191 
 
the ACTS often commented that the two men frequently fed off each other’s ideas.  Hansell 
stated that “Bob Olds and Ken Walker together were dangerously close to being a ‘critical mass.’  
Both were almost explosively intense and dynamic.”  He argued that, while at the ACTS, Olds 
and Walker “adopted Ken’s contention that bombardment was to air power what the infantry was 
to the Army—the basic arm.”438 
 Like Walker, Olds viewed bombardment aviation as the Air Corps’ most important 
mission.  However, that did not mean that he was blind to the potential of pursuit and attack 
aviation.  Hansell recalled that, “although he was devoted to the concept of bombardment,” Olds 
“found release for his immense physical energies in flying fighter type airplanes….  Hansell 
remembered that Olds’ “return to base from cross-country flights bore his characteristic 
signature: a slow roll over the flight line in his P-1 pursuit plane, at an elevation well below local 
regulations.”439  Olds, therefore, certainly did appreciate what a pursuit aircraft had to offer.  
However, that appreciation did little to change his belief that the development of bombardment 
aviation aircraft and doctrine had to be the Air Corps’ primary focus.  
Donald Wilson 
 Major Donald Wilson, another of the Bomber Mafia’s strongest advocates, joined the 
ACTS faculty in 1929 while the school was still located at Langley Field.  In 1931, Wilson 
followed the ACTS to its new home at Maxwell Field, Alabama.  While at Maxwell from 1931 
through 1935, Wilson developed into one of the “leading theorists at Maxwell during the 
thirties….”440  In particular, Wilson spearheaded the development of the “Industrial Web 
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Theory” (IWT) which posited that an enemy’s industrial capabilities could be disabled or 
destroyed by destroying critical targets, often referred to as nodes.  Wilson’s IWT built upon the 
theories of Douhet, Mitchell, and others who had argued that attacking an enemy’s “vital 
centers” could decrease the length of most conflicts.  Wilson’s background in the rail industry 
undoubtedly had a significant influence on his air power theories, especially the IWT.  Wilson 
argued that the development of aerial bombardment meant that the enemy’s troops in the field no 
longer had to be the primary focus during wartime.  Instead, Wilson contended that bombing 
targets much nearer to the enemy’s heartland had the potential to cripple an adversary’s ability to 
continue to fight.  Vital targets included industrial manufacturing plants, mining operations, 
railroad junctions, weapons plants, munitions plants, communication facilities, troop 
concentrations, and aircraft hangers.  Ultimately, Wilson and his colleagues concluded that: 
Loss of any of these systems would be a crippling blow.  Loss of several or all of 
them would bring national paralysis.  As to repair of this devastation, it would 
seem obvious that any air force worthy of the name should be able to destroy 
faster than replacement could be effected….The airplane gives us a weapon which 
can immediately reach the internal organization of an enemy nation, within range, 
and therefore bring about the defeat of that nation.  The fundamental innovation 
lies in the fact that whole nations now lie within the combat zone.441 
 
While Wilson developed many of his theories from those presented by Mitchell, Douhet, 
and others, he did not do so without deviation.  Mitchell, Douhet, and Trenchard had advocated 
attacking an enemy’s population centers in order to induce fear, thereby shortening the conflict 
via public demand.  Wilson maintained that attacks on population centers put enemy civilians, 
particularly women and children, in unnecessary and unwarranted danger.  More importantly, 
Wilson thoroughly believed that bombing civilians went against American principles.  Wilson’s 
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contemporary, Haywood Hansell, agreed, stating that “the idea of killing thousands of men, 
women, and children was basically repugnant to American mores.  And from a more pragmatic 
point of view, people did not make good targets for the high-explosive bomb.”442  
Once he had developed it and discussed it with his colleagues in the Air Corps, Wilson 
began to promote the IWT to his colleagues and to teach it to the students who attended his 
courses at the ACTS.  Wilson, who remained at the ACTS longer than many of his colleagues, 
had more contact with a greater number of students that most.  He served as an instructor from 
1929 to 1930, a student from 1930 to 1931, an instructor once more from 1931 to 1934, and as 
the director of the Department of Air Tactics and Strategy from 1936 to 1940.443  Many students 
who attended the school during Wilson’s many years there recalled that his lectures had a 
tremendous impact on their attitudes toward air power.444 
Harold George 
Another important member of the Bomber Mafia was Wilson’s friend Harold L. George.  
George, who became an advocate of bombardment aviation after meeting Mitchell in France 
during World War I.  George, taken in by Mitchell’s persuasive personality, participated in the 
bombing tests on the German battleship Ostfriesland in 1921.  George argued that the tests had 
proved to him that the Air Service faced stiff resistance from others in the U.S. military.  
Mitchell, George, and others maintained that the U.S. Navy had tried to limit both the type and 
number of bombs that Mitchell and his men dropped during the tests in an effort to control the 
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outcome.  As a result, George believed that airmen would receive little support as they tried to 
prove that airpower could achieve spectacular results.445 
Several years after the bombing of the Ostfriesland, George was assigned to the Air 
Corps Operations Division where he served as the Chief of the Bomb Section.  While there, 
Mitchell’s defense team asked George to testify on Mitchell’s behalf.  George explained that 
most of the men who testified in support of Mitchell were junior officers in the Air Service.  
George stated: “We didn’t know enough about whether you should keep your mouth shut or not.  
The attitude was what could they do?  We could go get another job.  Ranking people didn’t want 
to risk trouble and I can understand.”446 
In the years after Mitchell’s trial, George continued to demonstrate that he was one of the 
Air Corps’ premier minds.  In 1931, he attended the ACTS.  The following year, George was 
selected to serve on the school’s faculty.  George proved to be highly influential during the four 
years that he spent at the ACTS, primarily because of his position as the director of the school’s 
Department of Air Tactics and Strategy from 1934 through 1936.447  In 1935, George spoke to 
students on the opening day of the ACTS session for the year.  George stated: 
From today on much that we shall study will require us to start with nothing more 
than an acknowledged truth and then attempt, by the utilization of common sense and 
logic, to evolve a formula which we believe will stand up under the crucial test of actual 
conditions.  We shall attempt to develop logically, the role of air power in future war, in 
the next war.  We are not concerned with fighting the past war;--that was done 18 years 
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ago.  We are concerned, however, in determining how air power shall be employed in the 
next war and what constitutes the principles governing its employment, not by journeying 
into the hinterlands of wild imagination but by traveling the highway of common sense 
and logic. 
In pursuing this purpose, we realize that air power has not proven itself under the 
actual test of war.  We must also realize that neither land power nor sea power has proven 
itself in the face of modern air power. 
The question for you to consider from today on war, to have constantly before 
you as you continue your careers, is substantially this: 
Has the advent of air power brought into existence a method for the prosecution 
of war which has revolutionized that art and given to air forces a strategical of their own 
independent of either land or naval forces the attainment of which might, in itself, 
accomplish the purpose of war; or has air power merely added another weapon of waging 
war which makes it in fact only an auxiliary of the traditional military forces?448 
 
 Although several of George’s statements were posed as questions, he had little doubt as 
to their answers.  For him, airpower would play a primary part in any future war.  Airpower was 
also more than an auxiliary force that existed to assist the traditional military forces.  Finally, 
George firmly believed that bombardment aircraft were the aircraft type that would change 
modern war forever.  George, like Mitchell and Douhet, argued that airpower had the capability 
to degrade or destroy an enemy’s will to continue fighting.449  In a lecture to his students, George 
stated: “The destruction of military forces of the enemy is not and never has been the objective 
of war; it has been merely a means to an end—merely the removal of an obstacle which lay in 
the path of overcoming the will to resist.  The end was the breaking of the hostile will.”450 
 George’s impact was on airpower was probably best summed up by Haywood Hansell.  
Hansell, one of George’s friends and colleagues, stated: “Among the Architects of American air 
power, few rank higher than Harold George.  He was a farsighted and courageous prophet, a 
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creator of strategic air concepts, doctrine, and plans, and commander of the World War II Air 
Transport Command, which added to air power a new element of global, strategic mobility.”451 
Vandenberg 
Hoyt Vandenberg, who retired from the military after serving as the U.S. Air Force’s 
second Chief of Staff from 1948 to 1953, was one of George’s students at the ACTS.  
Vandenberg had joined the Air Service shortly after graduating from the U.S. Military Academy 
at West Point in June 1923.  Quickly rising through the ranks, Vandenberg attended the ACTS as 
a student from August 1934 to June 1935.  After completing the course of instruction at the U.S. 
Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in June 1936, 
Vandenberg joined the ACTS faculty.452   
By the time that Vandenberg joined the faculty at the ACTS, many of his peers viewed 
him as “one of the hottest pilots in the Air Corps.”  In the years prior to his arrival at Maxwell 
Field, Vandenberg had flown a number of different aircraft and accrued more than 3,000 flying 
hours, which provided him with a significant amount of critical experience that few could match.  
Thus, it surprised few that Vandenberg became a pursuit aviation instructor during his tenure at 
the ACTS.453 
Despite these credentials, Vandenberg did not come close to matching Chennault’s 
intensity.  In fact, as historian Phillip Mellinger noted, Vandenberg’s “two years at Maxwell 
proved remarkably unremarkable.”454  According to the recollections of many of his fellow 
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instructors, Vandenberg served as a mediator of sorts due to his relatively calm personality.  Not 
wanting conflict, Vandenberg sought to foster cooperation between pursuit and bombardment 
advocates.   His lectures focused on the strengths and weaknesses of pursuit aviation.  
Vandenberg argued that “it is extremely unlikely that a general defense can be provided that is 
strong enough to successfully oppose an enemy penetration in force.”455   Furthermore, he 
argued, the technologically more-advanced bombers in use during this tenure at the ACTS had 
far outpaced their pursuit counterparts.  Thus, Vandenberg maintained that pursuit aircraft were 
best used as airborne anti-aircraft artillery that, at the maximum, could inflict damage on enemy 
bomber formations. 
Vandenberg’s decision to minimize the role of pursuit aircraft likely stemmed from the 
fact that he was more interested in furthering his career than adding fuel to the debate between 
pursuit and bombardment advocates.  Of course, that is not to say that Vandenberg did anything 
wrong or dishonest during his ACTS tenure.  Rather, Vandenberg understood that the majority of 
his colleagues at the ACTS and in the Air Corps strongly favored bombardment aviation.456   
Despite, or perhaps because of, his easy-going nature and desire to get along, 
Vandenberg’s time at the ACTS proved to be brief.  In late 1936, Vandenberg began coursework 
at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.  The decision to 
attend the USAWC fit well within Vandenberg’s pattern of acquiring all the education that he 
could.  The decision to attend the USAWC also proved to be highly advantageous for 
Vandenberg.  While at the USAWC, Vandenberg focused on the air defense for the Philippines.  
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As soon as he graduated from USAWC, Vandenberg received a call from Brigadier General Carl 
Spaatz inviting him to join the staff of the Plans Division, which was part of the Office of the 
Chief of Air Corps.457   
Haywood Hansell 
Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., one of Vandenberg’s classmates at the ACTS, also had the 
potential to assume Chennault’s role as the Air Corps leading advocate of pursuit aviation.  Like 
Vandenberg, Hansell seemed like a perfect candidate to bolster Chennault’s theories at the 
ACTS.  After all, Hansell’s early association with Claire Chennault had a significant impact on 
his early career in the Air Corps.458  Hansell, who flew with Chennault as part of the “Flying 
Trapeze,” received the nickname “Pursuit Possum” due to his support of his mentor’s theories on 
airpower and his resemblance to an opossum.  Initially, Hansel agreed with Chennault’s 
arguments on the merits of pursuit aircraft.  However, the focus on bombardment aviation in the 
curriculum at the ACTS convinced Hansel to veer from the path he had begun to follow as a 
young lieutenant.   
 After a few months at the ACTS, Hansell could no longer correctly be referred to as 
“Pursuit Possum.”  Historian Charles Griffith argues that Colonel John Curry, Lieutenant 
Colonel Harold George, Captain Robert Webster, Major Donald Wilson, and Lieutenant Kenneth 
Walker “had a vicarious impact on Hansell” that strongly shaped his attitudes toward 
airpower.459   In fact, Griffith’s argues that their influence was so strong that it almost completely 
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changed the way Hansell viewed the application of airpower.460   Simply put, the strong 
personalities that surrounded him convinced Hansell to join the “bomber mafia.”  He quickly 
developed into one of bombardment aviation’s strongest supporters. 
 Lawrence Kuter, who argued that Mitchell’s theories were the primary influences on the 
instructors at the ACTS, was another member of the Bomber Mafia who seemed poised to take 
Chennault’s place as the service’s premier pursuit advocate.  Kuter, a highly skilled pilot, flew 
with Chennault in The Flying Trapaze.461   However, Kuter became convinced that bombardment 
aviation was the way forward for the Air Corps.   Much like Hansell, Kuter had a growing 
devotion to bombardment aviation that trumped any desire he may have had to support 
Chennault’s passionate arguments regarding pursuit aviation.   
In 1934, Kuter joined the ACTS as a student.  After graduating the following spring, 
Kuter continued on at the ACTS as a faculty member in the bombardment aviation section.  
During his tenure as an instructor, Kuter frequently found himself at odds with his former 
teammate.  Kuter argued that Chennault believed that pursuit aircraft should be used as an 
offensive and defensive weapon.  Kuter maintained that, as a result of such views, Chennault 
would not admit that either attack aircraft or bombardment aircraft could be as effective as 
pursuit aircraft when it came to destroying enemy targets on the ground.462   According to Kuter, 
Chennault refused to conceive of pursuit aircraft as anything less than the Air Corps’ most 
important type of aircraft.  Therefore, Kuter stated that Chennault rejected the idea of using 
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pursuit aircraft to escort bombardment aircraft on long missions over enemy territory.  However, 
as historian Dewitt Copp argued, “the bomber supporters were as dogmatic in their rejection of 
the need for fighter escort in any form….”  The result, as Copp concludes, was that “when reality 
caught up with the supremacy of the bomber theory, the price paid for the error would be bitterly 
high.”463  
Kuter, as a firm believer in the “supremacy of the bomber theory,” no doubt helped 
perpetuate the belief that bombardment aircraft where almost invincible.  During his ACTS 
lectures, he argued that the Air Corps would one day field a force of 10,000 aircraft capable of 
reaching nearly any spot on the globe.  Although Kuter understood that this day had not yet 
arrived, he believed it would come in the near future.464   
FAA Commission 
 
By 1934, the members of the ACTS’ Bomber Mafia had developed a coherent airpower 
theory that heavily emphasized the use of bombardment aircraft.  They maintained that large 
numbers of bombardment aircraft would alter how nations waged wars.  They also asserted that 
only airmen could properly use such assets.  Basically, they continued Mitchell’s argument that 
airmen must have control over airpower for it to achieve its full potential.465  
In November 1934, several Air Corps officers testified before the Federal Aviation 
(FAC) Commission.  The men included Major Wilson, Captain George, Captain Olds, and 
Lieutenant Walker.  President Franklin Roosevelt established the FAC in June 1934 and tasked 
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the members of the committee with examining aviation in its entirety.   The FAC hearings did 
not start off well for the Air Corps officers.  Brigadier General C.E. Kilbourne, the assistant chief 
of staff of the War Plans Division, instructed the men to acquaint themselves with existing Air 
Corps policy on aviation.  Kilbourne also made it clear that they were not to voice their personal 
opinions unless asked to do so by one of the members of the FAC.466   
In spite of General Kilbourne’s directive, the Air Corps officers who testified before the 
FAC spoke as freely as they did when teaching at the ACTS.  During his testimony before the 
committee, Major Robert Olds stated: “A determined air armada loaded with modern agencies of 
destruction, in readiness within range of our great centers of population and industry, may 
eventually prove to be a more convincing argument against war than all the Hague and Geneva 
Conventions put together.”467   
Captain George agreed with Olds’ statement.  However, he focused much of his 
testimony on convincing the FAC members that the Air Corps did not have the aircraft to 
undertake this task.  George stressed that an attack of any size could only be carried out if such 
an air armada existed.  George stated: “Future wars will be fought by the air forces that are in 
existence when the war breaks out and not by air forces which are created after the war 
commences.”468   
Lieutenant Walker’s testimony supported that of both Olds and George. Walker 
maintained that air power would be of vital importance in any future war.  However, he was 
clear that neither the U.S. Army nor the U.S. Navy did not have the vision to properly employ 
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aircraft in either an offensive or defensive manner.  When he addressed the committee, Walker 
stated: “Gentlemen, unless we create an adequate and separate Air Force, this next war ‘will 
begin in the air and end in the mud’—in the mud and debris of the demolished industries that 
have brought us to our knees.”469 
Olds, George, Walker, and their colleagues hoped that their testimony would convince 
the members of the FAC to put greater emphasis on the Air Corps and its place within the 
existing defense establishment.  Their efforts paid substantial dividends.  In their final report, the 
committee members explained that they understood that “the present degree of mutual 
understanding between the Army and the Navy is less than might be desired.”  That 
understanding led the committee to state that airpower had evolved.  The committee members 
stated: 
there is ample reason to believe that aircraft have now passed beyond their former 
position as useful auxiliaries, and in the future must be considered and utilized as an 
important means of exerting directly the will of the Commander in Chief.  An adequate 
striking force for use against objectives both near and remote is a necessity for a modern 
army, and the projected G.H.Q. [General Headquarters] Air Force must be judged with 
reference to its effectiveness in this respect.470 
 
 Although the committee’s statement did not change the Air Corps overnight, it did 
indicate that years of lobbying had convinced many that airpower had developed into more than 
just an auxiliary force.  Yet, the committee members were not ready to let the Air Corps separate 
from the U.S. Army.  The fact that the plans for a General Headquarters Air Force (G.H.Q. Air 
Force) had already been drawn up allowed the committee to bypass the contentious issue.471   
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Conclusion 
Billy Mitchell’s court-martial and resignation early in 1926 had left the Air Corps 
without its most powerful and persuasive advocate.  However, there were many officers who 
possessed the same “us versus them” mindset that had developed among early airmen.  Much 
like Mitchell, these officers thought strongly about air power and wanted independence from the 
U.S. Army.  Some of these airmen, such as Robert Olds and Newton Walker, had been heavily 
 influenced by Mitchell in their efforts to promote the primacy of bombardment aviation.  Others, 
such as Claire Chennault, took a different approach that favored an air force in which 
bombardment and pursuit aircraft were of nearly equal importance.  Alienated by their superiors 
in the U.S. Army and the War Department, the men in the Air Corps worked to gain control over 
air power because they believed that only airmen could employ large air forces properly.  
Air Corps leaders also became more devoted to acquiring independence for their service 
following Mitchell’s departure.  Even though General Patrick, General Fechet, and General 
Foulois did not agree with Mitchell’s tactics and often arrogant behavior, they supported his goal 
of achieving greater, if not total, independence from the U.S. Army.  As a result, they improved 
the ACTS, increased Air Corps participation in U.S. Army exercises, and aggressively lobbied 
Congress and the War Department.  Foulois was particularly important during the period because 
he led the Air Corps through the air mail scandal of 1934 and the lean budgets of the 1930s.   
Following Mitchell’s resignation, the men in the Air Corps came to the realization that 
they would have to join forces in order to gain greater control of airpower.  Although no single 
individual approached the level of influence that Mitchell had enjoyed, these men possessed 
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forceful and charismatic personalities that helped the Air Corps gain greater support among the 
U.S. military, Congress, and the American public.  Firm believers in air power, they threw their 
efforts into developing a strategic bombardment doctrine that built upon the theories of Mitchell, 
Douhet, and Trenchard.  Some, such as Chennault, dissented and fought for an Air Corps that 
championed pursuit aviation as much as it did bombardment aviation.  Yet, they all believed that 
the Air Corps could achieve independence from the U.S. Army by proving that no one else could 
employ airpower as well as airmen.   
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Chapter 5 – Pushing for Separation: The Air Corps’ Drive for Independence 
In their quest to prove that the Air Corps should be an independent branch, the men of the 
Air Corps decided that they needed to increase visibility of their service.  They continued to feel 
alienated from their superiors, so that, all the more, these airmen felt sure that the U.S. military, 
Congress, and the American people were not going to grant their service independence just 
because they wanted it.  To prove that they were capable of existing as a separate service, the 
men of the Air Corps seized every opportunity they could in order to show their doubters that air 
power had evolved into a force capable of acting both independently and in conjunction with 
ground forces.  
After a great deal of thought and discussion among themselves, the men of the Air Corps 
determined that U.S. military maneuvers were the best venues available where they could show 
that air power was no longer just an auxiliary of the U.S. Army.  Air Corps leaders, especially 
Major General Benjamin Foulois, were the driving force behind the Air Corps’ participation in 
the maneuvers.  Foulois, in particular, firmly believed that the maneuvers would allow his 
airmen to demonstrate that they were ready for a separate service. 
Although they were critical to the Air Corps’ push for independence, the military 
maneuvers were not the only place where airmen chose to demonstrate their service’s 
capabilities.  General Foulois and other Air Corps leaders sought out other opportunities for 
airmen to substantiate their arguments for a separate service.  Those opportunities included the 
search for the Mount Shasta, the Army Air Corps Mail Operation, and the effort to locate the 
Italian ocean liner Rex.   
Although most of the maneuvers and the other missions that airmen undertook in the 
1930s helped show the U.S. military, Congress, and the American public that the Air Corps was 
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far more capable than it had been in World War I, there were problems.  In particular, the 
botched handling of the Air Mail operation fueled the doubts of those who had argued that the 
men of the Air Corps had overstated their capabilities.  The negative response to the air mail 
operation, which required a great deal of effort and sacrifice on the part of many airmen, further 
reinforced their feelings of alienation and their desire to separate from the U.S. Army.  
Air Corps Command and Staff Exercises 
The Air Corps, officially the Air Service at the time, conducted the service’s first annual 
maneuvers in 1925.  The maneuvers allowed commanders to test the Air Corps’ equipment, 
tactics, and logistics.  Each maneuver was different than the last so that new challenges could be 
explored and new problems solved.  Throughout the mid-to-late 1920s, the exercises were 
relatively small in size and scope due to the size of the Air Corps and the small budget 
appropriations that the service received each year from the War Department.  In fact, the Air 
Corps did not have maneuvers in 1930 because of lack of a lack of funds that resulted from the 
stock market crash of 1929.472  
In 1931, F. Trubee Davison, Assistant Secretary of War for Aviation, decided that the Air 
Corps needed to increase its profile.  He decided to hold maneuvers with as many men and 
aircraft as possible in order to help the American people appreciate the Air Corps and its 
capabilities.473  Although Secretary Davison had decided on the scope of the maneuvers, it was 
Major General Benjamin Foulois, Chief of the Air Corps from 1931 through 1935, who was the 
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driving force behind them.  Foulois, who began his career as a military aviator in 1908, believed 
that the maneuvers were the best venue to demonstrate the Air Corps’ capabilities and to test the 
service’s theories and tactics under close to “real world” conditions.474 
1931 Exercises 
General Fechet, whose term as Chief of the Air Corps was about to end, chose General 
Foulois to command 1931 maneuvers.  After a great deal of discussion, Foulois and the rest of 
the men assigned to the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps (OCAC) decided to form a 
provisional air division composed of 667 aircraft, 692 officers, 69 flying cadets, and 643 enlisted 
men of all types.475  The OCAC decided to involve such a large number of aircraft in order to 
comply with Secretary Davison’s directive and to test the Air Corps’ ability to mobilize and 
move a force of significant size—something which American airmen had not been done since the 
final months of World War I.476 
The maneuvers proved to be challenging for the Air Corps.  The logistical demands 
required to gather that number of airplanes and men in one location were significant.  The Air 
Corps had to scour the nation to find enough aircraft and pilots to meet the planned scope of the 
maneuvers.  To do so, the Air Corps tasked nearly all of its squadrons stationed in the U.S., most 
                                                 
474 Historian Mark David Mandeles argues that the “leaders of the Army Air Forces (AAF—created on June 20, 
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of the aircraft and pilots assigned to the Air Corps’ Advanced Flying School, and 19 squadrons 
from the National Guard.477   
All elements of the division had arrived at Dayton, Ohio, by May 16, 1931.  After a one-
day delay caused by bad weather, the division moved across the country.  The first 
demonstration occurred over Chicago, Illinois, on May 21, 1931.  The second over New York, 
New York, on May 23, 1931, followed by aerial demonstration over Boston, Massachusetts; 
Atlantic City, New Jersey; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Washington, D.C.  While over each 
location, approximately 30 aircraft from the 13th Attack Squadron, 11th Bombardment Squadron, 
and 95th Pursuit Squadrons demonstrated high-speed dives and engaged in mock aerial combat.  
After that, the division’s bombardment wing, one of the observation wings, the attack group, and 
the other observation wing flew over in mass formation.478 
The maneuvers received considerable press attention, the majority of which was 
favorable.  The size of the maneuvers intrigued many people, including U.S. Senator Hiram 
Bingham of Connecticut; Howard S. Smith, Chairman of Aeronautical Committee, Dayton 
Chamber of Commerce; Secretary of War for Aviation F. Trubee Davison; and pioneer aviator 
Orville Wright.479  Not everyone was pleased that the Air Corps was conducting large maneuvers 
during some of the darkest days of the Great Depression.  However, Davison answered any 
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Guard personnel were.  Gerald T. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen: A History of the Air Force Reserve, 1946-1994 
(Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), pp. 5-22. 
478 Maurer Maurer, Aviation in the U.S. Army, 1919-1939, p. 247. 
 
479 Shiner, Foulois and the U.S. Army Air Corps, 1931-1935, p. 39. 
 
209 
 
critics by explaining that the maneuvers did not cost the American people any extra money 
because they had been paid for by appropriations that had been approved two years before.480 
The President Hoover congratulated the Air Corps on the “remarkable success of the 
maneuvers.” In a letter to Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley, Hoover stated: “To have mobilized, 
from all parts of the country, a force of 672 airplanes and maneuvered it from the middle west to, 
and along, the eastern seaboard from Maine to Virginia without any serious mishap, is very 
convincing evidence of the efficiency of the Army's air forces.” Hoover also concluded that the 
maneuvers “reflected great credit on our military establishment.”481  Secretary Davison was 
equally pleased.  He thanked the American people and the press for showing “an appreciation of 
the fact that the purpose of these maneuvers was to solve in actual operation difficult problems 
which can be solved in no other way.” Davison argued that the maneuvers put “the United States 
in first place in so far as the operation of large units is concerned.”482 
The Mount Shasta Incident 
In spite of the overall success of the maneuvers that took place in 1931, there were 
problems.  In August 1931, just two months after the air division maneuvers, the General Staff 
approved the Air Corps’ request to conduct bombing tests on a freighter, the Mount Shasta.  To 
facilitate the tests, the ship was towed approximately 55 miles off the coast of Virginia.  Shortly 
after the ship reached its destination, the American press learned of the tests, which they 
theorized were as important as the bombing of the SMS Ostfriesland had been over a decade 
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prior.483  However, the Air Corps officers who devised the tests had not intended to make them 
public because they did not view them as anything more than simple bombing practice.  As a 
result, the airmen did not obsess over the details.   
On August 11, 1931, a squadron of nine bombardment aircraft commanded by Major 
Herbert Dargue left Langley Field, Virginia to bomb the Mount Shasta.  Each aircraft carried 
several 300-pound bombs, which Dargue believed would be enough to sink the old ship.  After 
searching for it for some time, the squadron failed to find the Mount Shasta.  Three days later, 
the squadron found the ship but the 300-pound bombs proved to be too weak to sink it.484 
The squadron’s failure to sink the Mount Shasta led the American press and the U.S. 
Navy to question the Air Corps’ ability to locate and destroy a vessel out at sea.  Hanson 
Baldwin, the military affairs editor for The New York Times criticized the squadron for its’ 
inability to find the ship on August 11.  Baldwin wrote: “The inability of the army aviation…to 
find a floating target not more than sixty miles away—a problem which is solved almost monthly 
by Navy fliers—is certainly a definitive example of the value of specific training for a specific 
task.”485 
General Foulois, the Acting Chief of the Air Corps, was angered that he had not been 
properly informed about the tests.  He stated: “The Mount Shasta incident…left a lingering 
distrust in the public mind.”486  Thus, he worried that the failure to find and sink the Mount 
Shasta would undo the progress that the men of the Air Corps had made toward proving that they 
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needed centralized control over their own service.  Foulois was equally frustrated by the U.S. 
Navy’s reaction to the affair.  He argued that the U.S. Navy’s used the event to “question the 
needs of the Air Corps for planes, and brought their guns to bear on the next round of hearings 
for military appropriations.”487 
Although the Mount Shasta incident did not cause lasting damage to the Air Corps, it did 
embarrass the service in the short run.  More importantly, it demonstrated that many in the public 
and the U.S. military remained skeptical about the Air Corps’ ability to execute the important 
coastal defense mission.  This skepticism proved to the men in the Air Corps that they had to do 
more to convince people that their service deserved greater independence from the U.S. Army. 
To help rectify the situation, Foulois asked the General Staff to allow the Air Corps to 
set-up a school that focused on the particulars of defending the coast using airplanes.  On 
February 18, 1932, General Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, approved 
Foulois’ request to develop a school to teach coastal defense tactics.  The Air Corps wasted little 
time, opening the school at Bolling Field, Maryland, in April 1932.488 
Deepening Depression 
 The Mount Shasta incident did not mark the end of difficulties for the Air Corps.  On 
February 4, 1932, just two weeks before General MacArthur approved the Air Corps’ request for 
a new school, Foulois testified before the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive 
Departments.  The committee was reviewing two separate pieces of legislation aimed at merging 
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the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy into a Department of National Defense.  Both bills proposed a 
cabinet-level official for the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and a U.S. air force.489   
 The hearings were contentious at times.  Representative Charles Martin, a former Chief 
of Staff of the Army, was especially critical of the Air Corps.  Martin stated:  
I tell you that if you turn those air birds loose, you will have to organize something like 
the Veterans Bureau to take care of the appropriations to keep them going.  They are the 
most extravagant, undisciplined people on earth.  They go up in a plane and fly three or 
four times, then they go out yelling about flying flaming coffins.  If we had followed 
Mitchell’s program, we would bankrupt the government.  Those fellows have no sense of 
economy.490 
 
Foulois was quite agitated by Martin’s harsh criticism of airmen.  He explained to the committee 
that Martin’s comments showed “a pitiful lack of knowledge regarding the administration and 
operation of the Army Air Corps during the past five years [1928-1932].”  Foulois also argued 
that the Air Corps contained “a body of men who, in my opinion, are not exceeded in efficiency 
today by any other branch of the United States Army.”491 
 Neither bills the committee discussed survived.  Foulois was disappointed, but he had 
grown accustomed to such things over his long military career.  He had larger problems to 
contend with, including the election of President Franklin Roosevelt.  Foulois did not know 
precisely how Roosevelt felt about the Air Corps, but he had his suspicions based on the fact that 
the President was a former Secretary of the Navy.  Not wanting to disappoint Roosevelt, Foulois 
                                                 
489 Foulois and Glines, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts, pp. 221-222. 
 
490 Ibid., p. 222. 
 
491 Foulois and Glines, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts, p. 222. 
 
213 
 
tasked his subordinates to “push the state of the flying art at every opportunity.”492  Fortunately 
for the Air Corps, it did not take long for an opportunity to present itself.   
 During the winter of 1932-1933, powerful blizzards wreaked havoc in parts of Arizona, 
Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah.  The blizzards led to tremendous hardships for the people 
living in those areas, especially the approximately 21,000 Native Americans who faced 
starvation on their isolated reservations.  Once he became aware of the situation, Foulois 
contacted Hap Arnold, who commanded the 1st Wing at March Field, California.  Foulois asked 
Arnold if he and his men could do anything to help those in need.493  Arnold agreed and prepared 
to airdrop food and other supplies from Air Corps bombers.  The 1st Wing loaded Curtiss B-2 
and Keystone B-4, B-5 and B-6 bombers with food.  Over the next few weeks, Arnold and his 
men dropped the vital supplies on the Native American settlements.  The mission proved to be a 
success and generated a sizeable amount of favorable press for the Air Corps.  It also provided 
the men of the 1st Wing with valuable training that they would not have normally received due to 
the hazards associated with flying in such extreme conditions.  However, the mission reminded 
the men of the Air Corps that they had to constantly try to prove themselves to their doubters.494 
March Field Exercises, 1933 
At roughly the same time that Arnold and his men where assisting the Native Americans 
who were in distress, Foulois and his men in the OCAC began planning for another large 
exercise.  Foulois ordered his men to prepare or the exercise after the War Department informed 
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him that the Air Corps would be expected to undertake long-range reconnaissance and operations 
“to the limit of the radius of action of the airplanes.”495   
On January 18, 1933 the Air Corps organized the General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force 
(Provisional) in order to facilitate the maneuvers at March Field, California.  Foulois stated that 
the GHQ (Provisional) was formed “to test the value of such an organization under wartime 
conditions.”496  Brigadier General Oscar Westover, the Assistant Chief of the Air Corps, 
assumed command of the GHQ (Provisional).  With approximately $19,500 at their disposal, 
Westover and his staff met in Washington, D.C. to prepare for the exercise.  General Westover 
and his staff, which included Lieutenant Colonel Henry H. “Hap” Arnold serving as Chief of 
Staff, created the Air Force for the exercise, which included 350 officers, 530 enlisted, and 280 
airplanes.497   
The men and airplanes for the exercises came from 1st Bombardment Squadron, Mitchel 
Field, New York; 2nd Bombardment Squadron, Langley Field, Virginia; 3rd Attack Group, Fort 
Crockett, Texas; 9th Observation Squadron, March Field, California; and 12th Observation 
Squadron, Brooks Field, Texas.  Transporting the men and aircraft to March Field proved to be a 
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difficult process due, in part, to the fact that the units were located in several different states.  
After some struggle and delays, the various units arrived at March Field on 8 May 1933.498 
Once all the GHQ staff arrived, Lieutenant Colonel Arnold and his colleagues tried to 
“find the right way to handle the GHQ Air Force.”499  The various units participating in the 
exercise operated out of airports in southern California where they waited for the GHQ to issue 
the operation order for each day from May 12 1933 to May 26 1933.   
The Air Corps Command and Staff exercises held at March Field, California, in May 
1933 served as the first major exercise of the period.500  The Air Corps held the exercises to test 
the effectiveness of coastal defenses against an attacking force, particularly an attacking air 
force.  The planning staff for the exercise, led by Brigadier General Oscar Westover, divided the 
exercise into several phases in order to test a broad range of Air Corps capabilities.501  
The first phase of the exercise tested the Air Corps ability to quickly deploy attack, 
pursuit, observation, and bombardment forces from various locations to March Field.  The 
phases that followed the initial deployment tested the Air Corps’ ability to conduct offshore 
reconnaissance, attack naval ships, and to attack and defend land-based air forces.  During the 
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attack and defend scenarios, the Air Corps pitted pursuit forces against bomber forces, 
specifically attacking bomber forces.502 
During the exercises, Lieutenant Robert M. Lee, Jr., who later achieved the rank of four-
star general, flew with the pursuit forces.  Lee explained that the pursuit forces conducted air 
patrols, searched for bombers from the opposing force, and practiced escorting bombers during 
the exercise.  To do so, Lee stated that the pursuit aircraft would ascend to altitudes above the 
bombers to provide “high cover” from attacking pursuit aircraft from the opposing force.503 
Following the end of the exercise, General Westover, his staff, wing commanders, group 
commanders, and squadrons commanders met in Seattle, Washington, to discuss the maneuvers.  
In the report he issued after the conclusion of the exercises, General Westover asserted that 
attacking bombers had great prospects.  He stated: “Bombardment aviation has defensive fire 
power of such quantity and effectiveness as to warrant the belief that with its modern speed it 
may be capable of effectively accomplishing its assigned mission without support.”504  Westover 
was not as complimentary about observation and pursuit aircraft.  He stated: 
During these exercises, observation aviation appeared woefully obsolete in performance, 
as did pursuit aviation in speed characteristics.  Since new bombardment aircraft 
possesses speed above 200 miles per hour, any intercepting or supporting aircraft must 
possess greater speed characteristics if they are to perform their missions.  In the case of 
pursuit aviation, this increase of speed must be so great as to make it doubtful whether 
pursuit aircraft can be efficiently or safely operated either individually or in mass.505 
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 In addition to the observations made by General Westover, the group determined that a 
GHQ Air Force should be made part of the U.S. Army under the Office of the Chief of the Air 
Corps.  The group argued that this structure would provide the Chief of the Air Corps with 
operational control of all Air Corps units.  In addition, the commander of the GHQ Air Force 
would oversee the development, training, and employment of all Air Corps units.506 
Fort Knox Exercises, 1933 
 Several Air Corps units participated in joint exercises at Fort Knox, Kentucky, during 
approximately the same period other Air Corps units flew at March Field.  The Fort Knox 
exercise, held from May 15, 1933 to May 27, 1933, were important because they allowed the Air 
Corps to assess the effectiveness of using anti-aircraft weapons against aircraft, to examine the 
effectiveness of using an “intelligence net” to defend against air attack, and to test existing Air 
Corps tactics.507  Most importantly, the exercises provided a venue that the Air Corps could use 
to demonstrate that airmen could employ air power better than anyone else. 
The exercise employed an attacking and a defending force.  The Blue force, the attacking 
force, consisted of a bomber force of Curtiss B-2 Condor, Douglas Y1B-7, and Boeing YB-9 
Death Angel aircraft from March Field, California, and Langley Field, Virginia.508  The Blue 
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force also contained an attack group composed of Curtiss A-8 assigned to Fort Crockett, Texas, 
and Berliner-Joyce P-16 aircraft assigned to Selfridge Field, Michigan.  After leaving their home 
stations, the Blue force operated out of Patterson Field, Ohio.509 
The 1st Pursuit Group (1 PG), led by Major George H. Brett, comprised the bulk of the air 
component for the Red Force.  The 17th Pursuit Squadron and the 27th Pursuit Squadron joined 
the 1 PG on the Red force.  The 1 PG flew P-16s, the 17 PS flew P-6Es, and the 27 PS flew P-
12Es throughout the exercise.510  In addition to aircraft, the Red force contained anti-aircraft 
artillery units from Fort McClellan, Alabama; Fort Sheridan, Illinois; and Fort Totten, New 
York.511 
The exercise tested an intelligence net warning system that Claire Chennault had 
developed after extensive study of the techniques the British Army used to locate enemy aircraft.  
Chennault divided the 16,000 square mile play area into twelve subsectors.  Soldiers operated 69 
observation posts spread on three arcs located at distances of 50 miles, 75 miles, and 100 miles 
from Fort Knox.512  To aid them in their duties, the soldiers who manned the stations received 
aircraft identification training.513    
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Once the soldiers located an aircraft, or a group of aircraft, they then contacted the 
intelligence center at Fort Knox.  The operators at Fort Knox then contacted the operations center 
at Bowman Field and relayed the pertinent data.  The soldiers at the operations center then 
plotted the position of the aircraft onto a large map that depicted all participating forces.  The 
system worked well.  The field operators typically reported aircraft positions within one minute 
to three minutes of spotting the opposing aircraft.  
Chennault’s system also required pilots to communicate extensively with their superiors 
on the ground.  To facilitate communications, each squadron operating with the Red force had 
six SCR-183 two-way radios, and five SCR-192 receivers.  Major Brett carefully watched for the 
updates to come in on the map at Bowman Field.  Brett then relayed the information to his forces 
in the air, which allowed them to intercept the opposing forces aircraft more quickly and 
effectively.514   
Led by Captain Ross G. Hoyt, Brett’s forces used an ingenious three-method approach to 
intercept opposing force aircraft.  When using the first method, Hoyt’s forces first acquired data 
from the ground forces to determine the opposing aircraft’s position.  Then, they altered their 
flight paths as new information arrived from the spotting stations. When using the second 
method, the squadrons operated independently from “standby” areas until they received 
instructions to intercept opposing force aircraft.  When employing the third method, Hoyt’s 
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forces operated in flights of six that patrolled 50 mile areas.  Upon locating formations of the 
opposing force, Hoyt directed his forces to intercept them.515 
Colonel Arthur S. Conklin led a Composite Regiment composed of personnel from the 
61st Antiaircraft Regiment, Fort Sheridan, Illinois; 62nd Antiaircraft Regiment, Fort Totten, 
New York; and 69th Antiaircraft Regiment, Fort McClellan, Alabama.  In total, Conklin 
commanded approximately 50 officers and 1,000 enlisted men.   To accomplish their mission, 
the Composite Regiment utilized 17 search-lights, 15 sound locators, 12 three-inch anti-aircraft 
guns, 60 .50-caliber machine guns, and approximately 200 vehicles of various sizes.516 
 Conklin stated that his units prepared for the Fort Knox exercises by studying documents 
issued by the Fifth Corps.  Colonel Conklin and his men spent four months dissecting Air Corps 
formations so that they could determine the best defense against them.  Once they had finished 
studying the formations, Conklin’s subordinates lectured their men on the “identification of 
aircraft and the characteristics of the same.”517 
 After training everyone about aircraft types and their characteristics, Colonel Conklin’s 
forces established a communications net designed to transmit field messages, flash messages, 
and journals from various points throughout the Defense Forces territory.  The net covered a 
radius of 11 miles and an area of more than 350 square miles.  To cover all that territory, 
Conklin’s men laid over 300 miles of wire to connect the numerous command posts and 
operations posts used during the exercise.  Ultimately, the communications net played a key role 
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for the Defense Forces throughout the exercise because they allowed them to compete with the 
fast moving airplanes flown by the Offense Forces.518   
In his report, Conklin asserted that the Fort Knox exercise had been “of inestimable 
benefit to both Arms.  Friendly feeling and cooperation were shown at all times by the Air Corps 
toward the Antiaircraft Artillery.”  Conklin maintained that the exercise proved to him that the 
Air Corps and the Antiaircraft Artillery should continue under the oversight of the War 
Department as “an integral part of the Annual Training Program.”519 
In his report to the Commanding General, Fifth Corps Area, on the Fort Knox exercises, 
Brigadier General J. Lindsey determined that “daylight bombardment of an objective defended 
by aircraft, antiaircraft, and an intelligence net, will very likely result in heavy losses to the 
attacking forces.”  General Lindsey also stated that he believed that a pursuit force would 
maintain an advantage over bomber aircraft during daylight hours regardless of the speed 
advantage that bombers enjoyed over pursuit aircraft.520 
Conklin and Lindsey were not the only ones to report on the Fort Knox exercises.  The 
War Department sent observers to report back on the exercises.  The observers commented that 
the “success of day bombing attacks was problematical, under conditions as they existed.  Due to 
the efficient operation of the distant intelligence net, many of the bombing attacks were 
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intercepted by the defending pursuit ship, which, in some cases, were slower than the bombers 
they attempted to intercept.”521 
Ultimately, the Fort Knox exercises demonstrated that pursuit aircraft could successfully 
intercept bomber aircraft despite the spend advantage that most bombers of the period enjoyed.  
While the intelligence net contributed significantly to the success of the pursuit aircraft, it was 
certainly not the only factor.  
 
                                           Chennault Speaks Out 
Chennault participated in the Fort Knox exercises as a member of General Lindsey’s 
staff.  Chennault felt compelled to write about the effectiveness of pursuit aircraft during the Fort 
Knox maneuvers.  Using the Coast Artillery Journal as his outlet, Chennault reiterated his belief 
that bomber aircraft on the attack could be defeated if quickly detected, reported, intercepted, 
and destroyed by pursuit aircraft.522  Chennault maintained that an intelligence net similar to that 
used during the Fort Knox exercises was essential.  However, Chennault did not echo General 
Lindsey’s belief that the intelligence net had been a key component during the Fort Knox 
exercises. 
Chennault argued that the intelligence net would have been far more effective if the U.S. 
Army soldiers manning the observation posts had had more training in identifying aircraft and 
relaying that information to a higher level.  Chennault used the altitude reporting as an example.  
He stated that the “altitude was reported by the indefinite terms, ‘low,’ ‘high,’ and ‘very high.’  
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This indefiniteness as to altitude made the tracking, identification, and interception of hostile 
aircraft very difficult.”  Chennault argues that the imprecise altitude reporting forced pursuit 
aircraft “to search a vertical band many thousand feet deep in order to intercept airplanes 
reported by different posts as ‘high’ and ‘very high.’”523 
To emphasize his point, Chennault used the same British examples that he had used when 
designing the intelligence net for the Fort Knox exercises.  He asserted that the British, after 
several attempts, had determined that the quality of the intelligence net was largely governed by 
the quality of the men serving as observers.  In fact, to meet that need, the British had created the 
Royal Observers Corps in 1925.  Chennault believed that the United States desperately needed to 
create a similar organization.524    
In addition to the issue of the quality of the U.S. Army observers, Chennault argued that 
certain restrictions imposed during the maneuvers had tainted the results.  The Air Corps wanted 
to test efficacy of engine mufflers on bomber aircraft.  As a result, pursuit pilots were ordered 
not to operate within 25 miles of Fort Knox.  Chennault believed that prohibiting pursuit aircraft 
from that area kept ground observers from locating bombers using the noise produced by the 
pursuit aircraft trying to intercept the bombers.   He also argued that the prohibition allowed the 
bombers to fly further apart, which decreased the possibility of detection, because they did not 
have to fear attack from pursuit aircraft within 25 miles of their target.525 
Ultimately, Chennault placed the blame for the issues at Fort Knox at the feet of the men, 
especially the U.S. Army officers, who had organized the exercises. He maintained that they had 
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failed to invite someone with significant tactical pursuit experience to their planning meetings.  
He maintained that they simply did fully appreciate how some of their decisions would 
negatively impact pursuit forces during the exercise.526  
The Air Mail “Fiasco” 
 The Air Corps’ growing sense of separation and alienation continued.  On February 9, 
1934, Secretary of War George Dern met with President Roosevelt to determined what to do 
about the air mail scandal.  The scandal began after a Senate investigation discovered that 
Postmaster General Walter Brown had unfairly awarded air mail contracts.  Dern, who wanted to 
help Roosevelt resolve the issue, told Roosevelt that the Air Corps could do it.  Yet Dern had no 
idea if the service could actually accomplish this task because he had not spoken about the matter 
to Foulois, or any other airman for that matter.  Foulois found out about that the Air Corps had 
been volunteered after Harllee Branch, the Second Assistant Postmaster General of the United 
States, called him to his office.  While there, an impromptu meeting among representative of the 
Air Corps, U.S. Post Office, and the Aeronautics Branch of the Commerce Department took 
place.  Although surprised by Dern’s proposal, Foulois agreed that his men could do the job.  He 
estimated that the Air Corps could began delivering air mail in less than two weeks.527 
 After receiving word that Foulois had agreed to the endeavor, President Roosevelt 
suspended all airmail contracts effective at midnight on February 19, 1934.  Roosevelt then 
released Executive Order 6591, which directed the War Department to give the U.S. Postmaster 
General "such air airplanes, landing fields, pilots and other employees and equipment of the 
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Army of the United States needed or required for the transportation of mail during the present 
emergency, by air over routes and schedules prescribed by the Postmaster General.”528 
 On February 14, 1934, Foulois testified before the House of Representatives Post Office 
Committee regarding the Army Air Corps Mail Operation (AACMO).  Foulois outlined the steps 
that the Air Corps had taken to prepare, as well as the fact that the pilots who would be 
delivering the mail were some of the service’s most experienced.  However, Foulois’ statements 
were not entirely accurate.  He left out the fact that he had decided not to withdraw the Air 
Corps’ most experienced pilots from their assignments at the service’s aviation schools and the 
Air Corps Tactical School.  He also failed to mention that the Air Corps’ aircraft were not 
outfitted with the proper instrumentation for night flying.  Basically, Foulois neglected to tell the 
committee the truth because he beleived that he had to assure them that the Air Corps was up to 
the task.529 
 Immediately after testifying before the committee, Foulois and his staff in the OCAC 
began planning.  Foulois explained that he “held meeting after meeting with my staff and 
hammered away at the thousands of questions that had to be answered” prior to the start of the 
AACMO.530  General Douglas MacArthur made Foulois’ job somewhat easier by giving him 
special authorization to handle the AACMO in its entirety.  MacArthur did so because he did not 
want Foulois to have to come to him to ask permission every time a decision regarding the 
AACMO had to be made.   However, Foulois soon regretted that the responsibility for the 
AACMO fell entirely on his shoulders. 
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 The weather throughout the winter of 1934 proved to be quite poor for flying.  On 
February 16, 1934, just three days before the AACMO had officially begun, three Air Corps 
officers died during route familiarization flights in the western United States.531  The problems 
grew worse for the Air Corps.  For example, the weather was so bad that the pilot flying the first 
official AACMO mission required three attempts in three different aircraft to get airborne.  
Approximately ten minutes after leaving the field, the pilot returned because his compass and 
cockpit lights were not working.532  A few days later, two more airmen died while trying to 
deliver the mail.  Another airman died one day after that.533 
 The deaths led to an immediate outcry from the American public.  President Roosevelt 
responded to the criticism by ordering Foulois to account the accidents. Following the tense 
meeting between Roosevelt and Foulois, the Air Corps implemented new flight safety 
regulations designed to mitigate accidents.  Foulois issued the following orders: 
Only pilots of more than two years’ service in the Air Corps will be used on air-mail 
operations involving night flying unless weather conditions all along the route to be 
flown are excellent.  After taking off on a night air-mail run, no pilot will proceed on his 
flight unless his flight instruments are working satisfactorily and he is receiving proper 
reception on his radio. Pilots on night runs will not commence flights under unfavorable 
weather conditions, nor will they continue flights into unfavorable weather conditions.534 
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The measures that Foulois implemented did not achieve the desired results.  
 From March 8 through March 9, 1934, four more Air Corps pilots died in crashes, which 
brought the total number of airmen killed during the AACMO to ten.535  The climbing death toll 
spurred Edward Rickenbacker and Charles Lindbergh, who both worked for private airlines, to 
comment on the AACMO.  Rickenbacker, who had achieved fame during World War I, argued 
that the Air Corps’ attempt to deliver the air mail amounted to “legalized murder.”536  Lindbergh, 
who served as an air mail pilot in the 1920s, argued that the Air Corps’ delivering the mail was 
“unwarranted and contrary to American principles.”537   
The criticisms from two well-known aviators, both of whom had served as U.S. military 
airmen, bothered President Roosevelt and fueled the public outcry.   However, the deaths of three 
airmen in early March led Roosevelt to demand answers.  On the morning of March 10, 1934, 
General MacArthur called Foulois and told him that the president wanted to see them both.  
Upon arriving at MacArthur’s office, Foulois found him pacing back and forth nervously.  
MacArthur stated: “Benny, you’re in trouble.  I don’t know how you are going to explain three 
fatal accidents in different parts of the country in one night, but I think you had better try and 
find the words somehow.  The President is extremely upset by the public reaction to these three 
deaths.”538    
After arriving at the White House, General MacArthur and General Foulois were ushered 
to President Roosevelt’s bedroom.  After General MacArthur introduced Foulois, Roosevelt 
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stated: “General, when are these air-mail killings going to stop?”  Foulois, a man who had dealt 
with the dangers of aviation most of his adult life, responded: “Only when airplanes stop flying, 
Mr. President.”  Roosevelt, angered by Foulois’ response, proceeded to give both men “a tongue-
lashing which I put down in my book as the worst I ever received in all my military service.”539   
Foulois came away from the meeting certain that Roosevelt simply did not understand 
“air power, airplanes, or any of the problems of flying and apparently did not want to learn.”540  
Roosevelt may not have understood, but he did not have to.  He trusted his military leaders to 
accomplish the tasks he gave to them, which Foulois did despite the fatalities.  In addition, 
Roosevelt’s critics blamed him for the fiasco.  Thus, Roosevelt was right to be upset that Foulois 
did not provide him with a plan to reduce the risks associated with the air mail flights.  
To his credit, Foulois knew that he had to do something to mitigate the risks because 
publicity generated by the AACMO risked undoing much of the progress the Air Corps had 
made toward convincing the American people, Congress, and the War Department that they 
needed independence from the U.S. Army.  As a result, Foulois met with his staff and informed 
them that he was suspending the AACMO for ten days so that they could introduce a reduced 
route structure.  Unfortunately for the Air Corps, another crash occurred two days before the 
AACMO resumed.541    
Secretary of War Dern had finally had enough.  On April 17, 1934, Dern ordered an 
investigation of the Air Corps.  The committee, officially titled the War Department Special 
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Committee on the Army Air Corps, was commonly called the “Baker Board” because former 
Secretary of War Newton Baker served as the chairperson of the committee.  Dern tasked Baker 
and the rest of the committee members with examining the AACMO and the overall state of the 
Air Corps.  Of the twelve members, only three were friendly to the Air Corps.542   
The Baker Board, much like the Drum Board had done in 1933, concluded that the Air 
Corps should remain an auxiliary of the U.S. Army.  The members of the Baker Board also 
disagreed with the Air Corps’ contention that the United States needed a large air force to defend 
against a major air attack.  Thus, they opposed increasing the size or power of the Air Corps.  
However, the Baker Board was not completely against the Air Corps.  The committee members 
called for the activation of the General Headquarters Air Force, which would oversee and direct 
all airpower within the continental U.S.543 
Overall, the AACMO, as well as the scandal that resulted, proved to be the most 
significant threat that the men of Air Corps faced during the 1930s.  Foulois hoped that the 
AACMO would demonstrate the skills and capabilities of his men, thereby garnering more 
responsibility and independence for the Air Corps.  In spite of the fatalities, he remained 
optimistic throughout the ordeal because he believed that his men had to do things that put them 
in the public eye.  He understood that flying was dangerous and wanted to prove that his men 
could persevere despite the hardships.  Others, including President Roosevelt, were not as willing 
to accept such losses.  As a result, the last AACMO flight took place on June 1, 1934.   
                                                 
542 Those men included Major James Doolittle, Edgar Gorrell, and Dr. G.W. Lewis.  Bernard C. Nalty, Winged 
Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force, p. 126. 
 
543 James P. Tate, The Army and Its Air Corps: Army Policy Towards Aviation, 1919–1941, pp. 139-146. 
 
230 
 
The AACMO’s impact on the Air Corps was significant.  Foulois received most of the 
blame for the Air Corps’ difficulties.  Consequently, his days as the Chief of the Air Corps were 
numbered.  With his assignment due to end in December 1935, Foulois chose to retire at that 
time.544  His men, however, fared far better because the AACMO highlighted the fact that the Air 
Corps needed better equipment, improved aircraft, and larger budget appropriations.545  Most 
importantly, the problems experienced during the AACMO helped lead to the establishment of 
the separate General Headquarters Air Force in March 1935.546   
A New Boss  
 Major General Oscar Westover replaced Foulois as the Chief of the Air Corps on 
December 22, 1935.  Westover, who served as the Assistant Chief of the Air Corps during 
Foulois’ tenure, believed that the Air Corps had to refocus following the AACMO.  To achieve 
that goal, Westover wanted to improve cooperation between the Air Corps and the U.S. Army.  
Thus, Westover placed a great deal of emphasis on exercises that tested the Air Corps’ ability to 
work with U.S. Army ground forces.  However, he also wanted to continue research, 
development, and operational testing of new bombardment aircraft.  Some in the War 
Department had other plans, which further exacerbated the growing divided between the Air 
Corps and the rest of the U.S. Army.547 
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 In 1936, Major General Stanley D.  Embick, the Deputy to the Chief of Staff, and 
Brigadier General George R. Spalding, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, joined the U.S. Army 
General Staff.  Both men hoped to save the U.S. Army money by reducing the amount of money 
and personnel spent on research, which included the Air Corps’ efforts to build new long-range 
bombardment aircraft.  On June 25, 1936, General Spalding released a study that had been 
prepared by the War Department that the B-17 and planned XB-15 were not necessary to 
complete any of the Air Corps’ missions.  Spalding recommended that the Air Corps procure the 
Douglas B-18 Bolo because it was best suited to the Air Corps’ existing missions.548   
 General Westover and Brigadier General Frank Andrews, who led the GHQ Air Force, 
worried that the General Staff was trying to limit the Air Corps’ capabilities by limiting the 
development of new aircraft.  Both men knew that they had do something to convince the 
General Staff and others that new bombardment aircraft were absolutely necessary to the 
nation’s defense.  To help achieve that goal, Westover and Andrews continued to lobby Congress 
and the War Department.549  They also used Air Corps maneuvers to demonstrate that the 
bombardment aircraft of the day were beginning to lose ground. 
Defending with Aircraft 
 The first major maneuvers during Westover’s tenure took place at Muroc Lake, 
California, in May 1936.  The Air Corps held the maneuvers to examine the efficacy of pursuit 
aircraft defending a large city.   In total, the exercises involved nearly 300 aircraft and 
approximately 3,000 enlisted men and officers.  The defending force flew P-36 aircraft while the 
offensive forces flew Martin B-10 bombers and Northrop A-17 attack aircraft.  The attacking 
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force benefitted greatly by using diversionary tactics to confuse the defenders.  Part of the 
bombardment force split from the main force in order to confuse the defenders.  The gambit 
worked, allowing the main bombardment force to proceed to their targets without significant 
resistance.550  James Ferguson, who flew for the defending forces, stated: “Bombers came in too 
high for us to reach them, and the attackers used terrain masking to surprise us on the ground.”  
Thus, “with no other means of warning, we were caught and treated to a good dose of tear gas 
which took two weeks to shake out of our blankets.”551   
 The difficulties that the defending forces experienced during the Muroc Lake exercise did 
pay some unexpected dividends for pursuit aviation advocates who had long argued that pursuit 
aircraft development had long been neglected in favor of bombardment aircraft.  From 
Ferguson’s perspective, the exercise “helped General Arnold and others in Washington to 
persuade the Army staff that higher performance aircraft were needed.”552   
 The exercise also bolstered the case of bombardment advocated who became convinced 
that the medium-range bombardment aircraft such as the B-10 and the B-12 were not able to 
compete against pursuit aircraft of equal or superior performance.  Immediately after the exercise 
ended, Major General Frank M. Andrews briefed the nation’s press.  Andrews asserted that the 
exercises had all but proven that the U.S. had only enough airpower to fight a one-front war.  
Andrews’ main complaint was that he could only field about one third of the aircraft that he was 
supposed to have at his disposal according to the 1932 Air Corps Act.   More importantly, 
General Andrews used the results of the exercise to lead the Army Air Corps’ efforts to convince 
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the War Department that high-performance bombardment aircraft were an absolute necessity if 
the U.S. hoped to compete.553 
 Ultimately, the Muroc Lake exercises benefitted all parties involved.  Both the pursuit 
advocates and bombardment advocates better understood that the aircraft then in use did not 
possess the performance needed to compete against the Air Corps’ most likely allies—Germany 
and Japan.  The exercise also benefitted both groups because the U.S. news media covered the 
exercises and reported Andrews’ and others’ complaints to the nation.  The coverage helped 
increase support in the U.S. military and Congress for more aircraft and increased funding.554   
1937 California Exercises 
 In May 1937, General Andrews moved GHQ Air Force to several locations in California 
in order to conduct field maneuvers from May 10 to May 23, 1937.  The exercise plan, largely 
created by Andrews, involved B-10 bombers attacking the city of Los Angeles and A-17 attack 
aircraft using tear gas on the defensive forces’ positions, particularly their airfields and anti-
aircraft batteries.  Conversely, Andrews tasked the defending force with using camera guns to 
attack bomber aircraft so that the details of the attacks could be dissected after the exercise.555  
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 The exercise pitted aircraft of nearly equal speed against one another.  The P-26 aircraft 
had a slightly higher top speed but the B-10s minimized that advantage to some extent by flying 
at high altitudes.  After the first few days of the exercise, the P-26 pilots quickly determined that 
the best method for successfully attacking the B-10s required them to attack at roughly the same 
altitudes the bombers were flying at.  The pursuit pilots had tried to attack from above and below 
but both approaches proved to do little more than expose them to the B-10’s gun because they 
presented a larger target than they did when flying head-on.556   
 At the same time that the P-26 pilots honed their tactics, the B-10 aircrews did much the 
same.  The B-10 aircrews quickly determined that flying in close formation had the dual-edged 
effect of increasing the effectiveness of their bombing accuracy while at the same time 
increasing the chances of being hit by anti-aircraft fire.  Thus, the B-10 crews shifted tactics and 
began flying in columns with increased separation between each aircraft.  The B-10 crews also 
discovered that bombing as the sun was either rising or setting increased their chances of 
avoiding enemy searchlights and artillery batteries.557 
 Overall, the maneuvers proved the Andrews and his men with valuable information on 
the performance and capabilities of both pursuit aircraft and bombardment aircraft.  In particular, 
the maneuvers indicated that bombardment aircraft were vulnerable to pursuit aircraft under all 
but the best conditions.  The B-10 crews had some success, but it typically came at brief periods 
each day when the rising or setting sun decreased the ability of the ground forces to detect them.  
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The maneuvers also showed that the darkness of night did not make the B-10 crews task any 
easier because they had great difficulty seeing their targets.558   
Finding the Rex 
 The 1937 maneuvers in California provided the Air Corps with a great deal of useful 
information on the performance of bombardment and pursuit aircraft.  Yet General Westover and 
General Andrews agreed that much work remained.  Thus, in May 1938, Andrews assembled 
450 officers, 2,300 enlisted men, and 130 aircraft to participate in coastal defense exercises in the 
eastern United States.559  Andrews tasked three B-17 aircrews with finding the Rex, an Italian 
ocean liner used to represent an enemy surface fleet.  Andrews, aware that some still questioned 
the feasibility of an aircraft locating a ship at sea, used the exercise to demonstrate that aircraft 
could locate and disable enemy ships long before they because a problem for coastal defense 
forces.    
 Andrews’ three B-17s left Mitchel Field, New York, early on the morning of May 12, 
1938.  At the time that the aircraft departured, the Rex was approximately 725 miles off the coast 
of the U.S. and headed toward New York City.  The navigator of the lead aircraft, Lieutenant 
Curtis LeMay, faced the daunting task of locating the Rex in the vast sea of blue with heavy 
cloud cover.  Whether through sheer luck or sheer talent, Lieutenant LeMay’s navigational skills 
put the aircraft within visual distance of the Rex at the time he had predicted (12:25pm).560   
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 The effort to locate and intercept the Rex proved to be well worth the effort that Andrews 
and his men had put into the endeavor.  Since each aircraft carried a newspaper reporter, the 
story of the feat reached millions of Americans within short order.  The achievement also proved 
that bomber aircraft could locate small targets under difficult conditions, thereby reversing some 
of the bad press that the Air Corps had received following the Mount Shasta incident in 1931.  
However, the success of the mission had an adverse effect that Andrews had not anticipated.  
Based on U.S. Navy pressure, the War Department restricted the Air Corps to operating within 
100 miles of the U.S. coast.  Essentially, the War Department blocked the Air Corps’ ability to 
cross into the U.S. Navy’s traditional realm once the airmen had proven that they could 
successfully do so.561  The War Department’s decision angered Andrews and further fueled the 
men of the Air Corps’ sense of alienation and desire for a separate service. 
Fort Bragg Exercises 
 In the months following the successful search for the Rex, Air Corps leaders continued 
testing the effectiveness of the men, technology, and tactics.  More importantly, they hoped to 
once again demonstrate that airmen were capable of running the Air Corps without the U.S. 
Army’s help.  From October 3, 1938, to October 15, 1938, Air Corps units participated in air 
defense exercises at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.  The exercises tested the U.S. Army’s ability to 
defend an area against attacking air forces.  The War Department authorized $75,000 for the 
exercises.  Brigadier General Fulton C. Gardner, defense commander during the exercise, stated 
that the maneuvers were held to determine the anti-aircraft requirements for defending an air 
base against attack from the air; to test the coordination between the Air Corps, Anti-Aircraft 
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Artillery, and Aircraft Warning Systems; to test using non-military personnel as part of an 
Aircraft Warning System; to examine ground observers proficiency at detecting and reporting 
aircraft information; to determine the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Intelligence Service’s ability to 
detect, locate, and report attacking aircraft; to discover the most effective formations and tactics 
for bombing areas defended by aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, an Aircraft Warning System, and  
Anti-Aircraft Artillery Intelligence Service; and to determine the effectiveness of bombing 
targets defended by anti-aircraft batteries.562 
 During the exercise, the attacking force of B-10, B-17, and B-18 bombers operated from 
a simulated aircraft carrier on Langley Field, Virginia.  The defending force, which included 
anti-aircraft units, an Aircraft Warning System (AWS), and P-35 pursuit aircraft, operated out of 
Pope Field, North Carolina.  Approximately 1,500 civilians drawn from the area around Fort 
Bragg served as observers for the AWS.563 
 The Fort Bragg exercises once again provided ample firepower for both bomber and 
pursuit proponents.  Lieutenant Colonel E.W. Kepner, the commander of the pursuit forces, 
commented that the B-10 and B-18 bombers were “easy prey for any pursuit [aircraft] now in use 
by the GHQ Air Force” whenever they did not have pursuit aircraft escort.564  The newer and 
more-capable B-17 bombers fared better but, as Kepner noted, “B-17s unaccompanied by pursuit 
can be intercepted in fair weather when operating singly or in group formations” which allowed 
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P-35s and other pursuit aircraft to “intercept a high percentage.”565  Despite everything, Kepner 
admitted that numbers of B-17s protected by pursuit aircraft presented a difficult target that 
would have to be attacked with enough pursuit aircraft to overwhelm both the bombers and the 
pursuit aircraft.566   
 Overall, the Fort Bragg exercises did little more than to reaffirm what had already been 
all but proven during pervious exercises—bomber aircraft could be successfully intercepted 
using a combination of pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft batteries, and an intelligence net manned by 
trained observers.  Brigadier General Fulton Q. C. Gardner, the Defense Commander during the 
exercise, stated that the “exercise has shown definitely that both pursuit aviation and antiaircraft 
artillery have important roles in antiaircraft defense, that each supplements the other, and that 
joint training is necessary in order to insure the most effective use of both in war.”567 
 Some at the ACTS complained that Kepner had ordered his pursuit pilots to identify 
attacking bombers.  Proponents of bombardment aviation stated that the net worked very well.  
However, they argued that Kepner had “never thoroughly trusted it…because he still employed a 
combination of air patrol, air alert, and ground alert methods, keeping at least two-thirds of the 
force in the air at all times.”568  They complained that, while functional, Kepner’s approach 
would have exhausted his forces in real-world operations of any duration.  Essentially, the ACTS 
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observers argued that the exercise results did not reflect what would happen under real-world 
conditions. 
 Other ACTS members disagreed with their colleagues and sided with Kepner.  Major 
Fenton Epling and Major James Parker discussed the Fort Bragg exercise during a Reserve 
Officers Association of the United States meeting on March 6, 1939.  They argued that several 
nations had sophisticated intelligence nets that did not require the level of aircraft support 
Kepner had used.  Epling and Parker stated that Germany had a net that the Germans claimed 
could “plot the movement of any aircraft throughout its flight across the Fatherland.”  They 
added that Germany was divided into defense sectors each headed by a Defense Commander.  
Each sector worked in conjunction with other sectors to increase the probability of defeating the 
attacking force.  Epling and Parker noted that France had a similar system.569 
 Although the Fort Bragg maneuvers caused some disagreements among the men of the 
Air Corps, they once again demonstrated that airmen could effectively led large numbers of 
aircraft in combat scenario.  The maneuvers also showed the U.S. Army that air power, 
particularly pursuit aircraft, were critically important to defending a large area from an attacking 
air force.  Most importantly, the Fort Bragg maneuvers proved to be another important milestone 
in the Air Corps’ push for a separate service because they showed that air power had developed 
into more than just an auxiliary for the U.S. Army’s ground forces.   
Conclusion 
 The maneuvers and missions that the men of the Air Corps participated in throughout the 
1930s were important for several reasons.  To begin with, they provided Air Corps leaders and 
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personnel at the ACTS with ample evidence regarding the performance of bomber aircraft and 
pursuit aircraft.  The Fort Knox exercises, for example, indicated that pursuit aircraft could 
locate and intercept bomber aircraft quite easily when cooperating with an information net.  In 
addition, the Air Corps’ work in the 1930s changed the way in which the American public, 
Congress, and the War Department viewed the Air Corps and airpower.  At the start of the 
1930s, much of what the men of the Air Corps claimed that they could do was theoretical.  By 
the end of the 1930s, airman had demonstrated that the airplane had developed into more than 
just an auxiliary force for the U.S. Army.  Airmen showed that air power could be used to great 
effect in both defensive and offensive roles while supporting either supporting U.S. Army 
ground forces or operating as an independent air force.   
The events of the period also reinforced airmen’s desire for greater autonomy.  The men 
of the Air Corps continued to grow disenchanted with their subordinate position within the U.S. 
Army because they believed that the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and the War Department as a whole, 
still did not fully appreciate air power.  They argued that the War Department had used their 
failures during the Mount Shasta incident and the AAMCO scandal as rationale for keeping their 
service under the control of the U.S. Army.  As a result, airmen increased their efforts to separate 
from the U.S. Army.   
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Chapter 6 –  Evidence for Independence: The Spanish Civil War and the Second Sino-
Japanese War 
The Spanish Civil War (July 17, 1936 - April 1, 1939) and the opening years of the 
Second Sino-Japanese War (July 7, 1937 – September 9, 1945) were the most significant 
conflicts prior to World War II.  Both clashes, which involved military aircraft of all types, 
demonstrated that air power had evolved significantly since the end of World War I.  They 
showed that air power had developed into a critical component of a nation’s military.  But for the 
most ardent advocates of air power, acceptance as just one component among several was still 
problematic. Most importantly, then, the two wars intensified the differences between air 
advocates and ground-force exponents in the United States military, especially those in the U.S. 
Army Air Corps and the U.S. Army.  
The men of the Air Corps, were airmen who, in some cases, had fought to gain 
independence for nearly three decades.  They were convinced that air power had proven itself to 
be vital in both conflicts.  Airmen, especially those men assigned to the Air Corps Tactical 
School, closely followed the use of aircraft in both major pre-World War II conflicts through 
first-hand reports from U.S. and foreign military personnel stationed in the warring nations, as 
well as though radio and newspaper accounts of the destruction caused by aircraft.  These events 
abroad further solidified airmen’s belief that the U.S. Army and the War Department did not 
appreciate the air power and the Air Corps.  Thus, the conflicts were important for the men of the 
Air Corps because they increased airmen’s sense of alienation and frustration, even though the 
understanding of the impact of air power was growing among non-airmen, and this further fueled 
their desire to separate from the U.S. Army. 
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The Spanish Civil War 
 In A Few Great Captains: The Men and Events That Shaped the Development of U.S. Air 
Power, historian DeWitt Copp argues that the Spanish Civil War “failed to make much of an 
impression on bomber theorists at Maxwell Field and elsewhere.”  He asserts: “that may have 
been so because there were very few qualified air observers on the scene.”570  However, the use 
of aircraft in the Spanish Civil War was closely followed by men of the U.S. Air Corps.  
Although no American airmen participated in the conflict, they monitored the clash between 
Republican and Nationalist air forces very carefully because it provided them with the 
opportunity to study air power in combat.  More importantly, the conflict provided them with 
more evidence that they used to support their drive for independence.571   
The Spanish Civil War began on July 17, 1936 after several Spanish Republican Armed 
Forces generals led by Jose Sanjurjo issued a declaration of opposition (Pronunciamiento) 
expressing their extreme dissatisfaction with the government of Manuel Azaña.572  The following 
day, a series of well-coordinated uprisings led by the Spanish military occurred throughout the 
nation.  Despite their best efforts, the Nationalists faced a great deal of resistance from the 
Republicans.573  The Nationalists then turned to the Spanish Army of Africa which was stationed 
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in Morocco.  Unable to transport the Spanish Army of Africa back to Spain, the Nationalists, led 
by Francisco Franco following Sanjurjo’s untimely death in an airplane crash, turned to Adolf 
Hitler and Benito Mussolini for assistance.574   
 Shortly after Franco issued his call for help, the German and Italian aircraft arrived in 
Morocco to transport the Spanish Army of Africa to Seville, Spain.  Hitler, aware that the airlift 
effort had saved the Nationalists, stated “Franco ought to erect a monument to the glory of the 
Junkers 52,” the aircraft type that had done most of the major lifting.575  Most historians who 
have written about the Spanish Civil War have agreed with Hitler’s assessment of the Luftwaffe’s 
(German Air Force) role in keeping the Nationalists from an early defeat in the conflict.576 
 With their immediate survival guaranteed, the Nationalists began to try and solidify their 
position throughout Spain during a series of bloody battles that occurred in and around Madrid, 
Spain’s capital city.  The Nationalists had a small contingent of Spanish aviators at their 
disposal.577  However, they knew that they would need a much larger force if they hoped to 
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compete against the Republicans.578  As a result, the Nationalists turned to the Germans and 
Italians for further assistance.  Franco’s Nationalists unarguably benefitted significantly from the 
support of Adolf Hitler and the growing German war machine because, “except for foreign 
participation, there might have been practically no air warfare during the course of the 
subsequent fighting.”  Hitler, in turn, used the conflict to train and season Luftwaffe pilots and 
aircrews.  Approximately 5,000 Germans from the Luftwaffe and the Wehrmacht Heer (German 
Army) volunteered to fight for Franco from 1936 to 1939.  Known as the Condor Legion, these 
men provided expertise and firepower that proved instrumental in Franco’s triumph.579 
 The French also participated in the Spanish Civil War by supplying aircraft to the 
Republican government.  By November 15, 1936, the French had delivered 25 Potez 58 
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observation aircraft, 16 Dewoitine D.371 and D.372 monoplane pursuit aircraft, 20 Potez 540 
reconnaissance/bombardment aircraft, two Dewoitine pursuit aircraft, six Loire 46 monoplane 
pursuit aircraft, one Bloch MB-210 bombardment aircraft, seven transport aircraft, 1 Bleriot-
Spad S.91 biplane pursuit aircraft, and several “utility” aircraft.580  In addition to aircraft, the 
French sent trained aircrews from the Armée de l'Air (French Air Force) to help train the 
Republican Air Force.  The French, however, did not send any weapons along with the aircraft, 
which forced the French aircrews to retool gun mounts to accommodate the weapons provided 
by the Republican Air Force.581   
 Germany, Italy, and France were not the only nations to send aircraft and advisors to 
assist in Spain.  The Soviet Union sent a large number of aircraft and personnel to assist the 
Republicans.  By mid-November 1936, the Soviets had delivered 40 Tupolev SB Katiuska 
bombardment aircraft, 24 Polikarpov I-15 Chaika biplane pursuit aircraft and 36 Polikarpov I-16 
Ishak monoplane pursuit aircraft.582   Unlike the French, the Soviets had sent the requisite 
armament along with the aircraft and the personnel to fly them.  First Lieutenant E.H. Alexander, 
a U.S. Air Corps officer, stated that the Soviet personnel he came into contact with “were 
excellently trained, and displayed the best of discipline.  They knew what their job was, and had 
been trained how to accomplish assigned tasks in the most workman-like manner.”583 
The Battle of Guadalajara 
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 In March 1937, Nationalist and Italian troops captured Malaga, a resort town on Spain’s 
Mediterranean coast.  The easy victory emboldened the Nationalists and quickly led them to 
prepare plans to attack Guadalajara, a city 800 kilometers north of Malaga.  The Nationalists and 
approximately 20,000 of their Italian allies began the push north on March 8, 1937.  Heavy rains 
soon interceded, slowing their progress down considerably.  On March 11, 1937, a 
reconnaissance aircraft from the Republican Air Force located the large number of Italian trucks 
spread along about 20 kilometers of the Saragossa Highway.  The pilot subsequently reported the 
Italians’ location to his superiors.  The following day, the Republican Air Force initiated the 
Battle of Guadalajara by attacking the Italian convoy.584   
The initial strike force consisted of approximately 20 Soviet Katiuska bombardment 
aircraft, 20 Soviet attack aircraft, and 84 I-15 and I-16 Soviet pursuit aircraft.  The Soviet force 
dropped an estimated 100 bombs and fired approximately 20,000 rounds of ammunition.585  The 
Italians, mired in the mud, were caught unprepared without any anti-aircraft defense.  Worse yet, 
the Italian troops had difficulty doing anything because of the muddy conditions.   Realizing the 
severity of their enemy’s predicament, the Soviets flew two more sorties against the Italians.  
The Soviets dropped a total of approximately 492 bombs and fired around 200,000 rounds of 
ammunition.  The attack led the Italian troops to abandon their vehicles and equipment.586 
Guernica 
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 The bombing of the town of Guernica most definitely caught the attention of the bomber 
theorists in the Air Corps.  In fact, the attack on Guernica was so widely publicized that few 
people in the Europe or the United States would not have heard about it.   
The attack on Guernica began more than one month after the Battle of Guadalajara.  On 
April 26, 1937, the Nationalists ordered Oberstleutnant Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen, the 
Condor Legion’s commanding officer, to bomb the town of Guernica in order to bolster the 
Nationalist’s hold in that area.  Although Guernica had little appreciable military importance—
other than its general location—the Condor Legion and the Aviazione Legionaria dropped 
incendiary bombs, often referred to as firebombs, on the town of approximately 10,000.587   
 Although Luftwaffe doctrine did not advocate terror bombing, the attack was 
characterized as that by many.  Historian James S. Corum argues: “The bombing of Guernica 
was quickly turned into an event of mythical proportions and the version of events accepted by 
the public and the leadership of nations in Europe and America seemed to prove out all the worst 
predictions of civilian casualties that would result from aerial bombardment.”588  
The Basque government claimed that the bombing killed 1,654 civilians and wounded 
another 889.  Other reports suggested that the death toll was a low as 153.  Regardless of the 
exact number of deaths, news of the bombing shocked the international community, which 
referred to the attack as “terror bombing.”  Spanish artist Pablo Picasso was so moved by the 
bombing that he almost immediately began working on a painting of the event at his home in 
Paris, France.  Completed in June 1937, his painting Guernica evoked the brutality of the 
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bombing and the deadly affect that it had on its victims.  In fact, it was the twisted and deformed 
bodies that Picasso depicted that helped bring international attention to the violence then 
underway in Spain.589 
 
Observer Reports 
 Reports from military observers stationed in Spain proved to be highly valuable to the 
men of the Air Corps.  The reports provided the Air Corps with insight into how the various 
factions used the aircraft, including what types of aircraft and tactics worked best.  The reports 
also helped American airmen support their contention that air power had, in fact, changed the 
way wars were fought.  The reports showed that the success of ground forces was often reliant on 
air power.  Therefore, the men of the Air Corps used the reports to bolster their case for 
separation from the U.S. Army.  
The most detailed reports on the use of aircraft during the Spanish Civil War came from 
Colonel Stephen D. Fuqua, the U.S. Military Attaché stationed in Valencia, Spain, and Captain 
Townsend Griffiss, his assistant.590  Fuqua, a career infantry officer, and Griffiss, an Air Corps 
officer, were tasked with gathering any intelligence they could regarding military operations 
during the conflict.   To do so, Fuqua and Griffis compiled a great deal of information from 
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official Spanish government forces, newspaper reports, and interviews with pilots flying with 
Republican forces.591   
The level of detail that the Fuqua and Griffiss included in their reports was astounding. 
For example, they reported that “The Junker-52 bombardment plane is absolutely vulnerable to a 
head-on attack, or nearly head-on attack, made at the same altitude.” They added: “The bombers 
had two gunners on aft on top and the other aft and any other attack approach exposes the 
attacker to machine gun fire.  The forward part is unprotected and just above the heads of the 
pilot and bomber is the exposed reserve gasoline tank.”592    
 Fuqua and Griffiss also discussed the tactics that each side employed.  Franco’s 
Nationalists would fly Junkers in formations of 11 to 22 aircraft with protection from Heinkel 
and Fiat pursuit aircraft.  The Junkers flew in a large “V” formation or a line formation.  The 
Heinkel and Fiat aircraft flew in smaller formations at higher altitudes.  To combat such 
formations, the Republicans would typically use I-15s to attack while I-16s provided protective 
fire.  Fuqua and Griffiss explained that the I-15s flew at a designated altitude while the I-16 
pilots ascended to a higher altitude in order to use their aircraft’s potential energy to dive upon 
their targets.  The I-15s would attack the Junkers, while the I-16s fought off any He-52s or 
Cr.32s that attacked the I-15s.  To further increase their odds of survival, some of the I-15s did 
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not attack the Junkers.  Instead, they held off so that they could help the I-16s fend off attacks 
from the Nationalist’s aircraft.593     
  The Republicans also worked very hard to compensate for their enemy’s changing 
tactics.  Fuqua and Griffiss explained that, when possible, Republican I-16 pilots would attack 
Junker formations “on the hit and run principle and from all angles.”  However, the I-16 pilots 
had to be careful because attacking a well-armed Ju-52 often had disastrous results for an 
“overenthusiastic attacker.”594   
The Republican pilots used their experience attacking the Ju-52s to help better protect 
their own bombardment aircraft.  The twin-engine Russian bombers that the Republicans flew 
were fast and well armed.  As a result, they frequently flew without pursuit protection.  During 
particularly difficult missions, I-15s and I-16s accompanied the bombers.  To increase their 
chance for survival, the bomber pilots flew flights of three aircraft in a “V” formation directly in 
front of the lead bombardment aircraft.  The other pursuit aircraft would fly on either side of the 
main bomber formation.  When they encountered enemy pursuit aircraft, the I-15s and I-16s 
would break formation and attack.595 
Fuqua and Griffiss also reported that both the Republican and Nationalist air forces 
conducted a significant number of ground-attack sorties during the Spanish Civil War.  In fact, 
the sheer number of ground attacks surprised the attaché who commented that both sides 
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employed every aircraft in their respective arsenals during such missions.  Pursuit aircraft 
seemed to perform the bulk of such missions due to their maneuverability.  Fuqua and Griffiss 
reported that pursuit aircraft pilots typically used two different methods to attack their targets.  
The first method involved attacking from a high altitude.  During that type of attack, the 
attacking aircraft often climbed to approximately 14,000 and initiated a steep dive on their 
intended target.  Then, at approximately 7,500 feet, the pilot or bombardier would release their 
bombs while continuing to dive and fire on their target with machine guns until they reached 
approximately 4,500 feet.  At that point the attacking aircraft would depart the target area.  
Fuqua and Griffiss commented that “strange as it may seem it is reported that excellent results 
have been accomplished by high-altitude ground attack.”596    
Conversely, the second method involved attacking from a very low-altitude that used the 
element of surprise as a force multiplier.  The low altitude attacks depended on the weather, the 
target, enemy anti-aircraft, the size and location of enemy air forces, and the number of friendly 
aircraft that provided protection.  Fuqua and Griffiss noted that pilots attacking from low 
altitudes would frequently drop their bombs from an approximate altitude of 600 feet to 1,500 
feet in order to avoid being affected by the explosion.  The pilots would then use machine-guns 
until they reached approximately 100 feet and broke off their attack.597 
While both sides conducted the early ground attacks with whatever aircraft they had at 
their disposal, specialized ground attack aircraft quickly entered the conflict.  The Russian-built 
Polikarpov R-5 proved to be a highly-useful ground attack weapon for the Republican Air Force.  
A two-seat biplane, the R-5 carried up to 550 pounds of bombs on external bomb racks.  In 
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addition, it had one forward-firing Pulemet Vozdushny PV-1 machine gun on each wing and one 
Degtyaryov machine gun in the rear of the aircraft.598  To protect the aircraft from ground fire, 
the Russians added armored plating around the engine and encircling most of the cockpit.  In 
addition to the aforementioned ground attack tactics, R-5 pilots often approached their targets at 
an altitude of about 100 before climbing to 450 feet to 500 feet just prior to dropping their 
bombs.599  Fuqua and Griffiss stated: 
The value of ground attack has been clearly shown in recent air operations.  In my 
opinion the most important development that has taken placed in the Government 
Air Force is the tactical cooperation that now exists between the pursuit, 
bombardment and ground-attack aviation.  With internal understanding it has 
been a great deal easier to build up coordination and cooperation between the Air 
and Ground.600 
 
The arrival of the twin-engine Junkers Ju-86 in February 1937 forced the Republican Air 
Force to alter their tactics to some degree.  Designed as both a bomber and a civilian airliner, the 
Ju-86 served as a very stable bombardment platform.  More importantly, the Ju-86 had multiple 
guns in the front, top, and belly, which could quickly be brought to bear on an enemy aircraft. To 
counter the Ju-86, the Republican Air Force pilots had to try and fly in the aircraft’s blind spot in 
order to avoid being hit as they attacked.  According to the Fuqua and Griffiss, the tactic worked 
with “four or five” Ju-86s being shot down by April 1937.601   
The report that Fuqua and Griffiss produced was long and extremely detailed.  Yet that is 
exactly what the U.S. military wanted such reports to be.  The reports contained very few general 
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statements.  Instead, the reports contained paragraph after paragraph and page after page of 
highly detailed and useful data that an intelligence officer, commander, or military leaders could 
read to gain an appreciation of the topic covered in the report.  Thus, the reports issued by Fuqua 
and Griffiss provided the Air Corps with data on the performance of bombardment and pursuit 
aircraft in combat. Most importantly, they warned the Air Corps that “the Flying Fortress died in 
Spain.”  Furthermore, they asserted: “The peacetime theory of the complete invulnerability of the 
modern type bombardment airplane no longer holds. The increased speeds and modern 
armament of both the bombardment and pursuit plane have worked in favor of the pursuit.”  
Fuqua and Griffiss determined that, based on their data and observations, “the old formula of 
high altitude bombing is exploded.”602 
The exhaustive report that Fuqua and Griffiss compiled was not the only source the Air 
Corps had for information about the use of aircraft during the Spanish Civil War.  Another Air 
Corps officer, Captain Harlan McCormick, studied the conflict for the term paper that he 
completed while attending the ACTS.  McCormick interviewed a Royal Air Force officer about 
the conflict in Spain.  The officer explained to McCormick that “The escort of bomber 
formations proceeding to and from their objectives by double, or more than double, their number 
of fighters, has been found by both sides to be a necessity, notwithstanding the ability of the 
bomber to shoot down fighters.”603 
The military forces of the Soviet Union also paid careful attention to the Spanish Civil 
War.  In addition to aircraft and technicians, the Soviets sent their own military attachés and 
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intelligence operatives to gather information.  Two people who observed the conflict for the 
Soviet Union were P. Mikhailow and G. Gagarin.604  
In his report, titled “Tactical Employment of Pursuit Aviation: Experiences of the 
Spanish Civil War,” Mikhailow explained that the Republican Air Force had begun the conflict 
flying outdated Newport aircraft that were both slow and unable to fly at high altitudes.  The 
Nationalists, who Mikhailow referred to as “insurgents” throughout his report, flew more modern 
and more capable German and Italian aircraft.  He argued that the Nationalists’ superior 
performing aircraft gave them an initial advantage that forced the Republican Air Force to 
undertake a high number of raids.605   
 However, the outdated equipment did not prohibit the Republican Air Force from 
achieving some success in defending Madrid, Spain, from Nationalist air attacks.  Mikhailow 
stated that Republican Air Force leaders “adopted a system for guarding the city from nearby 
airdromes, whence planes would take to the air on a given signal from air observation posts.”  
According to Mikhailow, the “system of defense requires a smoothly functioning aircraft 
warning service along with properly developed airdromes to insure instantaneous take-off of all 
aircraft.”606  The Republican Air Force based their warning system on the model that the U.S. 
Air Corps had created in the early 1930s.607   
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 Mikhailow reported that, unlike their counterparts in the United States, the pursuit aircraft 
used in Spain by both sides typically possessed better speed and maneuverability than their 
bombardment counterparts.608  Thus the pursuit aircraft had a great deal of success against the 
slower bombardment aircraft, “often compelling them to turn back and to abandon their 
missions.”609  To protect their bombardment aircraft, the Nationalists placed them in the center of 
their aerial formations.  A group of pursuit aircraft flew approximately 3,000 feet in front of the 
bombardment aircraft to both protect them and attack enemy pursuit aircraft.  Another group of 
pursuit aircraft flew behind the bombardment aircraft at an altitude 2,000 feet to 3,000 feet above 
them to protect them from rear attacks.  In addition, the Nationalists had “outstanding pilots” fly 
high above the formation so that they could dive upon enemy aircraft as needed.610  
 The Nationalists’ tactics worked well in many instances, but they still suffered significant 
losses during daytime bombardment operations.  In spite of the initial lack of personnel trained to 
fly at night, the Nationalists soon implemented nighttime bombardment operations in order to 
minimize their losses.  The Republican Air Force did not allow the Nationalists to conduct their 
nighttime raids unopposed.  In July 1937, Republican Air Force pursuit aircraft shot down a 
Nationalist bombardment aircraft at night in the vicinity of Madrid.  The shoot-down, the first of 
the conflict, proved that nighttime bombardment was not free from danger.611 
 Although bombardment aircraft performed many missions during the Spanish Civil War, 
their achievements paled in comparison to those of pursuit aircraft.  Mikhailow reported that 
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pursuit aircraft performed several functions throughout the conflict, including pursuit, attack, 
ground-attack, bombardment, observation, and reconnaissance.  In fact, Mikhailow argued that 
the Republican air force’s pursuit aircraft were so successful when used as defensive weapons 
that the Nationalist bombardment aircraft “hardly ever risked attacks on any loyalist forces that 
were protected by pursuit aircraft.”612  In addition, the presence of friendly pursuit aircraft 
boosted the morale of Republican soldiers who, feeling strong protection in the air, carried out 
their combat missions with greater assurance.”613 
 Mikhailow maintained that Republican Air Forces’ pursuit aircraft were equally useful as 
offensive weapons.  Frequently, Republican pursuit aircraft joined with friendly attack and 
bombardment aircraft to attack Nationalist troop formations.  During the Guadalajara operation, 
Republican pursuit aircraft initiated the attack before climbing to higher altitudes in order to 
provide cover for the attack aircraft.  Mikhailow claimed that Republican pursuit aircraft acted as 
an “air cavalry” that disrupted the Italian corps they attacked.614    
 Overall, Mikhailow’s report provide ample evidence to support his contention that pursuit 
aircraft had played a prominent role for both the Nationalist and the Republican air forces 
throughout the Spanish Civil War.  While he did not address the fact that Soviet pilots flew for 
the Republicans and German pilots flew for the Nationalists, his report nonetheless indicated that 
pursuit aircraft played an indispensable part in the conflict.615  Moreover, his reports shows that 
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bombardment aircraft were highly vulnerable when opposed by well-trained pilots at the controls 
of capable pursuit aircraft. 
Another thorough report on the use of airpower in the Spanish Civil War came from a 
Soviet military officer named G. Gagarin.  In May 1938, Gagarin wrote a report titled “Aviation 
in Defensive Actions (Experience of the Spanish Civil War).”  In his report, Gagarin, echoing the 
U.S. military attaché and Mikhailow, focused on the importance of pursuit aircraft during the 
Spanish Civil War.  Gagarin explained that both the Republicans and Nationalists quickly 
discovered that infantry and tanks suffered heavy losses when they were without accompanying 
artillery and aviation support.  Thus, to avoid “protracted position warfare” similar to that 
experienced during World War I, the opposing sides began using both artillery and aircraft in 
order to achieve breakthroughs along the defensive lines.  Gagarin maintained that, of the two, 
airpower proved particularly effective because “troops in the front lines found it impossible to 
withstand the onslaught and began withdrawing even before the enemy advanced to the attack.”  
He also reported that, at other times, the infantry that had survived the initial aerial attacks 
“proved capable of organized resistance.”616   
In his report, Gagarin came to much the same conclusion that Mikhailow had regarding 
pursuit aircraft.  Gagarin indicated that, when acting in a defensive role, pursuit aircraft had to 
“maintain a constant patrol of the air” in order to be successful.  However, he argued that even 
the most active pursuit aircraft “were always too late to prevent the hostile bombers from their 
bombs on their objectives.”617   
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Despite stating that pursuit aircraft had an almost impossible task facing them when it 
came to stopping bombardment aircraft, Gagarin maintained that “the modern pursuit craft may 
be considered a most formidable weapon, both as a means of anti-aircraft defense and for general 
combat for control of the air.”  He continued: “Regardless of the efforts that may be made to 
increase the speed of the bomber, it will always fail to attain the speed of a fast pursuit craft.”618    
While later bombers did surpass the capabilities of their contemporary pursuit aircraft, at least 
for brief periods of time, Gagarin’s correct that pursuit aircraft historically possessed superior 
speed and maneuverability compared to bombardment aircraft.  
In addition to the overall superiority of pursuit aircraft, Gagarin argued that their 
effectiveness was exponential when working in conjunction with anti-aircraft weapons and 
aircraft warning systems.  Gagarin asserted that, during the Spanish Civil War, pursuit craft 
aided by anti-aircraft weaponry greatly increased the number of bombardment aircraft lost by the 
attacking force.  Gagarin postulated that “pursuit craft employed in cooperation with anti-aircraft 
defense weapons may completely prevent hostile bombers from reaching defended areas.”619   
Some in the United States agreed with Mikhailow’s and Gagarin’s assessments that 
bombardment aircraft were far from perfect.  In an article titled “The Misuse of Air Power,” 
Dallas D. Irvine strongly criticized the Air Corps in a different way.  He argued that the war in 
Spain, particularly the bombing of Guernica, led many airmen to believe that terror bombing 
worked.  Irvine stated: 
The aeromaniacs assume that direct attack on civilian population may indeed be 
effective, and even decisive, in breaking a people's morale.  In this assumption 
lies a most extraordinary fallacy.  How anyone familiar with the fortitude shown 
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by the human species among the horrors of war in the past can make this 
assumption is not easy to understand. The theory that the determination of a 
people to carry on war can be broken by mere punishment rests upon the grossest 
misunderstanding of the social psychology of war. Since exactly that theory is 
finding credence today, even in the circles of military supreme commands, it is 
desperately necessary to impress upon the minds of all who are thinking about 
future war that the determination of a people to prosecute a war is dependent not 
at all upon the punishment to which that people is subjected, but upon two things: 
(1) its belief in the Justice of its cause, and (2) its belief that it has a fair chance of 
winning, or in any case, of avoiding defeat. For substantiation of this assertion let 
one study the causes of the German collapse in 1918.620 
 
Irvine maintained that bombing people to break their will would never work.  Instead, he 
argued: “The only proper use of violence in war is for taking away a determined people's hope of 
victory, and this can be accomplished only by destroying or neutralizing that people's material 
power for attack or resistance in whatever degree is necessary."   Therefore, he asserted air 
power should be used to destroy a nation’s “mechanism of supply and communication” rather 
than its people.621 
The criticisms of bombardment aircraft during the Spanish Civil War continued. In 
September 1937, the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, conducted a course that 
addressed military events abroad.  Throughout the course, the instructor argued against nearly 
everything that the Air Corps had championed for almost two decades.  The text used for the 
course, Air Forces and War, argued that Italian Air Force’s experience in Ethiopia and the 
Luftwaffe’s actions in the Spanish Civil War both provided enough evidence to indicate that 
bombardment aviation, especially high-altitude bombardment, was not nearly as effective as 
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many in the Air Corps had long argued.  Worse yet for the Air Corps, the text maintained that 
smaller bombardment aircraft and pursuit aircraft had proven more useful in Spain.622  
Despite reports to the contrary, not everyone agreed that the Spanish Civil War had 
proven that bombardment aircraft were vulnerable to pursuit aircraft.  Lieutenant Roger Colton, a 
U.S. Army Officer, argued that the majority, if not all, of the commentaries had a significant 
degree of bias.  In an article published in The Coast Artillery Journal, Colton asserted that many 
people had ulterior motives when completing their assessments of airpower during the Spanish 
Civil War.  In 1939, Colton argued that “commentators appear to be using the Spanish Civil War 
to support their own preconceived theories.”623  
In the article, titled “Bombing Operations in the Zone of the Interior,” Colton focused on 
defending against land-based bombardment aircraft.624  Colton explored the history of 
bombardment operations in World War I, Ethiopia, China, and Spain.  Regarding Spain, Colton 
asserted that both the Republicans and the Nationalists had used the “tactics and techniques” 
developed during previous conflicts.  Colton suggested that others were using the conflict in 
Spain to support their own theories and ideas on airpower.  Trying to prove his point, Colton 
explained that “reports from air enthusiasts credit AA artillery with little success, while those at 
the other extreme report marvelous accomplishments of the AA guns.”  He maintained: “Some 
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even claim that the guns can, with a dozen or so shots, bring down any ship flying in daylight 
below 12,000 feet; they also credit the guns with 80% of all airplanes brought down.”625 
Colton’s criticisms of the reports concerning the use of airpower during the Spanish Civil 
War were valid.  Yet, most of the reports on the roles that airpower played during the conflict 
were far from one-sided attacks on bombardment aviation, pursuit aviation, or their vulnerability 
to anti-aircraft fire.  In fact, the majority of the reports were detailed and thorough assessments of 
the air war over Spain that included both the positives and the negatives of bombardment and 
pursuit aviation.  Therefore, his critiques point to his own bias on the matter.  Moreover, the 
conclusions that Colton reached further demonstrate that, whether he was aware of it or not, he 
had his own agenda.  His conclusion: “As in the World War, the bomber can be greatly hindered, 
but cannot be stopped until the enemy as a whole has been definitely defeated.”626  For Colton, 
bombardment aircraft were of primary importance. 
Although not everyone trusted the report coming in from the Spanish Civil War, many 
did.  Major General Malin Craig, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, read the reports and believed 
that they indicated that new weapons, including pursuit aircraft, had “restored to the defense the 
superiority it seemed to lose with the advent of the new offensive arms.”  Craig maintained that 
the effectiveness of the new weapons reaffirmed to him that “the Infantry is the core and the 
essential substance of an army. It alone of all the arms approximates a military entity. It alone 
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can win a decision.  Each of the other arms is but an auxiliary—its utility measured by the aid 
that it can bring to the infantry.”627  
General Craig’s statements were a tremendous blow to the morale of the men in the Air 
Corps who had fought to prove that airpower was far more than an auxiliary force.  The reports 
from the conflict in Spain had firmly convinced Craig that the Air Corps’ focus on bombardment 
aircraft was misguided.  In the summer of 1938, General Craig refused to authorize the Air Corps 
to buy an addition B-17 bombers.  Shortly thereafter, on August 6, 1938, General Westover 
received word that developmental expenditures for fiscal years 1939 and 1940 were to be 
“restricted to that class of aviation designed for the close support of ground troops and the 
protection of that type of aircraft.”628 
The Sino-Japanese War 
 The Spanish Civil War was not the only conflict of the period that provided data on the 
performance of pursuit and bombardment aircraft.  The Second Sino-Japanese War, which lasted 
from 1937 into 1945, provided a mountain of data for Air Corps officers to analyze.629  During 
the conflict, the Chinese Air Force (CAF) and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) fought one 
another using some of the most advanced aircraft of the period.  Both air forces also employed 
pursuit and bombardment aircraft to a great extent throughout the conflict.  The combination of 
the two proved to be of immense interest and value to the United States, Italy, the Soviet Union, 
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and Germany, each of which sent aviation advisors to China either to assist or to report on the 
conduct of the air war.630 
 The United States watched events developing in China in the early 1930s very closely.  
During that period the Nationalist Chinese, led by General Chiang Kai-Shek, and the 
Communists, led by Mao Zedong, were fighting a bitter civil war.  In 1931, the Japanese military 
took advantage of China’s internal divisions and launched an invasion of Manchuria.  Japanese 
forces quickly pushed the overwhelmed and overextended Nationalist forces back.631   
In 1932, Colonel John Jouett led a group of American aviators, who were not members of 
the U.S. Army Air Corps, to China to help build the CAF.  To assist their American friends, the 
Chinese provided the funds for Jouett and company to establish a flight-school in Hangchow, 
China, that trained aviators using a syllabus based on the model developed by the U.S. Air 
Corps.632  Disagreements between Chiang and Jouett regarding the level of American 
involvement in China soon developed.   Chiang had asked Jouett to order his men to bomb 
Chinese rebels, but Jouett explained that he could not assist because that kind of action went far 
beyond his mandate in China.  The rift that developed led many of the Americans aviators to 
leave when their contracts expired in 1934.633     
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Following Jouett’s departure, prospective CAF pilots received training from the small 
number of Americans who decided to remain at Hangchow, as well as members of the Italian Air 
Force who had established a flight-school at Loyang under the command of General Silvio 
Scaroni.  The Italian trainers passed every student who attended their courses, which degraded 
the quality of the CAF.  To make matters worse, the Italians sold the CAF outdated Fiat pursuit 
aircraft and Savoia-Marchetti bombardment aircraft that “rarely were in commission due to high 
accident rates.”634  Ultimately, the relationship between the CAF and the Italians did not last 
because of the developing alliance between Italy, Germany, and Japan.   
 The developing conflict between China and the Empire of Japan drew a great deal of 
interest from numerous foreign governments and military forces.  On April 28, 1933, Major 
Fugo of the Chilean Air Force published an article in the magazine Chile Aereo.  In the article, 
titled “El Empleo de la Fuerza Aerea en el Conflicto de Shanghai,” Fugo provided his 
assessment of the conflict then underway in China.635   He did not believe that the engagements 
between the Chinese and Japanese had been significant enough to provide anyone with concrete 
examples of “aviation in a conflict of great importance.”  He maintained that the air forces on 
both sides were too “deficient in number” to conclusively demonstrate “the real possibilities of 
aviation.”636  However, Fugo did not argue that the conflict between the Chinese and the 
Japanese was unworthy of examination.  Rather, he suggested that those interested in aviation 
operations during wartime could glean some useful lessons from the aerial engagements in the 
vicinity of Shanghai.   
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 Fugo observed that the Japanese clearly had more aircraft in operation near Shanghai.  He 
noted that the Japanese aircraft carrier Kaga had a complement of 28 bombardment aircraft and 
16 pursuit aircraft.  In addition, the Japanese had the aircraft carrier Hosho with 20 pursuit 
aircraft; the Notoro with 10 seaplanes, six reconnaissance aircraft, and four pursuit aircraft; and 
18 bombardment aircraft, 15 pursuit aircraft, and 18 observation aircraft based on land.637  
Despite the significant number of aircraft, Fugo did not believe that they “reach to exceptional 
conditions.”638 
The U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Corps were also watching the development of the air war 
between China and Japan.  In a report released three months after Fugo’s article, a U.S. Navy 
officer named S.B. Warner sent a confidential report to Captain A.W. Johnson, the U.S. Navy’s 
Director of Naval Intelligence.  In his report, Warner candidly discussed a recent visit that a 
German citizen had made to the Wright Aeronautical Corporation in Paterson, New Jersey.  
Warner explained that the German, who had flown in World War I, had a staff of approximately 
65 Japanese engineers working for him.  Although the German argued that the Japanese 
engineers were highly skilled and educated, he explained that “they were not in the least creative.  
They had absolutely no inventive genius and consequently were only good helpers.”639 
During the visit, the German spoke to Warner about various information that he had 
obtained in conversations with various Japanese officers.  The German explained that the 
Japanese officers wanted to take India from Great Britain and rule the “whole east.”  In fact, the 
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German argued that the Japanese had planned the attack Manchuria.  To support his claim, the 
German maintained that the Japanese had requested that all of their aircraft be equipped with 
wider tires in order to handle the soft ground common throughout Manchuria.640 
Warner had a particular interest in the state of Japanese naval aviation.  When discussing 
the subject, the German explained that the Japanese Air Service was far ahead of the Imperial 
Japanese Navy with regard to aviation.  The German argued that the Japanese Air Service’s 
success during the Manchurian campaign placed the Air Service in high esteem among Japanese 
military commanders.641  Most importantly of all, especially given later developments, the 
German mentioned that the Japanese with whom he worked had already determined that a 
conflict between Japan and the United States was “inevitable at some date.”  He explained that 
the presence of U.S. Navy vessels at various bases throughout the Pacific was particularly 
worrisome to them.  He then stated that the Japanese also kept a close eye on the Soviet Union 
and feared that the Soviets had amassed a large number of aircraft and personnel along the 
Manchurian border.  The fact that the Soviets had signed peace treaties with several European 
nations had all but convinced the Japanese that the Soviets would likely attack at some future 
date.642 
The situation did not improve for the Chinese between 1933 and 1936.  As a result, 
Chiang and his top commanders realized that they had to try to mend their damaged relationship 
with the United States.  Thus, in early 1936, General Mow Pang-tsu visited the U.S. to discuss 
aviation-related concerns with the Americans in the hopes of generating support for the CAF.  
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Soon after arriving in the U.S., General Mow witnessed as Chennault and his colleagues 
performed aerial acrobatics as the Flying Trapeze.  Impressed by the team’s skills, Mow asked 
Chennault if he knew of any good aviators who were willing to move to China in order to join 
the existing American-led school at Hangchow.643     Chennault stated that he would ask around, 
but he found no takers.  The following spring, General Mow asked Chennault if he would visit 
China in order to evaluate the CAF’s abilities.  Chennault agreed, retired from the U.S. Army on 
April 30, 1937, and left for China the following day with a three month contract that paid $1,000 
per month.644    
 During May and June 1937, Chennault conducted a thorough examination of the CAF in 
order to determine the service’s capabilities.  At the time, the CAF had 500 aircraft divided 
among 31 squadrons.  Much to Chennault’s dismay, approximately half of the aircraft were not 
in serviceable condition with only 91 being mission ready.645   Disturbed by the state in which he 
found the CAF, Chennault met with Soong May-ling to discuss the issues he had uncovered.  
Commonly referred to as Madame Chiang, Soong served as the head of the Chinese Aeronautical 
Commission.  More importantly, Soong was married to General Chiang Kai-Shek, who was the 
head of the Kuomintang (KMT).  The mutually respectful relationship between Soong and 
Chennault paid great dividends for Chiang as Japan began to exert greater pressure on China.646 
Shortly after Chennault completed his inspection of the CAF, the U.S. military 
discovered the exact size of the force that the Chinese airmen faced.  On July 1, 1937, Captain 
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John Weckerling, an assistant U.S. military attaché in Japan, issued the “Annual Aviation 
Intelligence Report.”  Weckerling determined that the Japanese had 1,225 aircraft divided among 
39 squadrons, only 21 of which were located in Japan.647   Interestingly, Weckerling reported 
that most of the Japanese squadrons were “equipped with few thoroughly modern planes.”  
However, he did state that “prospects of greatly improving this equipment by an ambitious 
building program during 1937-1938 were excellent.”648 
In addition to the quality and number of Japanese aircraft, Weckerling addressed the 
characteristics of the Japanese aviators he had met.  He explained that the “morale, discipline, 
and fanatic devotion to a cause of the personnel of the Japanese is an important factor to be 
considered in an evaluation of the combat strength of the [Japanese] Army Air Corps.” More 
ominously, he stated that “inferior equipment, heavy casualties and training programs are not 
likely to affect the morale of Japanese air units noticeably no matter to what degree efficiency 
may be lowered.”649 
Captain Weckerling’s report arrived less than one week before hostilities between China 
and Japan worsened.  Sporadic fighting had taken place for several years, but the exchange of 
gunfire between Chinese and Japanese forces near the Luguo (Marco Polo) bridge in Beijing on 
July 7, 1937, marked the official start of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Commonly referred to 
as the “Marco Polo Bridge Incident,” sporadic firing quickly developed into more widespread 
combat that led to the fall of the Chinese cities of Beijing and Tianjin.  The Japanese Imperial 
General Headquarters did not want to expand the conflict but General Chiang Kai-Shek and 
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others in the Kuomintang (KMT) argued that Japanese aggression had to be checked 
immediately.  Chiang quickly placed the Chinese army and air force under his direct command 
and attacked Japanese forces occupying Shanghai on August 13, 1937.650   
 Chiang’s bold attack on the Japanese prompted a swift Japanese response on August 14, 
1937, which included the use of large numbers of Mitsubishi G3M Rikko bombers assigned to 
the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN).   The IJN hoped to strike a decisive blow at Jianqiao Airfield 
in Hangzhou and Guangde Airfield in Anhui that would forever cripple the Chinese Air Force 
(CAF).  However, the CAF used American-built P-26 Peashooter aircraft and Chinese-built 
Curtis Hawk III aircraft to meet the Japanese attack.   While they also suffered significant losses, 
the CAF’s 4th Pursuit Group (4 PG) inflicted heavy damage upon the IJN units sent to annihilate 
them.  According to estimates from the time, the IJN squadrons lost approximately 50 percent of 
the aircraft they deployed against the Chinese.651  
 On 15 August 1937, the 4 PG intercepted 12 Japanese Type 89 torpedo bombers near 
Hangzhou, shooting down eight aircraft.  Later that same day, CAF aircraft from the 8th 
Squadron, 17th Squadron, 28th Squadron, and 34th Squadron intercepted 20 Japanese Rikko 
bombers, destroying four and damaging another six.  Unfortunately for the Chinese, the trend did 
not continue over the next few months.  From July 1937 to November 1937, CAF aircraft flew 
137 sorties and engaged in aerial combat with the Japanese on 57 separate occasions.  During 
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those engagements, CAF pilots shot down 94 IJN aircraft and damaged another 52 on the 
ground.652   
The destruction of the Japanese aircraft did not come easy with the CAF losing 131 
aircraft in combat.  The loss of valuable aircraft and pilots was particularly damaging for the 
CAF because the Japanese had a much deeper reserve of aircraft and aviators at their disposal.  
The Chinese pleaded with nearly anyone they could for new aircraft, including the Soviet Union, 
but the experienced aviators who met their deaths could not be replaced nearly as easily.  
The Soviet Union and the United States responded to China’s call for help by sending 
advisors to China to train the CAF.  Both nations also rushed to provide the CAF with new 
aircraft.  The KMT signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union in August 1937.  That 
same month, Chennault unofficially became General Chiang’s principal aviation advisor.  For a 
brief time, both nations worked to help the Chinese survive the Japanese onslaught.653   
As part of their efforts to assist the Chinese, the Soviets began to ship aircraft to the CAF 
in early 1938.  The Soviets also sent approximately 250 volunteer aviators to pilot the Polikarpov 
I-15 Chaika biplane aircraft they sent.654  Although support from the U.S. remained minimal 
during 1937, the Soviets began to steadily increase their support to China throughout 1938.655  
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By September 1938, the Soviets had provided approximately 360 aircraft to the CAF.   Nearly 
one full year later, on 18 July 1939, the Soviets delivered another 30 Chaika aircraft.  The 
following month the Soviets delivered 30 Polikarpov I-16 Ishak monoplane aircraft.656 
As the Soviets increased their support for the CAF, Chennault redoubled his efforts to 
recruit Americans to help him train new CAF pilots.  While small at first, Chennault’s actions 
were critically important to the CAF’s survival.  On October 26, 1939, Chennault returned to the 
United States alongside four Chinese officials in an effort to recruit pilots, acquire new aircraft, 
and educate his fellow Americans about the worsening situation in China.657 
Chennault returned to the United States the following year and repeated his pleas for 
help.  Accompanied by Madame Chiang’s brother, Dr. Tse-ven, usually cited as “T.V.” Soong, 
Chennault went to Washington, D.C., to discuss the possibility of creating a group of American 
volunteers who would fight the Japanese alongside the CAF.  On December 21, 1940, Chennault, 
Dr. Soong, and General Mow met with Henry Morgenthau, Jr., U.S. Secretary of the Treasury.  
During the meeting, those assembled discussed what the Chinese needed in order to more-
effectively fight the Japanese.658  The meeting produced significant results.  Convinced by 
Morgenthau and Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, to assist China, President Roosevelt 
dispatched his administrative assistant to China to examine the situation in person.  His assistant, 
Dr. Lauchlin Currie, went to China and reported that the country needed emergency aid from the 
United States if it were to continue to fight the Japanese.659   
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The initial plan to aid the CAF involved creating a First American Volunteer Group 
composed of one hundred pursuit aircraft and personnel, another group of one hundred 
bombardment aircraft and personnel, and a third group of pursuit aircraft and personnel. 
According to the plan, the United States would provide the aircraft and personnel while the 
Chinese Aircraft Manufacturing Company (CAMCO) would pay for the aircraft, the Americans’ 
salaries, and any other items needed to keep the aircraft running.660  The arrangement would, at 
least in theory, provide the U.S. with plausible deniability if the Japanese ever questioned 
transactions.  In reality, the arrangement provoked a great deal of concern among Japanese 
leaders.  However, the U.S. government felt that keeping China out of Japanese control was 
worth the risk.661 
The first group of American aviators consisted of 95 pilots who had either U.S. Navy, 
U.S. Army, or U.S. Marine experience.  The first group also included 184 aircraft crew chiefs, 
mechanics, parachute riggers, photographers, propeller specialists, weather specialists, clerks, 
and other necessary personnel.  The draw for many of these men stemmed from the excellent pay 
offered to them by CAMCO.  Most of the enlisted men received $300 per month working for 
CAMCO versus the $72 per month that a staff sergeant in the Air Corps made.  The same held 
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for officers who received at least $600 a month to fight for the Chinese.662  Others, including 
Chennault and Greg Boyington, joined for the chance to prove themselves and their theories in 
combat against a highly-skilled enemy.663 
Testing Ground 
The Second-Sino Japanese War was a struggle for survival for the Chinese, a battle for 
domination for the Japanese, and a laboratory for Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union, and the 
United States.664  Nations that sent military aircraft and personnel could, see how their aircraft, 
aviators, and equipment fared during wartime.  In addition, the conflict allowed those nations to 
see tactics and doctrine put into action on the battlefield, as well as above it.665 
The Japanese used the conflict to test their newest aircraft.  After some initial difficulties 
while fighting against the CAF, the Japanese introduced the Mitsubishi A5M “Claude” carrier-
based fighter aircraft, the first monoplane aircraft launched from aircraft carriers.  The A5M’s 
arrival on November 18, 1937, did not immediately turn the air battle in Japan’s favor but it did 
portend things to come.  A few years later, the Japanese began flying the Mitsubishi Navy Type 
0 Carrier Fighter in China.  Better known as the A6M “Zero,” the Type 0 quickly proved to be 
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one of the best fighter aircraft in existence.666  In September 1940, Japanese pilots flying A6M’s 
attacked and destroyed all 27 CAF I-15s and I-16s that they engaged.   
The Americans benefitted from the conflict as well.  While the aircraft that the U.S. sold 
to the Chinese were not the most-advanced pursuit aircraft that the U.S. had to offer, they 
nonetheless provided the U.S. with a strong sense of how their equipment performed versus a 
highly-capable opponent.   
Impact on the Air Corps 
The Second Sino-Japanese War provided a mountain of data that demonstrated that air 
power had become an indispensable military weapon.667  Both the Chinese and Japanese 
employed large numbers of pursuit and bombardment aircraft throughout the conflict.  The 
majority of reports on the use of aircraft during the war indicated that pursuit aircraft had proven 
very successful against attacking bombardment aircraft.  In 1937, the U.S. Naval attaché in Japan 
reported that “the modern fighting plane remains a potent weapon against the high speed 
bomber.  This has been forcibly demonstrated in the Nanking attack during which a number of 
the 96 twin-engine bombers have been shot down by the Chinese Curtis ‘Hawks.’”668  
 One year later, in 1938, ACTS instructor Captain Kerwin Moore wrote a report on the 
conflict.  Captain Moore asserted that “the modern pursuit plane remains a potent weapon 
against the modern high speed bomber and retains in full the value attributed to it in the past.”  
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Moore stated: “Losses of unsupported bombardment attacked by hostile pursuit in the operations 
in China were very high, approximately three or four bombers lost to one pursuit plane.”669  
 A 1938 report from the U.S. military attaché in China confirmed many of Malone’s 
conclusions.  In his report to the U.S. War Department, the attaché explained that the Japanese 
initially flew bombers without pursuit protection because they did not believe that protection was 
needed.  However, the attaché reported that significant losses early in the conflict led the 
Japanese to equip pursuit aircraft with auxiliary fuel tanks and send them as escorts for 
bombardment aircraft.670  
 The reports received from the Sino-Japanese War clearly indicated that bombardment 
aircraft remained vulnerable to attack from pursuit aircraft.  However, what is also clear is that 
the information regarding the vulnerabilities of bombardment aircraft either did not reach or did 
not substantially dissuade bombardment advocates in the ACTS and the Air Corps.  Captain 
Moore’s report was able to all ACTS students and leaders but, given the events that followed, it 
is unlikely that it received much attention at the time. 
Conclusion 
The Spanish Civil War and the Second Sino-Japanese War increased American airmen’s 
dissatisfaction with their position in the U.S. military.  They looked at the events abroad and 
worried that the Air Corps might fall behind the more experienced air forces of Japan and 
Germany, which had proven their success in battle.  They argued that both conflicts showed that 
air power had developed into an essential weapon of war, but few in the War Department seemed 
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to understand or care.  However, the men of the Air Corps did care because they had read the 
detailed reports produced by the U.S. military attachés from Spain.  They also read the many 
reports coming in from U.S. military attachés in China and Japan.  The combination of the two 
exacerbated the long-simmering sense of alienation that most airmen had, which only increased 
their desire for independence from the U.S. Army.  For airmen, the U.S. Army, the War 
Department, and Congress still didn’t get it—things had to change! 
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Conclusion - The Culmination of a Dream 
The Push for Air Power  
By the late 1930s, President Franklin Roosevelt and his administration realized that the United 
States would likely become embroiled in the conflicts that were developing abroad.671  Air Corps 
leaders, especially General Arnold, had also been paying close attention to events unfolding 
overseas.  They understood that war would require the Air Corps to expand rapidly in terms of 
men, equipment, and aircraft.  As a result, they began to prepare for the likelihood that the Air 
Corps would soon be involved in a major war against the experienced air forces of Japan and 
Germany.  General Arnold began to press hard to get the Air Corps in a position to handle the 
oncoming war.  Fortunately for Air Corps, President Roosevelt had been well-briefed on the 
strength of Germany’s Luftwaffe by Hugh R. Wilson, the U.S. ambassador in Berlin.672   
On November 14, 1938, Roosevelt met with his principal military advisors to discuss the 
need to expand the Air Corps.  Roosevelt, who believed that a large air force would impress 
Hitler more than a large army, told General Marshall and General Arnold that they should ask 
Congress for at least 20,000 aircraft and a production capacity of 24,000 per year.673  Roosevelt’s 
support and enthusiasm shocked Arnold, who had spent a great deal of his military career 
arguing for an independent service with military and civilian leaders who had been reluctant to 
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increase the size and budget of the Air Corps.  Arnold argued that Roosevelt’s support was the 
Air Corps’ Magna Carta.674 
Several months after he discussed the expansion of the Air Corps with his advisors, 
President Roosevelt addressed Congress regarding the matter.  During this speech on January 12, 
1939, Roosevelt urged Congress to immediately act to strengthen the Air Corps.  Shortly 
afterwards, Congress passed a budget authorization of $300 million for the Air Corps.  The 
immense sum allowed the Air Corps to greatly expand its existing aircraft fleet by 3,251 aircraft 
over a two-year period.675  More importantly, it provided an unprecedented level of official 
support for the Air Corps.  However, the need of countries friendly to the United States to 
purchase American aircraft threatened to interfere with the Air Corps’ own expansion and surely 
to slow it down.  Thus, even so remarkable an endorsement of air power as President Roosevelt 
had shown was offset, to some degree, by the U.S. government’s concern to back friendly 
countries, allowing some airmen to feel aggrieved even as they were being supported.  
The invasion and defeat of Poland in the fall of 1939 led Congress to pass a “cash and 
carry law” in 1939.  The law allowed nations to purchase U.S. military goods and transport them 
home aboard their own ships, thereby removing U.S. vessels from the dangers associated with 
travel across the Atlantic Ocean during wartime.  Great Britain and France took advantage of the 
new law immediately by ordering approximately 2,500 aircraft from American aircraft 
manufacturing companies.  That total number of aircraft sold to foreign nations since the start of 
the program was over 8,200 as of late March 1940.676   
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General Arnold worried that the foreign orders would harm the Air Corps by decreasing 
the number of aircraft that American aircraft companies could provide to the service since no 
new factories had been opened to meet the increased demand.  Once again, President Roosevelt 
came to the rescue of the Air Corps.  During his speech to Congress, Roosevelt asked for $1 
billion for the Air Corps and U.S. Navy aviation.  He maintained that the United States needed to 
increase its aircraft production immediately in order to protect the nation and provide aircraft to 
allied nations fighting World War II.677 
Others soon joined Roosevelt in arguing for more air power.  Henry L. Stimson, the U.S. 
Secretary of War, stated: “Air power has decided the fate of nations; Germany, with her 
powerful air armadas, has vanquished one people after another.  On the ground, large armies had 
been mobilized to resist her, but each time it was additional power in the air that decided the fate 
of each individual nation.”678   
American ace Edward “Eddie” Rickenbacker, who rose to fame after having achieved 28 
aerial victories in World War I, soon offered his assessment of the situation.  He argued that 
American military aviation was a least a decade behind that of Germany.679  Like other American 
airmen, Rickenbacker was not placated by the large appropriation that the Air Corps had recently 
received—he wanted concrete action.  Rickenbacker stressed his stance on aviation in a report to 
Secretary Stimson.  Rickenbacker stated: “The enterprise which begins on land or sea without air 
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superiority is foredoomed to failure. The enterprise which starts with air control is already on the 
high road or the sky road to success.”680 
Rickenbacker’s concerns were shared by aviator and inventor Alexander de Seversky, 
who thought that American air forces should not only be independent but pre-eminent in war-
fighting, at the expense of ground and sea forces.  De Seversky, who had flown with the Imperial 
Russian Navy prior to the Russian revolution, argued that the United States had to increase the 
size of its air forces without delay.  Four months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 
Hawaii, de Seversky published the book Victory Through Air Power.  In his book, which reached 
the top spot on the New York Times bestseller list in August 1941, de Seversky asserted that the 
United States needed an independent air force that was equipped with long-range bombardment 
aircraft.   He maintained that such a force should not focus on supporting the ground forces.  
Instead, he argued in favor of a strategic air force that would attack targets deep within enemy 
territory.681  De Seversky’s book, released in the wake of a devastating air attack on the United 
States, was quickly adapted into an animated film by Walt Disney Productions in 1943.682   
The combination of de Seversky’s book and the Disney film brought the essential 
elements of the arguments that American airmen had made for years to the American public in a 
way that General Mitchell, General Arnold, and the rest of the men in the Air Corps could not 
have done.  Therefore, although he was no longer in a military uniform, de Seversky was as 
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strong a proponent of air power as Mitchell, Arnold, and the rest.  Like them, de Seversky was 
never quite satisfied. 
While de Seversky promoted strategic air power to the public, American airmen began to 
plan for the post-war world.  Between 1943 and 1945, airmen assigned to the Post War Division 
of the Air Staff and the Special Project Office focused on how the Army Air Forces could 
achieve their long-coveted goal of an independent air force.  They determined that the Army Air 
Forces would have to be a strategic air force similar to the one then fighting World War II.683  
Although they wanted all aviation under their control, airmen believed that focusing on the 
perceived success of strategic bombing was necessary for them to gain independence.684  Major 
General Orvil Anderson, a member of the Strategic Bombing Survey, summed up the Army Air 
Forces’ logic quite succinctly.  He stated: “Since airpower is the only force capable of being 
launched directly against the enemy economy, it has become the primary weapon and must 
dictate the overall strategy of another war.”685 
Independence 
The leadership that Arnold provided during the war as the Chief of the Army Air Forces 
and acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, combined with years of effort from many different 
airmen, helped convince the War Department that an independent air force was not only feasible 
                                                 
683 Herman S. Wolk, Planning and Organizing the Postwar Air Force, 1943-1947 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air 
Force History, 1984), pp. 47-48.   
 
684 Perry McCoy Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 
1970), pp. 27-30. 
 
685 Gian P. Gentile, How Effective is Strategic Bombing: Lessons Learned From World War II to Kosovo (New 
York, New York: NYU Press 2000), p. 112. 
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but that, it was necessary.686  Thus, the efforts of American airmen to achieve independence from 
the United States Army reached fruition with the creation of the United States Air Force on 
September 18, 1947.  That event represented the culmination of an idea—some might say a 
dream—that began almost immediately after the creation of the Aeronautical Division, U.S. 
Army Signal Corps on August 1, 1907.  It began when airmen realized that the majority of their 
military and civilian leaders viewed aviation as a novelty of little military value.  As a result, 
they developed a culture that stressed the unique nature of aviators and aviation.  They came to 
believe that people who did not fly simply could not understand how to properly develop and air 
force and employ air power. 
American airmen had remained persistent in their quest for greater control over their 
service until they achieved it.  Their actions from 1907 to 1947 support the fact that they saw 
themselves as underappreciated by their superiors in the U.S. Army, who frequently stressed that 
air power existed to support the infantry—the “Queen of Battle.”  Their actions also 
demonstrated that they did not believe that the War Department, Congress, or the American 
people, truly understood what air power had to offer.  Airmen continuously lobbied Congress for 
more money and manpower.  They also conducted aerial demonstrations in order to increase 
enthusiasm for air power among the American public.  At every opportunity that they had, 
airmen worked to prove that aviation was more than just a passing fad.   
Billy Mitchell’s forceful efforts to achieve a greater level of independence for the Air 
Service following World War I was the best known example of airmen’s desire to separate from 
the U.S. Army.  Yet, Mitchell was only the most vocal member of an ever-expanding group of 
                                                 
686 After a great deal of discussion, General Arnold and General Marshall agreed that U.S. Army Air Forces would 
postpone their effort to achieve an independent service until World War II was over.  Nalty, Winged Sword, Winged 
Shield, pp. 179-180. 
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airmen who believed that only they were qualified to handle air power.  Airmen such as 
Benjamin Foulois, Hap Arnold, Kenneth Walker, and Claire Chennault firmly believed that air 
power was a military weapon of tremendous potential that should be controlled by airmen.  
The history of American airpower from 1907 forward demonstrates that airmen were 
never satisfied with being controlled by non-aviators.  Airmen were a difficult lot for the military 
and civilian supervisors to understand.  They argued for a separate service when their superiors 
in the U.S. Army said no to their requests for more money and personnel.  They wanted a 
separate service when their superiors said yes because they believed that they had not received 
enough—enough control over their service, enough airplanes, enough men, or enough money.  
Simply put, they were not happy as long as they were part of the U.S. Army.  But because of 
frustrations and anxieties accumulated in the decades-long quest for independence, they were not 
entirely happy even when they achieved it. 
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